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ABSTRACT 
 
Why did South Korea integrate multiple health insurers into a single national 
health insurance in 2003 while Japan maintained its fragmented insurance system 
based on labour market status? Why did labour in South Korea support the integra-
tion of health insurance schemes whilst labour in Japan was opposed to it? The 
health insurance systems in Japan and South Korea were both based on the social 
insurance system and fragmented on the basis of occupation and labour market status. 
However, these two countries have taken different reform paths.  
This thesis argues that the two self-undermining effects and ideas were in-
terwined and these led to different policy coalitions. Firstly, workers’ support for the 
consolidation reform was dependent on the inclusivity of the decision-making pro-
cess at company-level health insurance schemes. Labour in Korea was not able to 
take part in the decision-making process in company-based health insurance societies 
while Japanese workers were. The absence of self-governance in the Korean health 
insurance system reduced incentives for the labour unions to protect their health 
schemes. Secondly, the Korean government conferred small credibility to support for 
the municipal health insurance. The subsidy for municipal health schemes in Korea 
was provided at the discretion of the central government and local government had 
no legal responsibility for its municipal health funds. These regulations were in stark 
contrast to the Japanese regulations. It made the friction with the idea of universal 
health care in Korea. Thirdly, the socially oriented unionism and dense network be-
tween trade unions and reformers in Korea contributed to the integration of the 
health insurance system through creating intensive policy learning for solidarity in-
side labour movements. In contrast, the cooperative labour-management relationship 
and their strong networks in the Japanese healthcare policy arena led to the coalition 
to protect their occupational health funds.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research question 
 
This thesis examines why South Korea integrated multiple health insurers into a 
single insurance scheme in 2003 while Japan maintained its fragmented insurance 
system based on labour market status. In relation to this question, the thesis also in-
vestigates why labour in South Korea supported the integration of health insurance 
whilst labour in Japan was opposed to it. 
The healthcare in South Korea and Japan were based on a social insurance sys-
tem. Their finance largely relied on contributions and health insurance schemes were 
divided by various occupations. In both countries, the health system has been threat-
ened by uncontrolled upward trend in health spending. The pace of the increase in 
the health care expenditures was higher than that of GDP and it has induced serious 
financing problems in the health insurance schemes. From 1990 to 2001, health 
spending in South Korea grew at 7.5 percent, compared with a GDP expansion rate 
of 5.2 percent. The health care expenditures in Japan had grown at around 3.8 per-
cent over the same period whilst GDP grew at 2.3 percent (OECD, 2003, 60). There 
was an increasing concern on how to control health expenditures in these two coun-
tries. In addition, weak gate-keeping function and fee-for-service payment system in 
both countries resulted in frequent visits and longer stay in hospital significantly in-
creased their health care cost. The cost explosion in health expenditure led to the fi-
nancial problem in municipal health insurance societies, the most vulnerable health 
programme among various occupational schemes in these two countries (OECD, 
2008, 25). 
The municipal health insurance societies for the self-employed and the retired 
in both countries were substantially vulnerable to these structural problems. Most of 
these schemes experienced financial distress due to increased health expenditures as 
well as reduced ability to finance its health insurance benefits. The municipal health 
societies were supposed to cover those who were old and poor. The elderly com-
prised 40 percent of the Japanese municipal health funds’ members while they com-
prised only 4 percent of large firm-based health funds (MHLW, 2006). In South Ko-
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rea, the elderly comprised 15 percent of the municipal health plans’ members in rural 
areas while they comprised only 9 percent of company-based health plans’ members 
in 1997 (Jo, 1998, 279). In addition, the small size of membership made municipal 
health insurances more inefficient and vulnerable to external shock (Jo, 1998, 268; 
Nakagawa, 2009, 92).  
In this regard, the municipal health insurance schemes had a hard time in tack-
ling their accrued deficits. In Japan, municipal health insurance schemes recorded 
deficit of 450 billion yen in 1999 and around 60 percent of municipal health plans 
went into red. In Korea, around half of municipal health insurance schemes recorded 
deficits in 1989 (Jo, 1998, 268). Due to the structural weakness, the disparities of 
health societies among different occupational groups and the financial crisis of 
health societies for self-employed had been exacerbated. 
The voice for the integration of all health insurance schemes was raised in both 
countries. In Japan, the local governments and municipal health insurance societies 
became the strong advocates for the full-scale integration of health insurance 
schemes. In Korea, the insured in municipal health insurance societies became so. 
The two countries, however, took different reform paths in response to the fiscal cri-
sis of municipal health insurance societies. In South Korea, a full-scale integration of 
different health insurance programmes was chosen. Multiple social insurers were 
merged into a single National Health Insurance Corporation in 2000. By contrast, 
Japan maintained its multi-payer system. Interestingly, trade unions in two countries 
took quite different stances on the reform in the policy processes. Korean counterpart 
supported the integration reform while Japanese trade unions supported the frag-
mented health insurance system. 
In terms of risk pooling system, Korea adopted more solidaristic health insur-
ance programme than Japan although Japan still had more generous health care bene-
fits programme. Theoretically, there are four types of the public insurance system 
based on the degrees of solidarity: ‘no risk pooling’, ‘pure fragmented risk pooling’, 
‘partially integrated risk pooling’, and ‘unitary risk pooling’ (Smith and Witter, 
2004). The lowest level is ‘no risk pooling’, where individuals are responsible for 
meeting their own health care costs. Under the ‘pure fragmented risk pools’, there 
are various segments of the insurance schemes based on occupations. Risks are shar-
ing only within a same risk pool and there is no transfer among different insurance 
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bodies. In this case, pools with a high proportion of the sicker and older may incur 
high health care spending, which can give rise to fiscal difficulty in those pools. To 
solve this problem, ‘partially integrated risk pooling system’ develops the financial 
transfer or risk adjustment among different health insurance funds. Under the ‘uni-
tary risk pooling’ or ‘single-payer system’1, which Korea adopted, all citizens be-
come members of a risk pool and revenues are managed within a single pool. In this 
regard, the unitary risk pooling system holds the strongest form of social solidarity. 
South Korea integrated fragmented health insurers in 2003 while Japan main-
tained its fragmented insurance system based on occupations. In relation to it, the 
labour in South Korea supported the integration of health insurance whilst labour in 
Japan was opposed to such trial. The diverse paths of health insurance reforms leave 
us with unresolved puzzles, which lie at the heart of the thesis. Firstly, how was 
South Korea successful in the integration of health insurance schemes while Japan 
kept an occupation-based health insurance system, even though Korean labour un-
ions were less organised than Japanese labour unions and left-wing parties had no 
seat in the National Assembly (Lee, 2011, 152). Only 11.5 percent of Korean work-
ers were unionised as compared to 20.9 percent in Japan in 2001 (OECD, 2008, 21). 
In Korea, it was not until the 2004 general election that a left-wing party associated 
with the labour movement was voted into the National Assembly (Lee, 2006). This 
contrasts with the conventional explanation that strong unions and left-wing parties 
bring solidaristic welfare states (Korpi, 1983; Stephens and Huber, 2001). It allows 
an investigation of the relation between institutions and interests.  
The second puzzle is how South Korea achieved the solidaristic reform while 
Japan kept an occupation-based health insurance system, even though Korea had an 
obviously smaller welfare state compared to Japan (OECD, 2001). Historically, Ja-
pan provided much more generous health care for their citizens compared to Korea 
through governmental subsidy and financial transfer mechanisms from employment-
based to residence-based health funds (Ikegami, 2005). Later, however, Korea 
adopted more solidaristic health insurance reform in terms of risk pooling. It con-
trasts with the traditional explanation that welfare policy is highly influenced by pre-
                                                          
1 A single payer system also refers to the system that single body provides healthcare service or 
run its health insurance service (Hussey and Anderson, 2003, 215). 
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vious policy choices (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Pierson, 1994). This allows re-
consideration of the “path dependency approach” to healthcare politics.  
 
1.2 Critique of the relevant literature 
 
This study reviews the literature related to these two puzzles. Although there is 
large literature that attempts to account for the puzzles, existing studies do not ade-
quately explain them. The first theoretical concept to be examined is power re-
sources theory (Korpi, 1983; Stephens and Huber, 2001). It fails to explain the ironic 
phenomenon that South Korea was successful in the introduction of solidaristic 
health policy in spite of lower union density than in Japan. It wrongly assumes that 
labour as a homogenous and disadvantaged class is willing to support comprehensive 
and solidaristic social policy. In reality, however, Rengō (Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation), the largest national trade union centre in Japan, strongly opposed the 
integration of health insurance programmes. Worker’s support for the development 
of an egalitarian welfare state cannot be taken for granted (Nijhuis, 2009). Labour 
market insiders sometimes form a coalition with business to protect their vested in-
terests in the Bismarckian welfare system (Giaimo, 2002).  
The professional dominance theory claims that medical providers significantly 
control health care policies (Alford, 1975; Freidson, 1970). Health politics has one 
distinctive feature that medical professions, who have a monopoly of supply in med-
ical service, have a de facto veto power. The medical providers in Japan and Korea 
are highly organised on the basis of occupational interests. However, physicians in 
the two countries were not much dedicating their resources to the reform on the 
health insurance governance since it had little effect on physicians’ interests (Kwon 
and Reich, 2005, 1016).  
There are some studies that stress socio-economic problems such as inequality 
and economic crisis. Some scholars claim inequality of health care in South Korea 
led to the integration of health insurance (Jo, 2008; Lin, 2002). However, they can-
not explain how privileged workers in South Korea adopted more solidaristic stance. 
The inequality of the health system meant that labour market insiders had more gen-
erous benefits from health insurance than others. Labour in Korea may have held 
stronger incentives to keep a fragmented system due to their privileged position. The 
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studies that emphasise the shock from the “Asian Financial Crisis” in 1997 also face 
a similar problem (Kwon, 2011). It is claimed that the serious economic crisis 
prompted negotiations between business and labour and thus it relieved the pressure 
from those who were against the reform. Yet they fail to explain why the attitudes of 
labour towards health insurance were different in Japan and South Korea, as Japan 
had its own financial crisis after the Asian Financial Crisis (Watanabe, 2015a).  
  
1.3 Methodology and data 
 
This study uses qualitative methods to analyse the policy process of health care 
reform in a comprehensive and detailed manner. Although a quantitative study in 
welfare policy is suitable to investigate the general relation between two variables, it 
is not suitable to show political contexts and complexity of health care reforms in 
Japan and Korea. Instead, qualitative methods enable researchers to identify nuances 
and complexity in the political processes of health insurance reform in the two coun-
tries by avoiding over-simplification (Barakso et al, 2014, 192). Digging deeply into 
individual cases allows this study to explore how several related variables interacted 
with one another to impact reform outcomes. In this regard, this study adopts the 
“small-N” study and qualitative methods in order to show how actors’ ideas and in-
terests in the two countries have shaped the political dynamics in their socio-political 
contexts.  
This study compares Japan and Korea to explore the socio-political factors that 
determined the divergent reform paths. The choice of these two countries, Japan and 
South Korea, is justified by the “most similar systems design” (Przeworski and Teu-
ne, 1970). Scholars select cases that share a lot of important features and only signif-
icantly differ in one of a few crucial respects related to the research topic. This re-
search design can reduce the number of potential explanatory variables for the out-
come. The common characteristics act as controlled variables similar to scientific 
experiments. This makes it easier to find whether the crucial difference between the 
countries is related to different outcomes.  
There are several similarities between these two countries. First, Japan and Ko-
rea shared several key components of the health insurance system since Korea emu-
lated the Japanese health insurance system in many respects (McGuire, 2010, 224). It 
6 
 
is suggested that different institutional arrangements of the health care system create 
different political aspects of health care reform (Giaimo and Manow, 1999). Both 
countries adopted the social insurance system, in which health insurance benefit was 
provided based on occupation and financing was based on social contributions paid 
by employees and employers (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 575). In addition, gov-
ernments in both countries were strongly involved in healthcare policy. Secondly, 
the structures of trade unions were similar (Gray, 2007; Kume, 1998; Mo, 1996; Su-
zuki, 2007). It is suggested the different organisational and bargaining structures of 
trade unions shape their orientation (Anderson and Meyer, 2003; Nijhuis, 2009). 
More encompassing union structures and centralised bargaining structures are likely 
to lead to higher level of solidarity within working class as seen in Western Europe-
an countries. Yet Japanese and Korean trade unions are organised by enterprise un-
ions, largely based on big business. There are relatively weak neo-corporatist ar-
rangements including firm-level wage bargaining in the two countries (Schmitter, 
1974). Third, the political aspects of “weak left” have similarity in both countries. 
Left wing parties were not as important as business groups and a conservative party 
(Lee, 2011). Conservative parties, the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and the 
Grand National Party in Korea, had ruled in both countries most of the time.  
Those who criticise the comparison may claim labour in one countries on wel-
fare expansion path is more likely to embrace solidarity than other countries on re-
trenchment path since governments provide generous financial aids enough to coor-
dinate social actors’ conflicts of interest during welfare expansion period. In the 
1990s and early 2000s, Korean welfare state was on expansion path while Japanese 
one was on retrenchment path. While timing can be sometimes important in shaping 
social policy, however, this is not a relevant factor to explain the case of health in-
surance reform in Korea and Japan. In the early 1990s, Korean trade unions were not 
supportive of the integration reform and they became supportive of it only in the 
mid-1990s. In addition, the expansion of the Korean welfare state was fairly slow 
and the government did not provide financial supports enough to reconcile social ac-
tors’ conflicts of interest.  
This study adopts “process tracing method” because it more focuses on the 
identification of causal processes that have led to the divergent reform outcomes in 
the two countries (Elman, 2005; George and Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2000b). Pro-
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cess tracing refers to “a procedure for identifying steps in a causal process leading 
to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular his-
torical context” (George and Bennett, 2005, 176). In process tracing method, re-
searchers investigate the chain of events or decision-making process by which initial 
conditions are translated into final outcomes in a specific case. Process tracing al-
lows researchers who use a case study to go beyond strong telling since it provides 
an explanation of a casual path and sequence of events (Vennesson, 2008, 235). The 
process tracing method is different from a pure narrative in three points (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, 237–241; Vennesson, 2008, 235). Firstly, process tracing focuses on the se-
quencing of events. Secondly, process tracing is structured. It means that an investi-
gator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework iden-
tified in the research design. Thirdly, the ultimate goal of process tracing is to ex-
plain a causal path of a specific outcome. The process of health insurance reform can 
be conceptualised as a multi-level process where policy actors, policy ideas, and in-
stitutions interact. This study seeks to show when and under what conditions interac-
tions of these three factors can account for the reform outcome. This study will cap-
ture the phase and process through which these factors affects the mobilisation of 
reformers, coalition formation, and policy adoption.  
This study also uses two ways of data collection and analysis: document and in-
terviews. Firstly, this study uses document analysis. This study relies on the data 
from policy documents issued by the governments, governmental committees, labour 
unions, and employer associations. It also uses media reports and secondary litera-
ture related to the politics of health care reforms in Korea and Japan. Policy reports 
from governmental sectors, labour unions, and business associations are helpful to 
identify actors’ interests on a certain policy. It also contributes to identify policy ide-
as major actors used to justify their claims. Media reports are used to explain the 
contents of policy debates on health care reforms and broad contexts of political pro-
cesses in these countries. It is generally acknowledged that media reports could be 
politically biased (Carey, 2002, 80). To reduce this problem, newspapers represent-
ing political conservative and progressive in both countries are used at the same time. 
In addition, news media sources sometimes contain inaccurate information. To solve 
this problem, this study seeks to check other materials such as academic journals and 
official reports at the same time.  
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The Korean case includes several policy reports from think tanks and related 
policy committees. The Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), a 
governmental think tank of the Ministry of Welfare and Society, released several 
important policy reports on health care. The Federation of Korean Medical Insurance 
Societies also issued the publications to advocate a fragmented health insurance sys-
tem. NGOs such as “Solidarity for the Integration of the NHI” issued several policy 
reports and statements to support the integration of all health funds.  
Among media reports, this study mainly selects the newspapers which have dif-
ferent political orientation to avoid the political bias. In South Korea, “Han’gyŏre”, 
representing the progressive was supportive of the integration reform while 
“Tongailbo” representing conservative, was opposed to it. In the Korean case, news-
papers were very important because labour and business rarely released their official 
policy reports. Several keywords were used to search these newspapers from 1987 to 
2003. “Naver News Library” Database programme was used to search Korean news-
paper articles. The term “ŭilyopohŏm” (health insurance), for instance, was founded 
in 2,897 articles in Han’gyŏre and 2,827 articles in Tongailbo. The term “ŭilyokae-
hyŏk” (healthcare reform) was founded in 266 articles in Han’gyŏre and 204 articles 
in Tongailbo. The term “ŭipot'onghap” (integration of health insurance) was founded 
in 266 articles in Han’gyŏre and 204 articles in Tongailbo. In the initial step of anal-
ysis, relevant articles were selected and listed. In the next step, they were divided 
them into three groups - background information, actors’ preferences, and policy 
process. The articles in the first category provide background information on health 
care system and expenditure in Korea. The articles in the second group help to reveal 
actors’ preferences on a certain policy. The articles in the third group help to analyse 
the decision-making process of the Korean health care policy. It contains the policy-
making process in Blue House, the National Assembly, and major political parties.  
In Japan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (the Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare after 2001) and the Ministry of Finance put forward several proposals 
on health care reforms. In addition, the minutes of health care policy committees of 
the MHLW were used to analyse the political conflicts and debates on health care 
policy. Among media documents, this study mainly selects the two newspapers, 
Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun, for the same reason as Korea. Asahi Shimbun 
is the most famous liberal newspaper and Yomiuri Shimbun is its conservative coun-
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terpart. The “Kikuzo Ⅱ Visual” Database programme was used for Asahi Shimbun, 
“Yomidas Rekishikan” for Yomiuri Shimbun, and “Nexis” for the Daily Yomiuri 
through Hitotsubashi University Library in Japan. The Daily Yomiuri is English ver-
sion of Yomiuri Shimbun and it is used as well. Several keywords were used to 
search these newspapers from 1997 to 2012. The term “Iryōhoken” (health insurance) 
was founded in 5,700 articles of Asahi Shimbun and 363 articles of Yomiuri Shimbun. 
The term “Iryōkaikaku” (healthcare reform) was founded in 560 articles of Asahi 
Shimbun and 40 articles of Yomiuri Shimbun.  
Interest groups in Japan were more willing to publish their claims on health care 
reforms through policy reports than Korean organisations. Rengō and Nikkeiren (lat-
er Nihon Keidanren, Japan Business Federation) issued several policy reports on 
health care reforms and it has been analysed to understand the policy demand and 
position of labour unions and employers. Among interest groups, the JMA issued 
several important policy reports on health care reforms to represent physicians’ posi-
tion on health care reforms. Kenporen (National Federation of Health Insurance So-
cieties) issued several policy reports, periodical publications, and statements on 
health care reforms to champion company-based health insurance schemes. “All-
Japan Federation of National Health Insurance Organisations”, “Japan Association of 
City Mayors”, and “National Association of Towns and Villages” issued policy re-
ports, periodical publications, and statements for the municipal health insurance 
schemes. 
Secondly, this study used 13 elite interviews in Japan and Korea to supplement 
document data. Interviews were conducted face-to-face for around one hour by ask-
ing several questions related to the health care reforms. This study used “semi-
structured” interviews. This approach basically offers pre-planned and standardised 
questions, or close-ended survey-style questions to be compared with other interview 
respondents. However, if an interesting topic comes up, the interviewer goes off the 
prepared script and asks additional questions on the new topic. Such an approach at-
tempts to gain a degree of comparability between different interviewees while the 
researcher could obtain unexpected important information at the same time (Barakso 
et al, 2014, 194-5). Interviewees include labour unions, employer associations, 
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health insurance scheme staff, local governments, medical providers, NGOs, and 
scholars in academia.2  
In the Japanese case, interviewees included an Assistant Director of the Wel-
fare Policy Division in Rengō, a head of the Planning Department in Kenporen, the 
Economic Policy Bureau in Keidanren, three local government officers related to 
municipal health insurance including a health of Health Centre, a scholar in health 
care policy, a medical provider, and a director of a company health insurance society. 
In this process, a professor at Hitotsubashi University helped to arrange the first in-
terview and interviewees were willing to introduce other interviewees. In the Korean 
case, interviewees include a former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU, a Senior Direc-
tor of Policy Division in KCTU, an activist in the Solidarity for the Integration of the 
National Health Insurance, and a Senior Director in Korea Health and Medical 
Workers’ Union. In this process, a Senior Director of Policy Division in the Korean 
Financial Industry Union helped to arrange the first interview and interviewees were 
willing to introduce other interviewees. 
The main goal of interviews is to illuminate the major actors’ interests and ideas 
on health insurance reforms. Political actors’ ideas, perceived interests on health in-
surance policy, and the relationship between other political actors were demonstrated 
by these interviews. Interviews contain important data in this thesis because political 
actors’ ideas and political processes are sometimes not fully discovered in docu-
ments. There are nine interviews conducted in Japan and four conducted in Korea. 
This imbalance between the numbers of interviews in two countries is justified by a 
number of secondary interviews in the Korean reform case conducted by previous 
academic studies and mass media (Park and Heo, 2001; Sin, 2004; Wong, 2001). 
The dialogues with interviewees were not recorded and instead summarised through 
note-taking. This was because interviewees preferred it by mentioning that recording 
might make themselves nervous. Instead, some of them provided the interviewer 
with the summary of their responses to pre-planned questionnaire. The data has been 
strictly used only for this study. 
The written informed consent document and participant information sheet were 
provided to all participants. These forms acknowledge that participants' rights will be 
protected during data collection. The “participant information form” includes the fol-
                                                          
2 They are listed in the end of the thesis, “Appendix1: List of interviewees”. 
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lowing: identification of the researcher, identification of the researcher’s institution, 
indication of how the participants were selected, identification of the purpose of the 
research, guarantee of confidentiality to the participant, identification of the level 
and type of participant involvement, provision of names of persons to contact if 
questions arise. And the “consent form” includes the following: identification of that 
participation is voluntary, guarantee of confidentiality to the participant, assurance 
that the participant can withdraw at any time, right to decline to answer a particular 
question, notification that data collected from participants can be used for not only 
PhD research but also other forms of the future research related to this PhD project 
such as journal articles. One interviewee in Japan, an Exuceutive of a company 
health insurance society, requested anonymity on the participants’ name and affilia-
tion. Based on the request, the subject and affiliation remain anonymous. This study 
acquired the ethical approval from the University of Sheffield on 1 December 2014.  
 
1.4 The aim of this research 
 
This study has three purposes. Firstly, this article aims to find the condition of 
political and social solidarity within welfare states. Solidarity3 is defined as “a gen-
eral readiness to help those who are in need” (Ullrich, 2002, 124). The welfare state 
is based on a concept of solidarity that bridges social demarcation between various 
groups and classes. As Van der Veen mentioned, “solidarity binds the fates of the 
lower and the middle classes, the poor and the rich, the young and the old and the 
sick and the healthy together in welfare programmes” (Van Der Veen, 2012, 14).   
Healthcare policy is a good subject to explain the attitudes of major social ac-
tors towards solidarity since public health insurance directly links to solidarity in two 
points. The underlying principle of public health insurance is the willingness to share 
health risks and the costs of healthcare. In addition, social health insurance calls for 
income solidarity by imposing contributions based on subscribers’ incomes, not on 
their potential risk levels. For these reasons, resources move from the healthy and 
rich to the sick and poor via pooling. These features pose the question of who up-
holds solidarity with whom. Some actors attempt to exclude a relatively high risk or 
low income group from their insurance schemes whilst others are willing to partici-
                                                          
3 The concept in health care arena is detailed in Chapter 3.  
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pate in such redistributive schemes. This study will investigate the political and so-
cial condition to foster the feeling of solidarity.  
Secondly, the purpose of this study is to account for the divergence in health in-
surance policy trajectories between Japan and South Korea. The health insurance re-
form cannot be treated as a purely economic problem. It should be driven by political 
as much as by economic and social considerations. The actors including political 
parties, physicians, trade unions, farmers, scholars, and public servants have a lot of 
interactions within institutional contexts. Such political interactions and battles make 
healthcare policy an arena of conflict (Carpenter, 2012; Freidson, 1970; Hacker, 
2004; Immergut, 1992; Starr, 1982). This thesis shows the political dynamics of 
health care reform through the comparative study of health insurance reforms in Ko-
rea and Japan in the 1990s and 2000s, focusing on trade unions’ roles. The 
healthcare systems in two countries were both based on a social insurance system 
(Hwang, 2008; Shimazaki, 2011). In both countries, health insurance programmes 
were fragmented by occupation, labour market status, and region. However, South 
Korea chose to integrate all health insurance schemes into one in the early 2000s 
while Japan stayed in the occupational-based system.  
Lastly, this article aims to develop the understanding of policy change by sug-
gesting that the ways in which interaction between institutions and ideas bring into 
institutional shifts. New institutionalism tends to emphasise institutional constraints 
and it is useful for explaining policy inertia and stability. However, it has difficulty 
in explaining institutional change. Some scholars seek to explain policy change by 
ideational change and (re)interpretation of institutional arrangements (Béland 2005, 
2009). This study aims to illuminate the political dynamics of policy change by in-
teraction between ideas and institutions.  
 
1.5 Significance of the research and its contributions  
 
This thesis contributes to several important debates in comparative political 
economy literatures. The first contribution is to the literatures on institutional change. 
Historical institutionalism shows how a historically constructed set of institutional 
arrangements shape the behaviour of political actors such as interest groups (Hacker, 
2004; Pierson, 1994; Skocpol, 1992). However, institutional approaches have diffi-
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culty in explaining institutional changes. Most of the accounts on institutional 
changes are largely dependent on exogenous factors such as war and crisis as punc-
tuated equilibriums (Krasner, 1984). Against this background, this thesis shows the 
ways in which self-undermining effects embedded in institutional arrangements and 
ideational change of major political actors shape institutional changes. Institutional 
arrangements often contain the self-undermining effects which gradually weaken a 
base of institutional setting over time by affecting main political actors’ interests, 
ideas, and capacities (Capoccia, 2016; Jacobs and Weaver, 2014). These effects can 
undermine an institution itself by creating negative feedbacks on its legitimacy, fea-
sibility, and efficiency. However, self-undermining effects effectively work when 
they interact with ideational changes of major political actors. Actors reinterpret an 
institution by reshaping their own preferences and perceptions on it in the long-term, 
rather than simply repeating same actions decided in an initial stage (Béland, 2009; 
Blyth, 2002; Kwon, 2003, 2012). Their ideational reflection and social learning from 
other actors are also important in interpreting the meanings of institutions (Hall, 
1993). Through these processes, some groups who were advantaged by a prevailing 
institutional setting could move to form a coalition with reformer groups.  
Secondly, this thesis explains how different styles of health insurance systems 
are installed. Most of the existing studies – quantitative studies, in particular – focus 
on the size of welfare states measured by welfare expenditure. They treat Japan and 
Korea as a typical “small” welfare state and seek to explain why East Asian states 
have meagre welfare spending (Stephens and Huber, 2001; Wilensky, 2002).4 They, 
however, neglect to investigate the diversity of the welfare systems in governance 
and financing. This study will pay attention to accounting for the installation of the 
different health insurance governance styles. It seeks to explain how institutional de-
signs, socio-economic structures, and political ideas make the dynamic of health care 
reform. 
Lastly, this study illuminates the characteristics of the welfare regime in Japan 
and South Korea in the perspectives of comparative studies. Some studies put the 
                                                          
4 There are some studies to illuminate the features of Japan’s welfare system not focusing on the 
size of total spending. For example, Lynch (2006) measures the bias for the old in welfare states 
in Japan. Estevez-Abe (2008) argues that Japan has developed particular types of social security 
programs and their functional equivalents – work-based and savings-oriented programmes in-
stead of official welfare programmes. 
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emphasis on the peculiarity of region (Choi, 2006; Kwon, 2007). The literatures of 
the so-called ‘East Asian model of welfare states’ (Goodman et al, 1998) are based 
on the idea that the East Asian welfare states are too peculiar compared to other wel-
fare states. Most of the studies on health care reforms in East Asia stress unique vari-
ables such as civil groups’ idea and leaders’ personal characters (Choi, 2006; Kwon, 
2007; Leduc, 2002). In contrast with these studies that solely focus on the peculiarity 
of one country based on the literatures of the East Asian welfare states model, this 
thesis attempts to find the general logic to explain the health insurance reform in the 
two countries. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter two examines the literatures on 
health insurance reforms. The review shows that existing approaches that focus on 
the power of political left, interest groups including medical professionals, and advo-
cacy coalitions certainly have their merits but fail to explain systematically the varia-
tion between the two countries. It also develops theoretical framework and the hy-
potheses on solidaristic health insurance reform. Chapter three provides an analysis 
of health policy in a comparative context. It briefly explains the types of health care 
regimes and common pressures on health care systems in the Bismarckian system. It 
also shows how institutional arrangements in a social insurance system lead to po-
tential conflicts among different occupational groups.  
Chapters four through seven provide empirical accounts on the health insurance 
reforms in South Korea and Japan. Chapters four and five explain the health insur-
ance system in South Korea and Japan before the major reform respectively. These 
chapters offer a brief explanation of the historical development and key features of 
healthcare policy in these countries. They also analyse the structural problems of 
health insurance system in both countries. Finally, they illustrate major actors’ inter-
ests and ideas in the policy area.  
Chapters six and seven examine health insurance reforms in the two countries. 
Chapter six presents the political dynamics of health insurance reform in South Ko-
rea. In the late 1980s, there was a reform attempt for the integration of all health 
funds raised by farmers and yet it was frustrated by the Presidential veto. In the mid-
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1990s, trade unions shifted to support the reform and shaped the cross-class coalition 
for the reform. As a result, Korea achieved the consolidation reform in the early 
2000s. Chapter seven presents the political dynamics of health insurance reform in 
Japan. Although the consolidation idea was raised in the 1990s by the municipal 
health societies, labour and business formed a coalition for protecting the existing 
corporate health insurance system. The government of Prime Minister Koizumi de-
cided to maintain the occupation-based health insurance system, separating the elder-
ly from the other health insurance schemes. Later, the government of the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) attempted to integrate all health insurance schemes based on its 
2009 general election manifesto. However, it was blocked by the corporate actors 
and weak leadership of the new ruling party. 
Chapter eight compares the political dynamic of health insurance reforms in 
these two countries. This chapter focuses on two institutional features – decision 
making process and problem solving - and ideational features labour hold. Based on 
this difference, this chapter identifies the various outcomes of reforms in two coun-
tries. Finally, chapter nine summarises the arguments of the thesis and discusses the 
study’s empirical and theoretical contributions. It also considers the policy implica-
tions of this study for health insurance reforms in general.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review and analytical framework 
 
This chapter highlights several important theoretical approaches to health insur-
ance reforms and discusses their respective shortcomings in relation to the under-
standing of the health insurance reforms in Japan and South Korea from the late 
1980s to the 2000s. This will be followed by delineating a theoretical framework that 
analyses the preferences of various actors and identifies the political and institutional 
conditions that facilitate or impede healthcare reforms in the two countries. 
 
2.1 Literature review on health care reforms 
 
This section conducts a critical review of previous studies relevant to health in-
surance reforms. Existing studies such as the power resources theory, professional 
dominance theory, policy process theory, democratisation approach, advocacy coali-
tion framework, and multiple streams model in policy process studies do not ade-
quately explain the divergence of health insurance reform in both countries.   
 
Power resources theory 
 
One of the most dominant approaches in the literatures on the political economy 
of welfare politics is power resources theory. This theory explains different levels of 
solidarity and equity in social policy based on the strength of organised labour (Kor-
pi, 1983). The theory argues that labour’s political power is positively linked to the 
level of solidarity in welfare programs as well as the size of welfare spending 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Stephens and Huber, 2001). This approach assumes that 
there is power imbalance between capitalists who control the means of production 
and workers who have to sell their labour for wages, and workers collectively at-
tempt to limit the power of capital by organizing themselves. In this regard, welfare 
states are the outcome of the struggle between labour and capital over social policies. 
The power resources theory posits that welfare states have potentially the distributive 
mechanism to intervene and resolve economic conflicts that involve class-related 
interest groups. This particular school of thought believes that the size of social 
17 
 
spending is strongly correlated with labour’s political resources (Korpi, 1983). Un-
ion density and the proportion of left-wing parties in parliament are used as key indi-
ces of political resources of pro-welfare policy groups.5  
While power resources theory emphasises the importance of workers’ mobilisa-
tion in accounting for reform outcomes, it fails to explain why organised workers 
support solidaristic reforms in one place while not in another place. This is because 
this theory presumes that labour will support solidaristic welfare programmes by de-
fault (Carnes and Mares, 2007, 873). Workers in big businesses are privileged under 
the Bismarckian healthcare system, as compared to those outside the formal labour 
market, such as workers in small corporations and irregular workers.  
They are often interested in protecting their company-based health funds (Giai-
mo, 2002). Theoretically, literatures that focus on the “varieties of capitalism” 
stresses shared interests between labour and businesses based on company-specific 
interests so that the workers can preserve their comparative advantages vis-a-vis 
workers from other sectors (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The exclusive health insurance 
and pension programmes, which are enterprise-based, are strong incentives for firm 
specific training and low labour mobility (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001, 161). Not surpris-
ingly, when employers and unions collaborate to shape policies, they are eager to 
block reforms that subvert the corporatist framework (Giaimo, 2002).  
Literatures on the unification of healthcare insurance in South Korea that draws 
on the power resources theory is extensive (Baek, 2001; Lim, 2010). They argue that 
the mobilisation of workers aligned with the farmers and the progressive NGOs en-
hanced their power resources to achieve a solidaristic health insurance system. The 
transition of political power from conservative to liberal government in Korea’s 
1997 election is also a crucial factor in explaining Korea’s recent health insurance 
reforms (Lim, 2010). However, they leave many crucial questions unanswered. Why 
did unions in Japan and South Korea differ widely on the health insurance systems 
they supported? Japanese trade unions preferred a more fragmented and corporatist 
form of national health insurance system (Hwang, 2008; Jeong and Niki, 2012). In 
                                                          
5 Political left has been frequently mediated by alliance with rural farmers and the middle class. 
Historical studies in welfare expansion across Europe stress the importance of cross-class 
alliances between blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and agrarian interest (Baldwin, 
1990). Cross-class coalitions also became an effective vehicle to legitimise mainstream social 
welfare ideas (Lim, 2010; Wong, 2004). 
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this regard, power resources theory tells us little about the empirical preference for-
mations and coalition configurations in these two countries. 
Some who defend power resource theory may claim that Korean labour had 
more political resources through strong internal cohesion than Japanese labour which 
were weakened due to the low level of integration and the gap of political power be-
tween Korean and Japanese labour may lead to the different outcome. However, 
trade unions in both countries achieved what they wanted to get on the health insur-
ance reform. In this regard, we need to find out the condition under which trade un-
ions in both countries shaped different policy interests. 
 
Interest group politics and the medical profession 
 
The theory of pluralist politics explains the development of welfare state as the 
outcome of negotiations between various interest groups and politicians’ responses 
within competitive democracies (Dahl, 1958; Feltenius, 2007). For instance, doctors, 
unions, employers, and other interest groups actively engage in the formulation of 
medical care policies. The pluralist approach thus suggests that competing interest 
groups are hugely influential in the formulation of welfare policies. According to 
them, social policies are negotiated and shaped by the political strengths of various 
interest groups (Carpenter, 2002).  
Health politics, however, is distinctive in that the medical profession can mo-
nopolise the supply of medical services. The medical profession is the most powerful 
and influential interest group in health care policy in most countries, including Korea 
and Japan (Freidson, 1970; Ikegami, 2006; Kwon and Reich, 2005). Medical provid-
ers have a monopoly over medical services. In most countries, health professionals 
are licensed by governments. The medical association is an extremely exclusive and 
protectionist occupational group. In addition, their interests are substantially cohe-
sive and mainly related to their economic gains and professional autonomy. For ex-
ample, an increase in the number of physicians might diminish their earnings and 
they, in turn, lobby governments to restrict the number of entrants into the profession 
(Carpenter, 2012, 298). Reimbursement methods for medical providers also shape 
their incentive structures and earnings (Freeman, 2000, 95-6; Langwell and Nelson, 
1986, 5). In this regard, the medical profession has veto power in healthcare policy-
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making. There is extensive literatures that discusses the role of medical professional 
groups (Alford, 1975; Freidson, 1970; Light and Levine, 1988; Starr, 1982). When 
doctors’ organisational power is strong, they can shape health policies in their favour. 
According to Quadagno (2005), there is no universal health insurance in the United 
States precisely because of the strength of organised physicians. This asymmetry of 
interest, however, fundamentally challenges the ideal of pluralist politics, which 
strive to forge compromises among competing interests.  
Based on the theory of “professional dominance”, the medical associations are 
extremely influential on health policymaking. Hence, the struggle between physi-
cians and the state over health policies represents a very real conflict of interests be-
tween the ‘sellers’ and the ‘buyers’ of medical services. The professional dominance 
theory, however, cannot be applied to some parts of healthcare reforms physicians do 
little care for. Existing research shows that physicians in Japan and Korea tend to be 
less interested in health insurance reforms which might have a marginal influence on 
their income and working conditions (Jeong and Niki, 2012; Kwon and Reich, 2005). 
They are much more concerned with policies that directly and significantly affect 
their revenue, such as the payment system and the separation of drug prescription 
from dispensing. They would prioritise reforms of pharmaceutical prices and the fee 
payment system rather than the integration of health insurance.  
 
Rigid institutional approach 
 
The school of new institutionalism focuses on the ways in which the “rules of 
the game” shape political actors’ behaviours and structure political battles (North, 
1990). Scholars in the strand call attention to the processes by which initial decisions 
constrain structures the political actions of political actors such as interest groups 
during the policymaking process (Immergut, 1992; Pierson, 1994). Initial decisions 
or existing institutional arrangements can reinforce themselves mainly by shaping 
political actors’ behaviours and capacities over time through three mechanisms.  
Firstly, an institutional arrangement strengthens its base of political support 
(Esping-Anderson, 1990; Pierson, 1994). A new institutional arrangement creates 
two competing groups between those who gain benefits from it and incur loss from it, 
which could be called beneficiaries and the disadvantaged or “winners” and “losers”. 
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Institutional settings tend to mobilise beneficiaries than the disadvantaged since ben-
efits are concentrated in a small proportion of beneficiaries while its burden would 
be diffused (Pierson, 1994). It also empowers beneficiaries by granting more re-
sources to them. For instance, some of the generous welfare states have “de-
commodification” effects, which means an individual does not need to be reliant up-
on market for one’ welfare (Esping-Anderson, 1990, 22). When workers are com-
pletely dependent upon market, they are difficult to mobilise for solidaristic action 
by atomising workers into individuals. In contrast, workers who are less dependent 
upon market are more willing to take part in collective actions. In turn, these institu-
tional arrangements might bolster the power of trade unions. 
Secondly, an institutional arrangement could enhance efficiency of whole insti-
tutional settings (Pierson, 2004; Tang, 2010). A new institution, once created, results 
in “learning effects”, “coordination effects”, and “adaptive expectations” (Arthur, 
1994; Pierson, 2000, 2004). Over time actors within an institution arrangement be-
come more skilled at this institutional setting (Deeg, 2005, 171). In addition, as ben-
efits from an institutional arrangement are increasing, other actors adapt their behav-
iour to those accrued benefits (Pierson, 2004). It also creates positive “network ef-
fects”. New institution becomes a part of the overall social system and is usually 
compatible with existing institutions (Tang, 2010). 
Third, institutional arrangements are strengthened by legitimation process (Jor-
dan, 2010; Rothstein, 1998, 2005). An institutional arrangement, once created, 
makes specific practices and ideas to support itself by changing how individuals and 
interest groups interpret their preferences. Rothstein (1998, 2005) shows how the 
welfare state in Sweden has strengthened the support for universal welfare pro-
grammes by creating citizens’ social trust and moral sentiment of solidarity. Jordan 
(2010) also demonstrates that when a state has a hierarchical health care system ra-
ther than decentralised one, it is more likely to obtain high public support for nation-
al health care.  
However, such a rigid institutional approach has difficulty in explaining endog-
enous institutional changes. Less attention is paid to ways in which existing institu-
tional settings are weakened by endogenous factors over time while most explana-
tions of institutional changes rely on exogenous factors such as war and crisis and 
fail to explain changes from within institutions. Rational choice institutionalism as-
21 
 
sumes an institution is in equilibrium with its environment (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Levi, 2009; Weingast, 2002). Self-interested individuals coordinate their best re-
sponses and thus actors in this institutional setting are resistant to institutional 
changes. This theoretical school relies on exogenous changes in some of the parame-
ters6 which undermine institutional self-enforcement to explain institutional changes 
(Greif and Laitin, 2004, 634). Sociological institutionalists tend to examine the pro-
cesses of institutional formation and reproduction through socially constructed 
norms and roles (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) but they fail to explain endogenous 
changes because of their static cognitive framework. 
There are some studies, which apply the framework of new institutionalism to 
health insurance reforms, particularly in Japan and South Korea (Hwang, 2008; 
Kwon, 2011). Nonetheless, most of them arrive at the same impasse when explaining 
institutional changes. Hwang (2008) investigates how Japan and South Korea are so 
different in their health insurance reforms. He asserts that specific political events 
and opportunities in each country shape different political opportunities and the ca-
pacity of its main actors. Confronted with the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, Ko-
rea’s newly elected centre-left government could achieve integration of all health 
funds. In contrast, the weakening of medical providers, Kenporen’s opposition and 
the merger of municipalities in Japan’s Koizumi government has led to very different 
policy opportunities (Hwang, 2008, 431). However, his study overly relies on con-
tingent conditions for its analytical framework. As Thelen (1999, 397) mentions, 
“What we need to know is which particular interactions and collisions are likely to 
be politically consequential”. Moreover, economic crisis in Korea can either push 
the state towards en masse retrenchment or compensation for the ‘losers’. Whether 
economic crisis leads to retrenchment or compensation depends on an array of social 
and political factors. Hence, this theoretical approach does not sufficiently explain 
why labour in both countries chose different reform options.  
Some historical institutionalists emphasise “negative feedbacks” or “self-
undermining effects” in explaining institutional changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2002; Jacobs and Weaver, 2014; Mahoney, 2000a; Wlezien, 1995). Mahoney (2000a, 
                                                          
6 Parameters in game theory refer to the specific given conditions of a game which can affect its 
outcome such as “the payoffs from various actions, time discount factors, risk preferences, 
wealth, and the number of players” (Greif and Laitin, 2004, 634). 
22 
 
527) said, “Whereas self-reinforcing sequences are characterized by processes of 
reproduction that reinforce early events, reactive sequences are marked by backlash 
processes that transform and perhaps reverse early events”. Negative feedback pro-
vides the basis for an explanation of endogenous institutional change. For instance, 
Skocpol (1992) showed how the patronage pension programme for Civil War veter-
ans from the 1860s to the 1890s led to its demise and, later, constrained the devel-
opment of social policy in the US. These pensions became associated with patronage, 
fraud, and profligacy and thus it had created widespread concern of its degeneration 
into a government handout.  
However, most of the studies in this approach fail to develop more elaborate ac-
counts of negative feedback effects. The concept of negative feedback usually over-
uses the explanation of homeostatic reactions (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, 20). 
For instance, Wlezien (1995) has used the metaphor of “thermostat” in the explana-
tion of negative feedback in mass politics. When politicians implement policies that 
are too liberal from the public opinion, as he states, the public react to move in a 
more conservative position. It can be a just “metaphor” rather than an analysis. 
Moreover, an institutional arrangement contains positive and negative feedbacks at 
the same time and thus these studies fail to elaborate how negative feedback effect 
works and when it outperforms positive feedback effects.  
In the similar vein, Jo (2008) and Lin (2002) argue that institutional context and 
effects and historical sequences have played important roles in the development of 
the Korean health insurance system. They stress that institutional arrangements in 
critical junctures created negative historical legacies and social cleavages and these 
in turn, led to institutional change. According to them, a fragmented health insurance 
system established at a critical juncture has resulted in serious inequality between 
company-based and residence-based health insurance schemes and social conflicts 
between various subscribers to different health insurance schemes. These legacies 
have led to the single-payer reform in South Korea.  
They, however, fail to properly explain how negative institutional legacies of 
the previous system had resulted in political actors’ mobilisation. They assume that 
significant inequalities in the health insurance system have ultimately led to health 
insurance reform because of organised actions by disgruntled rural residents who 
suffered the brunt of these disparities. Their claims are based on the two assumptions. 
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First one is that grievance among population leads to social mobilisation. However, 
dissatisfaction alone cannot account for collective actions and social movements 
mainly arise based on sufficient groups’ resources and organisation (Jenkins, 1983). 
Collective action theory also claims that common interests do not necessarily pro-
duce concerted political actions because of the costs of collective actions (Olson, 
1965).  
Second one is median voter theory, which predicts that redistribution tends to 
increase when resource distribution is skewed as the median voter becomes support-
ive of redistribution in a democratic society (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In contrast 
to their intuitive argument, several empirical studies deny the positive relation be-
tween inequality and the amount of redistribution (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Moene 
and Wallerstein, 2003). Research on political economy describes this phenomenon as 
the Robin Hood paradox, meaning “redistribution is least present when and where it 
seems to be most needed” (Lindert, 2004, 15). Scholars have pointed out that redis-
tributive social spending is largely attributed to organised political actions by estab-
lished interest groups and political parties (Bradley et al, 2003). In sum, these studies 
had difficulty in explaining institutional shifts since they had the gap between insti-
tutional problems and collective actions.  
Recently, instead of static, rigid, and simplistic institutional accounts, several 
studies within institutional approach open up the space for new approaches that can 
explain institutional changes. Some historical institutional approach focuses on the 
“ambiguity” of institutions and their “interpretative” process which can provide the 
micro-foundation of institutional changes. Mahoney and Thelen (2009) show how 
actors exploit the ambiguity of rules and their imperfect enforcement to change pre-
vailing institutional arrangements. They see institutions as active objects of political 
contestation in that political actors seek to interpret the meaning of ambiguous rule 
for their sake. These conditions open up space for actors to challenge institutional 
setting. In addition, Lieberman (2002) has suggested the alternative model of linkage 
between institution and mass mobilisation by incorporating ideational process into 
institutional politics. He mentioned institutional changes come from the friction be-
tween institutional capacities and ideational patterns. When the idea an institutional 
arrangement carries conflict its institutional capacities to achieve these ideas, it leads 
to the actors’ mobilisation.  
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Policymaking process 
 
Political institutions play a crucial role in structuring political conflicts and 
thereby produce divergent policy outcomes (Immergut, 1992; Weir and Skocpol, 
1985). By providing opportunities and impediments to both politicians and interest 
groups, political institutions build distinct 'rules of the game' that directly impinge 
upon the capability of various groups to influence policymaking. Immergut (1992) 
claims that it is more likely that universal healthcare programme is established when 
there are few veto players and a strong political leadership. She examines the impact 
of institutional veto points on health insurance reforms. She explains why Sweden, 
France, and Switzerland have different healthcare governance systems in spite of the 
fact that their medical professions are equally strong. The capability of interest 
groups to influence policy outcomes depends on their access to the political repre-
sentatives located at points with veto power in the political process. Although the 
medical profession enjoys similar level of power in the three countries, the Swiss’ 
veto point, such as the referendum, makes the implementation of public healthcare 
more difficult (Immergut, 1992). 
Jeong and Niki (2012) explains these divergent reform outcomes in Japan and 
Korea by focusing on the different political arrangements. The Korean President is 
said to have a great deal of power and he or she plays a critical role in public poli-
cymaking (Choi, 2010). The authoritarian legacies in Korea have allowed much of 
presidential power to be left unchecked and negotiations on policies tend to take 
place by the executive rather than by the legislative. Political parties can maintain 
strong party discipline among their members because party leaders could exclusively 
select their candidates for elections. Lawmakers hold strong party loyalty and thus 
cross-party voting in the National Assembly is not common. Hence, the president 
tends to have parliamentary support since his or her party usually forms the majority 
in the parliament.  
In contrast to the strong presidency in Korea, the Japanese prime minister had 
less power until recently (Iio, 2007; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2010). Politicians within 
the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) rested on a delicate balance of factional powers 
within the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) playing an important role in pol-
25 
 
icymaking process. Moreover, state bureaucrats who were influential in setting poli-
cy agendas and interest groups that sat in various deliberative councils (shingikai) 
could all exercise veto power (Iio, 2007).  
However, this approach has difficulty in explaining two points. First, Prime 
Minister Koizumi who decided to maintain the fragmented health insurance reform 
had stronger power than previous Prime Ministers (Iio, 2007; Miura, 2007; Shimizu, 
2005; Shinoda, 2007; Uchiyama, 2010; Watanabe, 2012). The prime minister’s lead-
ership and the new policymaking process had played a critical role in healthcare re-
forms, despite the strong opposition from the politically powerful Japan Medical As-
sociation and “zoku” politicians7, particularly on the issue of medical treatment fee 
(Ikegami, 2005). Koizumi had replaced bottom-up policymaking process with a top-
down one in the so-called “cabinet-directed” (Kantei shudō) approach and succeeded 
in reducing the influence of the factions and the “zoku” politicians from the policy-
making process by bypassing the procedure that has been hijacked by various inter-
est groups (Kikuchi, 2010, 220). The Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), 
a cabinet council, not only infused new ideas into the health system that was previ-
ously monopolised by the “zoku” politicians and bureaucracy but also successfully 
brought in new reform agendas (Iio, 2007). The great victory of the 2005 general 
election, known as the “postal election”8, had also dramatically reduced the influence 
of “zoku” lawmakers. 
Second, while political leadership and policymaking structures might properly 
explain the pace of policy reforms, they cannot explain major actors’ attitudes, pref-
erences and choices in healthcare policy (Béland, 2009, 702). For instance, Japanese 
and South Korean labour differed widely in their opinions on health reform even 
though the labour structures in both countries are similar. In addition, the consolida-
tion reform of all health insurance schemes in Korea was driven by mobilisation in 
rural areas in alliance with workers and intellectuals, not the government (Choi, 
2006). 
 
Advocacy coalition framework  
                                                          
7 It refers to “parliament members who worked on behalf of special interests and with benefits 
from their supporters” (Kikuchi, 2010, 221). 
8 The most controversial issue in this election was the privatisation of postal services.  
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The “Advocacy Coalition Framework” (ACF) stresses the role of actors’ ideas 
in forming a long-term policy coalition (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994; Sabatier, 
1998). Advocacy coalition refers to a band of political actors who seek to achieve 
their similar policy goals on the basis of shared ideas and beliefs over time (Sabatier, 
1988). The policymaking process is characterised by competition between coalitions 
which advocate different policy approaches in a certain policy subsystem. Advocacy 
coalitions emerge when they incorporate political actors into a certain policy alterna-
tive or platform. According to the ACF, this process is driven by actors’ beliefs ra-
ther than their interests. This framework suggests that actors form a coalition based 
on similar long-term beliefs rather than short-term self-interest (Kübler, 2001, 624). 
Beliefs bind political actors together within a certain advocacy coalition. The frame-
work also suggests that belief systems consist of three levels. “Deep core beliefs” 
refer to an actor’s general philosophy and normative values, which are extremely 
difficult to change. “Policy core beliefs” refer to fundamental policy orientation in a 
certain policy subsystem. “Secondary aspects” refer to a certain policy goals (Saba-
tier, 1998, 103-110). Different advocacy coalitions within a specific policy sub-
system compete with each other to design or change public policies that closely cor-
respond to their beliefs. Outside of the policy subsystem, there are relatively stable 
parameters and external subsystem events.  
Several studies on the advocacy coalition approach argue that the long-term 
evolution of the advocacy coalition for equity in the Korean health system is crucial 
to merging health insurance schemes (Baek, 2010; Kim 2011; Kwon, 2007). Kwon 
(2007) explains how the reform was consolidated based on institutional strength and 
the policy rationale of the reformer group. In the late 1990s, the advocacy coalitions 
in Korea had institutional strength through their access to key institutional locations 
within the policymaking system. In addition, they developed a clear and coherent 
policy paradigm (Kwon, 2007, 149). These evolutions had enabled the advocacy 
coalition to achieve the solidaristic health insurance reform. This approach provides 
important insights. This framework focuses on coalition as unit of analysis rather 
than specific interest groups or individuals. It also stresses the importance of shared 
beliefs among a certain coalition which can make actors hold together.  
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The ACF, however, has two shortcomings. A first shortcoming is the absence of 
linkage between institutional arrangements and coalition building (Cairney, 2011, 
218-9). According to this framework, institutional arrangements have significant in-
fluence on reform outcome only via the decision-making process and do not signifi-
cantly affect the ideas and beliefs itself behind policy process. Hence, this approach 
does not adequately explain how different institutional arrangements in the Korean 
and Japanese health insurance system have shaped actors’ interests and ideas about 
the health care reform. Secondly, the dynamics of policy changes is still insufficient-
ly understood in this approach (Cairney, 2011, 210). Although it suggests various 
pathways to institutional changes, major changes happen only with external shocks. 
This is because the framework assumes that members within a certain coalition can 
hardly change their policy core beliefs voluntarily (Sabatier, 1998, 105; Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007, 198-199). In contrast to this assumption, this thesis will show that a 
major change could happen in endogenous process through changing labours’ ideas 
and their orientations.  
 
Kingdon’s multiple streams model in policy process studies 
 
Kingdon (1995) seeks to explain the process through which issues become po-
litical agenda and allow for meaningful reforms. By analysing transportation policy 
in the late 1970s, he characterises policy process in three aspects - problematic pref-
erences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Kingdon states that policies by 
the national governments are the result of three streams: problems, policies, and poli-
tics. The problem stream is the first one in Kingdon’s model (Kingdon, 1995, 90). 
Political actors recognise that there is an existing problem for policy change. Alt-
hough there are a lot of problems in a society, only some of them can be addressed. 
Since policy-makers can only deal with a few crucial issues, selecting national agen-
da is one of the most critical issues in policy process. The second stream is the policy 
stream (Kingdon, 1995, 116). It is here where solutions and policy alternatives are 
shaped to tackle visible problems. Policy experts in academia, governmental agen-
cies, interest groups, and think thank shape alternatives and policy proposals. The 
third stream is the political stream (Kingdon, 1995, 145). It encompasses political 
environment such as elections, public opinion, and national mood. He notes that 
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three streams are significantly autonomous. Policy entrepreneurs seek to put together 
a recognised problem and a policy proposal they favour. When the three streams 
converge, he notes, the convergence creates a “policy window” for rapid policy 
change (Kingdon, 1995, 165). 
Some studies employ Kingdon’s model of multiple streams in the field of poli-
cy process studies in the process of adopting the national health insurance in South 
Korea (Lee, 2010). When it comes to the problem stream, policy actors recognised 
the visible problems that the number of insurers recorded deficits. More than 80 per-
cent of municipal health insurance societies were operating in red. As for the policy 
stream, the integration of all health insurance societies was regarded as the best al-
ternative within reformers. As for the political stream, Kim Dae-jung, who was a 
long supporter for the integration reform, was elected as new President. As these 
three streams converged, the merger of the insurers eventually took place.  
The Kingdon’s model, however, has three shortcomings. First, his model is 
highly contingent and policy process is too fluid (Sabatier, 1999). It is quite difficult 
to predict the timing of conversion in these three streams. He does not elaborate how 
policy windows are open and close. Birkland (2002, 224) notes that the “opening of 
window” does not guarantee policy change. Second, his model includes little insight 
on how to conflate policy ideas within institutional contexts. This is partially because 
Kingdon restricts himself to the explanation of agenda setting and the specification 
of alternatives in a particular set of institutions (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, 244). This is 
also partially because his study use institutions just as background information and 
political opportunities. Third, some critics cast doubts on whether three streams are 
relatively autonomous (Smith and Larimer, 2009, 112). It is often mentioned that 
defining the characteristics of a problem is closely associated with finding a solution 
to the problem. It suggests that problem stream could be significantly connected to 
policy stream.  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework  
 
Having examined the shortcomings of the relevant literature, this section sets 
out the theoretical framework for this dissertation’s comparative study. Firstly, it ex-
plains the various logics of unions’ preference formation. It then suggests new model 
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that explains institutional changes based on interactions between self-undermining 
effects and ideational changes. Finally, it proposes the main hypothesis in this study. 
 
Labour’s interests in welfare policy 
 
Trade unions tend to represent the interests of the majority, or protect organisa-
tional interests to exerting certain political influences (Anderson, 2001; Davidsson 
and Emmenegger, 2012; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). It shows that labour interests 
are complicated in manifold ways and even competing with each other. Interests of 
political actors can be contradictory to one another, be it short-term or long-term, 
economic or political, individual or organisational, and material or ideational. Some 
actors are more concerned about long-term impacts such as political influences and 
organisational vitalisation, whereas others instantly respond to short-term incentives 
from pay-offs (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000; Frege et al, 2004; Kwon, 2012; Ross, 
2007).  
Political actors’ interests in the social health insurance system mirrors this com-
plexity. The fragmented insurance system benefits high skilled workers who enjoy 
low risk and high income (Jeong and Niki, 2012). In a unified health insurance struc-
ture, the “insider” workers would have to pay more to support those at low income 
and high-risk (Baldwin, 1990; Rehm et al, 2012). Therefore, unions representing 
employees in large firms tend to oppose the merger of health insurance schemes alt-
hough it can inhibit solidarity with other groups. The corporate-based health insur-
ance system thus incentivises them to cooperate with employers to block reforms 
aimed at redistribution and risk pooling in solidarity with other workers.  
However, when trade unions seek to uphold solidarity, they can prioritise to 
implement social reforms in social policy domain. They can transcend short-term 
interests and embrace broader interests. Confronted by popular demands to restruc-
ture their health insurance system, trade unions are faced with difficult choices be-
tween promoting members’ direct interests for a fragmented health system and 
adopting a universal single-payer health insurance system9 based on the notion of 
solidarity. In this process, their perceptions on the interests and legitimacy of health 
                                                          
9 The single-payer refers to a body for health care in terms of finance and organisation (Hussey 
and Anderson, 2003, 215) 
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insurance system, which are crucial to explain their attitudes on the health insurance 
reform, would be explained by the process in which actors interpret their interests 
based on the interactions between actors’ ideas and institutional practices in a certain 
policy domain. 
 
Institutional frictions and ideational shifts  
 
A new institutional arrangement creates two competing groups between those 
who gain benefits from it and incur loss from it, which could be called “winners” and 
“losers” for an institutional battle. Most of the previous studies which stress institu-
tional stability focus on positive feedback effects which strengthen beneficiaries 
from the institutional arrangement. Through this process, the winner group can keep 
taking control of the institution. However, shifts in the balance of power between 
two competing groups can lead to the institutional change (Thelen, 1999). While 
some of the “losers” from previous legislative battles sometimes just disappear, other 
loser groups who mobilise themselves carry out fight for the institutional change and 
attempt to override the previous winner groups (Thelen, 1999, 385). More important-
ly, institutional arrangements and ideas can diminish existing policies’ bases of polit-
ical support and expand the opposing coalitions. Part of the groups who were advan-
taged by a prevailing institutional setting can move to form a policy coalition with 
loser or reformer groups. The shifts in political coalitions which underpin institutions 
can result in the change of institutional configurations.  
The coalition shifts could begin with institutional tensions. An institution occa-
sionally has certain some built-in components to politically weaken its supporters, to 
cognitively undermine its legitimacy, and functionally impair its efficiency (Jacobs 
and Weaver, 2014). An institutional arrangement contains various sub-components 
such as policy goal, enforcement, monitoring, decision-making, problem-solving, 
and evaluation (Lowndes and Robert, 2013, 151-3). In addition, an institution con-
tains its underlying ideas since it is the carrier of specific ideas (Rothstein, 2005; 
Schmidt, 2010). There is no reason to presume that these sub-components are neces-
sarily linked with each other in coherent ways (Lieberman, 2002, 701–702). Some 
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elements in an institution are sometimes significantly incompatible with others when 
these elements embody contradictory logics and policy ideas.10  
These mismatched institutional and ideational patterns create frictions for insti-
tutional changes and provide the micro-foundation of endogenous institutional 
changes (Capoccia, 2016; Lieberman, 2002). It provides space for the political battle 
among political actors over an existing institution. This discrepancy and incoherence 
can make the room for ambiguity or plurality of meanings of one institution (Ma-
honey and Thelen, 2009, 11). When “losers” from a prevailing institution challenge 
the existing institution, they can use the friction to persuade other political actors and 
general population to challenge status quo.  
This process can be amplified by the transformation of political actors’ funda-
mental ideas and orientations. Agents are “reflexive” and “sentient” in that they ac-
tively reflect the drawbacks of current system and find better solutions (Kwon, 2003, 
97-98; Schmitt, 2010, 14). Actors constantly reinterpret the meaning of institution by 
reshaping their preferences and perceptions of it, rather than simply repeating same 
actions. When political actors shift their identities and orientations, it will make sig-
nificant changes of their attitudes and interests in specific policies through their own 
deliberation over priorities and policy orientations (Frege and Kelly, 2003; Hyman, 
2001; Weir, 2006). Political actors can reshape the meaning of an institution and 
their own interests based on their belief system and main values and thus seek to le-
gitimise their claim for policy change (Béland, 2009, 706-7). 
These processes can change the composition of policy coalitions over time 
when some potential winner groups move to form coalition with the reformers (Bé-
land, 2005, 2009; Cappoccia, 2016). The different types of cross-class coalitions can 
lead to the divergent reform outcomes. Political parties, trade unions, farmers, and 
employers’ associations form specific reform coalitions in various ways. When la-
                                                          
10 This is because most public policies are the products of political negotiation reflecting various 
groups’ competing interests and electoral pressures based on politicians’ shorter-term interests 
(Jacobs and Weaver, 2014, 8; Nordhaus, 1975). There is also critical discrepancy between ‘rule-
in-form’ and ‘rules-in-use’ since politically powerful groups seek to bend some components in 
institutional practices to their priorities and preferences (Leach and Lowndes, 2007, 185). In ad-
dition, policy learning from other countries is sensitive to the institutional and political context. 
Policy makers can deliberately modify some sub-components and practices within a whole insti-
tutional setting in the time of policy learning (Rose, 1991, 21–2). Through these processes, some 
elements in an institution can contradict other elements or their underlying ideas and make fric-
tions for change.  
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bour forms broad alliances with other sectors, such as the farmers, this leads to inclu-
sive social policies that are based on solidarity (Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 
1990). In contrast, when labour enters into coalition with businesses, they tend to 
block reforms that are more egalitarian and redistributive in pursuit of benefits that 
are exclusive to their specific occupations (Giaimo, 2002).  
 
Institutional changes in health insurance reforms  
 
This study focuses on two institutional sub-components or practices that un-
dermine institutional arrangements in the long-run: decision-making processes and 
credibility on problem solving. The social health insurance system contains the in-
ternal tension between solidarity and conservatism, which will be detailed in Chapter 
3. Such tension is relieved by several institutional sub-mechanisms such as decision-
making processes and credibility on problem solving in some countries. However, 
other countries under the social insurance system have the defections in theses sub-
mechanisms and they create potential frictions for institutional changes.  
Firstly, decision-making process in health insurance programmes can under-
mines the institutional arrangement itself through creating two negative effects. De-
cision-making process could affect the legitimacy of an institutional setting. The so-
cial health insurance system is usually fragmented by occupations and this practice is 
justified by the principle of “self-governance”, which means that insurers govern 
their health societies themselves independently from the government (Blank and Bu-
rau, 2014, 112). A group who shares same occupational identity runs its own health 
fund. Labour and business equally take part in the administration of their company-
based health funds. The self-governance has been regarded as a tool to prompt the 
liberty in health care policy and strengthen group identity (Giaimo, 2002, 92).  
This practice has led people to perceive a health insurance society as a substan-
tial unit, which can make meaningful effects on health insurance governance rather 
than just another form of governmental body. Even though the fragmented health 
insurance system is supposed to contain some degree of inequality among various 
occupational groups, the principle of “self-governance” could justify the inequality 
to some extent. By contrast, when insurers including workers are not allowed to be 
part of the decision-making, individual health societies are considered as no more 
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than another form of governmental intervention, which are totally subordinate to the 
government (Kwon and Reich, 2005, 1107; Lee, 2002, 304). Therefore, such divi-
sion within health insurance schemes based on occupations are regarded tentative, 
which can be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, the insurers could cast doubt on the 
inequality among various occupational health schemes.  
The rules for decision-making also affect actors’ political capabilities and op-
portunities. This is because participation in the decision-making process of individu-
al health insurance society can be one of the channels to influence policy making 
process and thus access to decision-making process becomes political resources for 
actors. For instance, scholars show that union administration of unemployment bene-
fits, so called the “Ghent system”, has constantly increased union strength, as it has 
allowed them to build large membership bases (Anderson, 2001; Davidsson and 
Emmenegger, 2012; Rothstein, 1992). By contrast, when trade unions are not able to 
join the decision-making, they have smaller organisational incentive to protect the 
fragmented health insurance system.  
Secondly, low credibility to solve serious fiscal problems inherent in the frag-
mented health insurance system could undermine the institutional arrangement itself 
by creating negative effects, particularly when it contradicts the ideational goal of 
the institutional arrangement. When a government establishes a universal right to 
health care for all citizens, for instance, this health care system contains the concept 
of ‘equity’ of health care service and governmental responsibility on health care 
(Blank and Burau, 2014, 110). An institution, however, sometimes could be exposed 
to critical problems to achieve its goal. The universal health insurance system with 
multiple insurers has a critical problem to tackle financially distressed health funds. 
The health funds which mainly cover low-income and high-risk populations are in-
evitably weak in terms of fiscal capability. Faced with the fiscal problem of these 
health societies, a government often set up specific problem-solving mechanisms to 
assist these funds such as governmental subsidy or inter-funds transfer (Buchner and 
Wasem, 2003; Van de Ven et al, 2007). When these measures can sustain the “frag-
mented but universal health insurance system” by reducing inequality among health 
insurance schemes of different occupational groups, the congruence between institu-
tional and ideational mechanisms in the health insurance system make self-
reinforcing effects by enhancing the legitimacy of the institution.  
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By contrast, when these problem-solving rules do not contribute to sustain the 
operation of fiscally distressed health insurance societies, incongruence between in-
stitutional and ideational mechanisms could make self-undermining effects by de-
creasing the legitimacy of the institution. The problem-solving rules may hold the 
low level of institutional commitments (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, 8). When these 
problem-solving rules are not entrenched by strong commitments, a government or 
politically stronger groups can exploit the ambiguity in problem-solving rules that, in 
turn, lead to unfair problem-solving practices (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, 10). 
These practices can make cognitive frictions with the ideas of equality and govern-
mental responsibility which are embedded in the universal health insurance system 
and thus it can lead to challenge the status-quo. 
However, these processes through which institutional incongruences between 
institutional subcomponents and ideational goal make self-undermining effects are 
not automatic processes. Political actors’ ideational reflection crucially affects these 
processes by re-interpreting the meaning of a prevailing institution. Some benefi-
ciary groups can allow for fundamental changes of the institution by giving up their 
privileges and adjusting their ideas about the status-quo (Jacobs and Weaver, 2014, 
5). This study focuses on the role of labour which can dramatically change their ide-
as and interests on health insurance policy through shifting union identity. Union 
members are usually a beneficiary group from the fragmented health insurance sys-
tem and thus support the system (Giaimo, 2002). However, they can move to form a 
coalition with farmers and other occupational groups. The shift of coalition for-
mation can be one of the main cause of radical health care reforms.  
Beyond ideas on specific policy areas, labour movements and unions have their 
core values and identities; “business unionism”, where unions focus narrowly on 
benefits to their members; “revolutionary unionism or class opposition” where un-
ions seek to politically mobilise their membership for a challenge to the existing so-
cial and economic order; and “social movement unionism”, where unions attempt to 
form a coalition with other social actors for social reforms (Connolly and Darlington, 
2012; Frege et al, 2004; Hyman, 2001). When trade unions are largely concerned 
with economic benefits in the labour market, they are more likely to support the 
fragmented health care system since it provides their members with more benefits in 
short-term perspectives. When trade unions seek to reorder political economic struc-
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ture in a society, they would not be much interested in health care reform. However, 
trade unions could shift their orientation towards social justice. When trade unions 
embrace socially oriented labour movement, they are more likely to be positive 
about the consolidation of health care systems. In this case, unions pursue agendas 
for social reform, focusing on issues of equity and fairness (Frege and Kelly, 2003; 
Hyman, 2001). These processes could result in the shifts in the political coalition un-
derlying an institutional setting (Weir, 2006).  
However, social movement unionism alone could not account for institutional 
changes in a specific policy domain. New ideas on the fundamental union orientation 
needs to interact with institutional arrangements and specific ideas embedded in a 
certain policy. Firstly, these interactions are involved in agenda-setting process. 
There are a lot of social reform agendas such as gender equality, education reform, 
environmental reform, pension reform, tax reform, and health care. Unions have to 
choose their agendas among them based on their strategic calculation and union ori-
entation. If unions choose a certain issue of reform with low political attention and 
fewer activists, they will face higher collective action costs to gain sufficient support 
for policy change. In this regard, unions are more likely to focus on issues which 
have high salience among population and potential coalition partners (Capoccia, 
2016, 1112; Frege et al, 2004, 149). The frictions between ideational goals and insti-
tutional capability to achieve them could enhance political salience in a certain poli-
cy reform. 
Secondly, socially oriented labour movements become more sensitive to the 
friction between ideational goals and institutional capability. As they changed their 
orientation, this mismatch became more visible for labour movement and they can 
more sympathise with members in municipal health schemes and reformers for 
health insurance reforms. Unions in Korea thought that weak problem-solving prac-
tices in Korean health insurance system were against social equity and the govern-
ment should be more responsible for less fortunate citizens’ welfare. In addition, un-
ions in Korea argued that the occupational division within the health insurance sys-
tem was not based on legitimate grounds and health insurance societies had to be re-
structured in order to achieve equity.  
These micro-foundational processes coupled with institutional frictions and re-
interpretation can lead to the coalition shifts in the health care policies. Socially ori-
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ented trade unions can form a policy coalition with farmers and civil movement 
groups upholding solidarity. Such shifts in the political alliance that underpin the 
health insurance system can result in the reconfiguration of institutional arrange-
ments. In contrast, when labour sustains the policy coalition with business, the coali-
tion can sustain the fragmented health insurance system. While labour and farmers in 
Korea formed a policy coalition for the integration reform, labour and business in 
Japan created a coalition for protecting the fragmented health insurance system. 
 
2.3 Arguments 
 
This study put forwards three arugments on the divergent paths to health insur-
ance reforms in Korea and Japan, which are derived from the framework mentioned 
above. Firstly, the inclusion of labour in the decision-making processes of health in-
surance at the societal level tends to protect the fragmented health insurance system. 
In Japan, employees can take part in the decision-making process on company-based 
health funds. Rengō sought to enforce its political influence on welfare and labour 
reforms through the principle of ‘self-governance’. Trade unions in collaboration 
with business associations were opposed to radical reforms that would merge all 
health insurance societies. In contrast, Korean trade unions could have little impact 
on their health insurance societies because employers did not allow workers’ repre-
sentatives to participate in the administration of their health insurance societies. In 
addition, employers regarded the reserve funds in health insurance societies as funds 
held by their companies. Thus, such institutional arrangement had provided Korean 
labour with little incentive to oppose the unification of health insurances.  
Secondly, the huge gap between the idea of universal health insurance and weak 
problem-solving mechanism in this system can lead to the integration of all health 
funds. The Korean government did not confer credible commitments on financing 
the financially distressed municipal health insurance schemes. This has led to the 
build-up of less institutionalised problem-solving mechanisms on distressed munici-
pal health insurance schemes. The residence-based health insurance schemes have 
only begun to receive governmental subsidies at the latter’s discretion and the 
amount has been changing drastically every year. The Korean government charged 
high insurance contributions because of the fiscal crisis in the municipal health in-
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surance programme. As there was disparity between the ideas of universal health in-
surance and actual practices, farmers were mobilised for integration of all health 
funds as strong commitment for governmental responsibility. This gap also provided 
the common ground to challenge the status quo between farmers and labour when 
trade unions focused on the governmental responsibility in the health insurance poli-
cy. 
By contrast, the health insurance system in Japan carries huge political respon-
sibilities with effective and credible commitments. The central and prefectural gov-
ernment granted half of expenditures of municipal health insurance schemes as pub-
lic subsidies that are legally binding. The municipal governments have transferred 
their general budget accounts into municipal health insurance funds to make up for 
the loss since the Japanese municipal health insurance schemes were directly run by 
the municipal governments. In addition, inter-fund transfer programmes have trans-
ferred a significant proportion of financial resources from corporate-based to resi-
dence-based health insurance schemes. Given this as a background, most of the ac-
tors thought that it was possible to build a sustainable universal programme under a 
fragmented system. 
Thirdly, when labour movements adopt socially oriented unionism, the reform 
trial for the integrated health insurance system is more likely to succeed. While la-
bour in Korea has showed little sympathy for farmers at the first stage of reform, the 
Korean labour movement began to adopt a more socially conscious orientation to 
pursue broader public interests and to forge closer partnership with the civil move-
ment in the mid-1990s. Even though the core members of labour unions in big busi-
nesses were the one who gained short-term benefits from the fragmented health in-
surance system, the KCTU supported the integration reforms after they had reshaped 
their orientation towards socially oriented movement. By contrast, as Japanese la-
bour movement adopted more economic orientation, they were resistant to the inte-
gration reform. There was a policy network between labour and big businesses in 
Japanese healthcare, which was consolidated by shared interests in corporate health 
insurance schemes and cooperative business-labour relationship (Kume, 1998). They 
were more interested in protecting short-term economic benefits.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
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This chapter has discussed the shortcomings of existing studies in relation to the 
health insurance reform in Korea and Japan and set out the theoretical framework for 
the dissertation. Theories such as professional dominance theory and multiple 
streams model do not provide an adequate explanation of variation in the health in-
surance reforms in the two countries.  
This study instead focuses on the role of trade unions since they can shift their 
ideas and interests in health insurance policies and thus lead to the coalition shifts. 
This study also seeks to specify the condition under which institutional self-
undermining effects and ideas are intertwined and these interactions can give rise to 
shift of coalition formation. It is claimed that decision making process and credibility 
on problem-solving rules have potential to result in institutional change. It is also 
claimed that when actors change their broad orientations, these institutional features 
can help them change their specific ideas on the social policy. Based on the interac-
tion, the political actros can challenge an existing institutional arrangement.  
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Chapter 3 The politics of health care reforms 
 
This chapter analyses the distinct political dynamics of the health care reform. 
Firstly, it examines why and how health care makes the unique dynamics of political 
conflicts. Secondly, it reviews the typology of health care systems and examines the 
main characteristics of the social health insurance system, or Bismarckian health care 
system, as the health care systems of Japan and Korea fall into this category. Lastly, 
it explores recent debates about the merger of health insurance schemes under the 
social insurance system.  
 
3.1 The distinctiveness of health care service and its politics 
 
Health care service has several peculiar characteristics compared to other goods 
and these features shape the unique dynamics of health care politics. First, health 
care is regarded as a ‘merit good’ (Musgrave, 1957), which is to be distributed 
among the population by the principle of need rather than financial ability to pay. 
Since healthy life is regarded as minimum standard of civic life, governments have 
the duty to provide the basic health care service regardless of its citizen’s financial 
capability.  
Second, there is significant information gap between providers and consumers 
of health care services. Consumers have limited information on their health condi-
tions and treatments, and consumption of health care services is largely dependent on 
doctors’ recommendation. As a result, doctors have an incentive to encourage their 
patients to demand more medical services than a Pareto-efficient level, and -it some-
times leads to an oversupply of medical services. The phenomenon in medical ser-
vice market is called ‘supplier-induced demand’ (Evans, 1984; Rice and Labelle, 
1989). The regulatory actions are justified to correct this problem by changing incen-
tive structure of medical providers.  
Third, health care service creates significant ‘external effects’ (Coase, 1960). 
When consumption or production of a commodity makes external cost or benefit to a 
third party, who is not involved in this process, it creates negative or positive exter-
nalities. Some health care services, particularly those concerned with communicable 
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diseases, generate external benefits. If some people get vaccinated against whooping 
cough, for instance, it enables to reduce the probability of others getting the disease. 
The concepts of sanitation, vaccination, and quarantine in modern history show the 
importance of external effects in health care services (Porter, 1999).  
Lastly, the co-evolution of professions and state licensure is also important in 
shaping health care politics (Abbott, 1988; Carpenter, 2012; Starr, 1982). In most 
societies, governments have endowed legitimated experts with particular legal au-
thority to deliver medical services. Officially legitimated physicians from govern-
ment alone are able to prescribe and deliver medical procedures to citizens. They are 
able to effectively mobilise themselves in order to enhance their collective status 
ranging from a price of their medical services to a control of supply on physicians 
(Alford, 1975; Freidson, 1970). Based on strong organisational capacity, they have 
acted as a ‘veto group’ on the development of health care policy (Freeman and 
Rothgang, 2010, 369). Although other policy experts in economic, security, and en-
vironmental policy also play critical roles in their fields, the organisational and insti-
tutional power of medical profession is hardly matched.  
 
3.2 Typology of the health care systems 
 
There are huge variations in how different countries deliver and finance their 
health services. Scholars have attempted to put these variations in health care policy 
into several regime types. A starting point for a typology of health care systems can 
be also found in Esping-Andersen (1990)’s concept of welfare regimes. His pioneer-
ing study seeks to identify the three patterns of welfare regimes. He presents a typol-
ogy of welfare states based respectively upon the operationalisation of three princi-
ples: de-commodification (which examines the extent to which an individual’s wel-
fare rely on market force), levels of social stratification (which examines the role of 
welfare programmes in sustaining social stratification) and the private–public mix 
(which examines relative proportion of state, family, and market in the provision of 
welfare benefits). He categorises welfare states into three distinctive regime types; 
Liberal (US, UK, and Ireland, for example), Conservative (Germany, Austria, France, 
and Belgium, for example), and Social Democratic (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and 
Finland, for example). However, the ‘three worlds of welfare states’ do not fit well 
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into health care services (Bambra, 2005). For instance, Britain, Canada, and New 
Zealand, which are regarded as liberal welfare states, have more similarities with the 
social democratic model than the liberal model in the health care system. It is be-
cause his typology is largely based on cash benefit programmes such as pensions, 
sickness, and unemployment benefits whereas it neglects to examine services pro-
grammes such as education, health care, and other social services (Kautto, 2002, 54).  
The most frequently used division of health care services is that between Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) model, social insurance model, and private model by 
exploring the dimensions of financing, provision, governance, and regulation of 
healthcare (Blank and Burau, 2014; Carpenter, 2012; Castles, 1998; Freeman and 
Rothgang, 2010; Immergut, 1992). The NHS used in the UK, Sweden, and Canada is 
characterised by universal coverage funded out of general taxation. For example, 
more than 80 percent of financial resources of health care came from public one in 
2010 in the UK and most of them came from general tax (Blank and Burau, 2014, 
82). Only 9.6 percent of funding came from co-payments by patients and private in-
surance accounted for just 3 percent of total health expenditures in the UK. It ensures 
free access to health care services for all citizens and thus it guarantees universal 
medical services (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 576). Although private health care 
is allowed in the UK, its practice by private doctors is highly restricted and marginal-
ised (Jordan, 2010, 869). In the national health system, delivery is also unique. Most 
of the hospitals are public owned. Doctor’s income is not determined by the market 
competition. In the UK, general practitioners in the ambulatory sector are paid main-
ly on the basis of a capitation while doctors in hospital are salaried.  
This system is often known as the Beveridgean model, named after the “Bever-
age report” which contained the core principle of this system. According to this re-
port, all citizens are endowed with socio-economic rights, irrespective of class or 
market position, as much as political rights. The Beveridgean idea assumes that a 
state provides services as a matter of right to all citizens to guarantee basic necessi-
ties such as health, knowledge, food, and shelter by offsetting some basic social risks 
such as invalidity, old age, unemployment, illness, and maternity. In this regard, the 
system seeks to promote the equal benefits.  
The social insurance system or Bismarckian system used in countries such as 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands provides its citizen with health care benefits 
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through health insurance societies. They are to be para-public and non-profit, which 
are operated under public law. The system is mainly financed by social contributions. 
Health insurance is funded by social contributions of employees and employers as a 
fixed percentage of their monthly incomes. Other sources of funding are co-payment 
from patients and governmental subsidy. When people visit a doctor, they are sup-
posed to pay at some proportion of medical fee on the emphasis of individual re-
sponsibility. Governments also provide subsidies for vulnerable groups who have 
difficulty paying their contributions and co-payment. The freedom of medical ser-
vices in this system is much higher than in the national health system. A patient is 
able to choose providers. The supply of health care is mixed; partially private (most 
of the primary or ambulatory health care), and partially public (in substantive pro-
portion of hospital services). Physicians in the ambulatory sector are mainly paid on 
the basis of the fee-for-service system.11  
The social insurance system is based on the mixed ideas such as conservatism 
and social solidarity. As for the principle of social solidarity, contribution is paid in 
proportion to one’s salary rather than one’s health risk, which represents a re-
distributional feature in terms of risk and income. At the same time, it contains the 
conservatism. Originally, social health insurance was designed for protecting high-
skilled employees and offers protection against catastrophic medical expense and 
income loss. For this reason, social insurance schemes are usually fragmented by 
various occupation-based schemes. The levels and scopes of benefits among them 
are usually quite different. 
The private insurance system, used in countries such as Switzerland and the 
United States, is characterised by the market-driven approach and the dominant roles 
of private actors (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 577). It is based on the belief that 
the less state involvement in health care service is the more efficient system and the 
funding and provision of health care should be left to market principal (Blank and 
Burau, 2014, 84-6). The system is featured by various private health insurance con-
tracts and employers or individuals pay for them. Individuals voluntarily make their 
contracts with insurance providers and the level of premium is linked to the level of 
individual health risk rather than income. Patients are required to pay co-payment or 
deductibles to cover all or part of the costs of their health care services. Companies 
                                                          
11 The FFS is a system under which providers are paid for each service individually. 
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sell various private health insurance contracts and their premiums are usually contin-
gent on individual health status and coverage boundary. Public insurance pro-
grammes in the US only cover certain groups of their citizens. Medicaid works for 
the poor and Medicare covers the elderly and disabled. Service delivery is mainly 
performed by private providers. In the private health care system, health care is pro-
vided by hospitals and doctors operating as entrepreneurs. This system allows con-
sumers to freely choose their providers. Doctors gain remuneration based on the fee-
for-service system. 
 
3.3 Reforms in the Bismarckian healthcare system 
 
There are some common problems and conflicts inherent in the Bismarckian 
healthcare system. As Blank and Burau (2014, 108-10) points out, the three health 
care regimes face a trilemma in healthcare policy between quality, equity, and cost 
containment. In many advanced countries, their health care systems are threatened 
by uncontrolled upward trend in health expenditures. At the same time, as health 
care attracts considerable political attention, governments have to maintain the quali-
ty and equality of health care service. The NHS system is geared to pursuit equality 
and cost containment at the expenses of its quality. The private health insurance sys-
tem is supposed to emphasise quality over other two values. The social insurance 
system is designed for the quality and, to a lesser extent, equality at the expense of 
cost containment.  
 
Cost containment  
 
Health care policy in many advanced countries has been dominated by the pur-
suit of reforms for the last two decades (Saltman and Figueras, 1997). Most of the 
health care reforms were directed at cost control and improvement of efficiency. It is 
well known that the Bismarckian health care regime is much more vulnerable to cost 
explosion than the National Health System (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 576). In 
the NHS, it was relatively easy for governments to control their health care expendi-
tures by freezing their budgets and thus this system ensures relatively low levels of 
health care expenditure. Instead, the NHS in the UK offers a low quality of treatment, 
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which is well represented by long waiting lists for the access to specialist care. In 
sacrifice of service quality, the NHS has achieved the control of health care expendi-
ture.  
In the social insurance system, by contrast, it has a different combination among 
various goals of health care services. It usually provides higher quality of health ser-
vice than the National Health Service (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 576). However, 
the social insurance system tends to result in higher health expenditures. The gov-
ernment in this system is not able to directly control health care expenditures since 
the system guarantees reimbursing significant part of medical expenses incurred by 
insured person. This system has suffered a significant rise in health expenditures. 
Therefore, deficits in health insurance schemes and cost containment have been put 
on the top of the agenda of health care reforms (Blank and Burau, 2014, 125). Since 
the 1970s, health care spending in Germany, France, and the Netherlands swelled 
much faster than their economy grew (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2007, 582). While 
they opt for raising contributions in the 1980s in response to the fiscal problem, high 
contributions led to high labour costs. Employers in Germany claimed high contribu-
tions made German industry less competitive in the global economy and inhibited 
the growth of employment (Giaimo and Manow, 1999, 977). In this regard, health 
care reforms in most of the European social insurance countries shifted from raising 
contributions towards limiting the growth of health care expenditure. They have at-
tempted to introduce the variety of cost containment measures such as budget cap for 
health spending, comprehensive payment methods, and higher co-payment (Blank 
and Burau, 2014, 128; Schut and Van de Ven, 2005, 62).  
 
Solidarity and conservatism 
 
The Bismarckian health care system contains the tension between the ideas of 
solidarity and conservatism and governments seek to balance them. Theoretically, 
there are two competing principles underlying the social insurance system - the logic 
of social security and the logic of insurance (Blank and Burau, 2014; Kurata, 2009). 
On the one hand, “the logic of social security” emphasises solidarity among different 
groups. This logic supports the idea that all citizens have a right to acquire similar 
level of health care benefits regardless of their occupations. The benefits are sup-
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posed to be equally distributed by needs and citizenship. In this regard, social insur-
ance programme acts as not just insurance but also redistribution measure. On the 
other hand, “the logic of insurance” stresses the budget balance in the social insur-
ance scheme since it is a kind of insurance. Benefits are supposed to be closely 
linked to contributions and, in turn, the insured person is to be conscious of costs as 
well as benefits. In addition, the principle presumes that redistribution through health 
insurance programme does not fit well with its goal and it should be marginalised. 
“The logic of insurance” also emphasises the self-governance in the social insurance 
scheme, which is run by the insured. The boundary of insurance had to be limited to 
similar occupational group members since the social insurance schemes were organ-
ised by strong group identity. It also implies that non-members including govern-
ment could not strongly intervene in the insurance scheme for common goods. In 
this regard, this logic is used to justify different levels of contributions and benefits 
in various health insurances societies.  
The two competing ideas make the political dynamics of solidarity in the social 
insurance system. Solidarity is often defined as “a general readiness to help those 
who are in need” (Ullrich, 2002, 124). Correspondingly, welfare state is regarded as 
an institutionalised form of solidarity (Cramme and Diamond, 2009, 178). Health 
care politics in the social insurance system includes the multi-dimensional meanings 
of solidarity (Maarse, 2003; Van de Veen, 2012). “Risk solidarity” means that pre-
mium the insured person pays is not related to the level of one’s health risk. Risk sol-
idarity is a redistributive arrangement by redistributing individual person’s medical 
care costs across all members in a group. Risk solidarity implies redistribution from 
the healthy to the (potentially) sick. Risk solidarity contrasts with “actuarial fairness”, 
the principle underlying private health insurance schemes. The actuarial fairness 
principle means that a person with higher health risk is supposed to pay higher pre-
mium and this way to pay one’s premium is fair. The second dimension is “income 
solidarity”, which means contribution level is related to one’s ability to pay. In other 
words, contribution is determined by the subscribers’ incomes. Income solidarity 
implies redistribution from the rich to the poor. By contrast, there is usually no link 
between a person’s income and premium in private health insurance.  
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Risk 
Income 
Low-risk group High-risk group 
High-income group support the fragmented health  
insurance system 
- 
Low-income group - Support the integrated health  
insurance system 
 
Table 3.1 Incentive structures on health insurance reforms on the basis of the level 
of risk and income  
Source: Based on Baldwin, 1990; Rehm et al, 2012 
 
Baldwin (1990, 20-28) shows how the levels of risk and income shape actors’ 
interests on public insurance programmes, as shown in Table 3.1. Based on their 
economic incentives, a group with lower risk and higher income is more likely sup-
port the “insurance principle” while a group with higher risk and lower income is 
more supportive of “solidaristic principle.” This is because when insurance pool is 
more integrated, financial resources move from the wealthy and secure to the disad-
vantaged and insecure.  
The Bismarckian health regime is based on the occupational origin in Germany. 
The social policy programmes in the system are split along occupational lines and 
solidarity was limited in the demarcation of labour market. To some extent, it has 
contained inequality within different occupational health insurance funds. In this re-
gard, governments in this regime attempted to balance between two principles by 
introducing several measures to enhance equity such as risk-adjustment scheme (van 
de Ven et al, 2007, 163). 
 
3.4 The Debate between the single payer and multi-payer system  
 
Many countries in the social health insurance system confront the choice be-
tween a single-payer and multi-payer systems.12 Under the single-payer system, a 
single body controls the system of health care service and finance (Hussey and An-
derson, 2003, 215). Under the single-payer system, one organisation - usually gov-
                                                          
12 A single payer system includes the nationalised healthcare system like in the UK, Canada and 
so on, but in this section, it means a single insurance scheme under the social health insurance 
system (Hussey and Anderson, 2003, 215).  
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ernment - collects revenues and purchases health services for the entire population. 
Under the multi-payer system, several insurance bodies carry out these services for 
certain groups of people. The social insurance system started with the multi-payer 
system while the NHS started with the single-payer system. 
The countries which adopt the social health insurance system have sought to of-
fer effective health care services without sacrificing solidarity. In this process, the 
integration of separate insurance programmes emerged after the end of the Second 
World War (Baldwin, 1990, 100-104). France and Germany attempted to establish 
comprehensive and solidaristic social insurance schemes through consolidating dif-
ferent occupational insurance programmes. This reform proposal was attractive for 
the governments because it would enable governments to operate their social insur-
ance schemes with few subsidies and reduce inequality across different occupational 
insurance programmes, at the same time. In some East Asian countries such as Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan, the consolidation of multi-payer health insurance system was 
taken into seriously after the late 1980s. Some advocate groups claimed that it would 
enhance not only equality but also efficiency of the health care system. After Taiwan 
established a single payer system in 1995, this idea was given more attention from 
scholars and politicians in this region.  
In general, the debates between these two models focus on efficiency and soli-
darity (Hussey and Anderson, 2003; Oliver, 2009; Tuohy, 2009). The first topic is 
whether the integration reform increases the efficiency of health insurance admin-
istration and achieves cost containment in response to the trend in increasing total 
health spending. The supporters of a single-payer system claim that it has an ad-
vantage over a multi-payer system in overall cost control. Firstly, a single payer sys-
tem can use financial resources more effectively through the implicit transfer mech-
anism from a wealthy and healthy section of population towards a less fortune sec-
tion. In a multi-payer system, on the other hand, the transfer between different health 
insurance schemes is fairly restricted. Therefore, it occasionally happens under a 
multi-payer system that some heavily deficit-ridden funds coexist with other health 
funds with a large amount of reserves.  
Secondly, a single-payer system has the advantage on the size of risk pooling 
and its effect. The ‘law of large numbers’ indicates that risks become more predicta-
ble as the size of the pool grows. Health care costs for a small group are less predict-
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able than a large group. In a multi payer system, there are many different sizes of 
health funds. Some of them are occasionally too small to efficiently pool their mem-
bers’ health risks. Tiny health funds are fairly vulnerable to a surge in insurance 
claims and it would lead to a fiscal catastrophe. If risk pool becomes larger, it would 
be easier to predict potential risk levels and less vulnerable to this kind of shocks.  
Third, under a single payer system, it is much easier to reduce administrative 
cost. Under a multi-payer system, an individual insurer possesses its own monitoring, 
information, and payment system. By contrast, a single-payer system is to build a 
single administrative body, which means to reduce overlapping administration fee. 
Moreover, a single payer may have greater bargaining power against providers since 
it could monopoly the purchase of medical service and hold a strong control on ser-
vices and goods.  
By contrast, those in favour of the multi-payer system claim decentralising 
health care administration is easier to control moral hazards and governmental bur-
den. Firstly, the consolidation of health insurance schemes in the social insurance 
system leads to dramatic rise in health spending due to highly politicised health care 
policy. As Pierson (1994) clams, sophisticated tactics to hide the responsibility and 
visibility of welfare policies are more likely to cut off the welfare spending. When 
health policy making is centralised, however, it is much easier to track the responsi-
bility of welfare retrench. The integration of all health insurance bodies means that 
government is fully responsible for the finance of the public health insurance system 
(Kwon, 2007, 153). It would lead to a greater political determination of total health 
expenditure levels and most politicians are reluctant to support unpopular policy to 
raise the contributions or cut off the benefits.  
Moreover, a single payer system would face serious moral hazard problems. 
Under a multi-payer system, each health society is responsible for its own fiscal bal-
ance, including collecting revenue and controlling expense. Since the fiscal outcome 
in a health society affects the levels of contributions, the insured person becomes 
more conscious of the financial status of its insurance fund. They have an incentive 
not to overuse medical services since excessive utilisation may increase their insur-
ance contributions. By contrast, patients in a single-payer system may take less trou-
ble to minimise their health care expenditures. In addition, the collection of contribu-
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tions would not be done actively under the single-payer system.13 Lastly, those in 
favour of the multi-payer system argue that it is not clear whether government as a 
single insurer are really willing to use its power against the providers.  
The other main topic is the solidarity and redistribution in health insurance. 
Those in favour of the integration reform argue that the reform would lead to the 
moral sense of equity and solidarity by achieving vertical and horizontal equity. Due 
to the quite different financial conditions of health funds, the insured are supposed to 
pay different contribution fees for the similar benefits in a multi-payer system. How-
ever, in a single-payer system, it is much easier to equalise contribution rates across 
subscribers with similar income, which is the concept of ‘horizontal equity’. In addi-
tion, a single-payer system is usually progressively financed14 and it helps to pro-
mote greater financial redistribution between different income groups, achieving 
‘vertical equity’. If health societies are merged, it can redistribute financial resources 
across different groups. Moreover, a single-payer system is able to maximise the re-
distributional effect through comprising whole population. By contrast, a multi-payer 
system is able to share the risk and revenue only within specific groups because it is 
divided by workplaces or regions. It often happens that those with higher income pay 
less contribution than those with less income under a multi-payer system.  
The champions of the multi-payer system, however, claim the integration re-
form ironically undermines fairness. The income structures between the self-
employed and salaried workers are different since incomes of the self-employed 
fluctuate and are difficult to objectively assess (Bärnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002, 
1568). Some countries have difficulties in calculating contributions and collecting 
revenues from them due to widespread tax evasion, large informal economy, and 
limited capacity of tax administration. If a government consolidates all health 
schemes regardless of different income structures, it would hurt the fair charging 
mechanism in its health insurance system. For these reasons, solidarity should be 
mainly applied into a homogenous group. 
Moreover, a multi-payer system is also able to redistribute its financial resource 
through a variety of subsidies and transfers. Government provides subsides for cer-
                                                          
13 It falls into the collection of the self-employed contribution since employees’ contributions are 
automatically deducted under a single insurance fund. 
14 Progressive financing arrangement means that a proportion of contribution rises in accordance 
with income level. 
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tain groups in need of assistance such as the elderly or the unemployed. In addition, 
there are financial transfers from richer health fund to poor health funds in some 
multi-payer countries. For example, in Germany, there are inter-pool transfers be-
tween different health funds in accordance with different levels of risk and income 
(van de Ven et al, 2007).15  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the first section has examined the distinctiveness of health care 
service and its politics, followed by the description of the three main types of the 
health care system. Japan and Korea falls into the social insurance system, which 
relies on the occupational demarcation and social insurance contributions. The fol-
lowing section has explained the general problems inherent in the social insurance 
system. This system has been more vulnerable to cost explosion than the National 
Health Service. It has also contained the tension between social solidarity and con-
servatism. The last section has summarised the debates between the single-payer and 
multi-payer system in terms of efficiency and equality. Based on the general expla-
nations on health care systems and reforms developed in this chapter, the next chap-
ter will examine the features of Korean health insurance system and its reform goals 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
                                                          
15 A risk-adjustment scheme in Germany seeks to equalise differences of risk level in the sick-
ness funds’ membership based on age, income, sex, and number of dependents. They provide 
subsidies for sickness funds which account for more high-risk people. This system is geared to 
improve efficiency and solidarity. 
51 
 
Chapter 4 Political context of the health insurance reform  
in South Korea 
 
This chapter examines the historical and political background of the health in-
surance reform in South Korea. In the first section, it reviews the historical develop-
ment of health care policy in Korea. This section provides a systematic analysis of 
the origin and evolution of the Korean health insurance system from the 1960s to the 
1980s. In the second section, it examines the main features of the Korean health care 
system. In the third section, it investigates the problems inherent in the healthcare 
system in Korea. The institutional features under the fragmented system coupled 
with the upward trend of health care spending resulted in the serious fiscal crisis in 
municipal health insurance schemes. These schemes, which consisted of the relative-
ly older and poor insured persons, were in an adverse financial position. In the fol-
lowing section, it explains how the idea for the integration of all health insurance 
schemes was raised in South Korea. Lastly, it identifies major actors in health care 
policy in Korea and analyses the actors’ stances on the health insurance reform 
drawing from institutional arrangements and incentive structures.  
 
4.1 Historical development of health insurance in South Korea 
 
The Korean health insurance system has undergone several transformations in 
response to changing social and economic conditions. Korea built up its social health 
insurance system to protect skilled workers and acquire the legitimacy of political 
regime in 1963 and it actually began to work in 1976. The health insurance benefits 
were gradually extended into employees in small firms and their family and then the 
Korean health insurance system achieved the universalisation of health insurance in 
1989. In 2003, the Korean health insurance system integrated all health funds.  
 
The origin of health insurance  
 
The origin of social health insurance in South Korea could be traced back to the 
early 1960s (Kwon, 2007; Wong, 2004). Following the military coup d’état in 1961, 
the government in South Korea announced to introduce a series of social policies 
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including public health insurance in January 1962. In July 1962, the military coup 
leader, Park Chung-Hee, issued a memorandum to the “Supreme Council for Nation-
al Reconstruction” (SCNR) calling for the implementation of social policies. The 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) set up the “Committee for Social 
Security” (CSS) to tackle these tasks. The CSS put forth a proposal on the introduc-
tion of several welfare programmes such as health insurance. When the Medical In-
surance Act was enacted in December 1963, the SCNR made public health insurance 
not compulsory but voluntary, considering the weak economy and meagre medical 
resources in South Korea. For this reason, most of the companies did not take part in 
the programme and thus the public health insurance covered only 0.46% of the popu-
lation in 1976 (Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 61).  
The Medical Insurance Act in Korea was substantially revised in December 
1976 and came into effect in 1977. The 1976 Medical Insurance Act made it manda-
tory for all firms with 500 plus workers to build up health insurance societies. The 
bill was highly influenced by the Japanese health insurance system. When the bill 
was being drafted, Korean legislators invited Japanese physicians and scholars to 
learn the Japanese model (McGuire, 2010, 224). The Korean health insurance system 
emulated the basic structures of the Japanese system as it was divided between sala-
ried workers and the self-employed. 
Despite the revision of the Medical Insurance Act, the health insurance schemes 
which covered employees in small companies and the self-employed were still vol-
untary. In 1979, the company-based health plans were extended into corporations 
with more than 300 employees. It was extended into companies with over 100 em-
ployees in 1981, over 16 employees in 1983, and over 5 employees in 1986 (Kwon, 
2007, 65). In 1979, another health insurance programme for government employees 
and private school teachers came into effect. The medical assistance programme for 
the destitute was also introduced in the same year. 
 
Democratisation and universal coverage of health insurance in the 1980s 
 
South Korea finally achieved the universal health insurance that covered the en-
tire population in 1989 by extending its health insurance coverage. After the an-
nouncement about the universalisation of health insurance coverage, debates on the 
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health insurance governance occurred. Some lawmakers and academics proposed a 
single insurance body for the universal health care, claiming that it would solve the 
potential fiscal problem in municipal health insurance. However, the government 
chose to keep a multi-payer health insurance system, arguing the merger of health 
insurance schemes would increase the burden of the government.  
As shown in Table 4.1, 138 municipal insurance societies in rural areas began 
to operate in January 1988, which meant that approximately 70 percent of the popu-
lation were covered by public health insurance. As 117 urban municipal insurance 
societies began to work in July 1989, public health insurance became available to the 
entire population. Both political and economic factors led to the rapid achievement 
of universal health care (Kwon, 2007, 69). Firstly, the economic boom in the late 
1980s substantially increased the financial ability of the self-employed to pay for so-
cial insurance contributions. Secondly, as a political factor, President Chun and the 
ruling party attempted to retain their political base in rural areas by proposing uni-
versal health insurance coverage. The 1987 democratic transition in Korea also made 
the government more responsive to the mass public. 
 
Year 1977 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 
Coverage rate (%) 8.8 24.2 44.1 51.1 68.9 94.2* 
 
Table 4.1. Health insurance coverage from 1977 to 1989 
Source: Kim, 2012, 116 
Note: The others were covered by the medical aid programme in 1989.  
 
4.2 The Structure of health insurance system in South Korea before reform 
 
This section examines the structural features of the Korean health care system 
before the integration reform in terms of organisation, financing, and delivery. While 
it shared the critical features in the Bismarckian health care system, there were some 
crucial differences between Korean and typical social insurance system (Hwang, 
2008).  
 
Organisational structure 
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Health insurance programmes in Korea were fragmented by occupation and la-
bour market status. Before the integration reform of the health insurance schemes in 
2000-3, the national health insurance system in Korea was made up of more than 300 
non-profit health insurance societies. As shown in Table 4.2, there were three types 
of health insurance programmes in Korea; first was one for employees in private 
companies, second for public officers, and the last for the self-employed organised at 
the municipal level (Kwon, 2003, 76).  
 
Programme Occupation 
Number of 
the insurers 
Proportion of those 
covered  
Corporate health insurance 
programme 
Employees in large 
companies 
150 37.2% 
Health insurance programme 
for public workers 
Public workers 1 10.6% 
Municipal health  
insurance programme 
Self-employed and 
others 
266 45.6% 
Medical aid* The destitute - 6.6% 
Total - 417 100% 
 
 Table 4.2 The structure of health insurance programmes in Korea (As of December 1991) 
Source: Hoffmeyer et al, 1994, 30 
Note: The Medical aid programme was legally independent from health insurance schemes.  
 
The health insurance programme for employees in private companies was estab-
lished on the basis of enterprise or industrial district. A company whose employees 
were more than six thousand was able to build its own health insurance scheme 
(Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 265). In an industrial dis-
trict, small companies could put together to build a health insurance scheme. Most of 
the Chaebol companies, large family-owned business conglomerates in South Korea, 
built up their common health insurance schemes. For instance, companies in Sam-
sung built up the “Samsung General Health Insurance Scheme”. Each health insur-
ance society was legally autonomous although it was operated under the direct su-
pervision of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. All insurance societies joined 
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the Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies. In July 1977, 481 health in-
surance societies began to operate based on the 1976 Health Insurance Act, which 
covered approximately 3 million populations (Maeilgyŏngje, 1977). A second cate-
gory was for government employees and private school teachers. The civil servants, 
private school teachers, and soldiers were covered by an independent medical insur-
ance scheme, the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation (KMIC).  
The municipal health insurance programme covered those who were not entitled 
to join these two employment-based health programmes, such as the self-employed, 
unemployed, retired, and farmers. It was constructed mainly on the basis of resi-
dence under Article 6 of the 1976 Medical Insurance Act. The programme was main-
ly organised at the municipal government level. 266 municipal health insurance soci-
eties were organised as of December 1991.  
 
Financial structure 
 
There were three main sources of health care financing in Korea: contributions, 
government subsidy, and co-payment. The first source of health care financing was 
contributions by the insured persons, which comprised around 30 percent of total 
health spending in 1990 (Jeong, 2011, 141). The contributions of the employment 
based-health insurance schemes were designed to be equally shared between em-
ployers and employees. Employees paid their contributions as a fixed percentage of 
their monthly incomes. The contribution rate was decided by individual health socie-
ties within legal framework, between 3 and 8 percent of their wages in the early 
1990s.  
Health insurance societies for the self-employed collected contributions from 
the insured and they were responsible for paying their entire contributions. Since it 
was fairly difficult to assess their incomes, the schemes charged contributions in a 
different way compared to salaried workers. As shown in Figure 4.1, the contribu-
tions for the self-employed comprised two parts: basic and capability part (Federa-
tion of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 361-88). The basic part was not 
proportional to subscriber’s capability to pay contributions while the capability part 
reflected the subscribers’ abilities to pay contributions. The basic part consisted of 
two components. The “basic contribution per household” was a fixed amount per 
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household and “basic contribution per person” was commensurate with the number 
of family members. The capability part consisted of two components, the earnings-
related contribution and the assets-related contribution, which was linked to sub-
scribers’ income and asset respectively.  
However, there was widespread discontent over the fee system among farmers. 
The basic part was proportional to the number of persons, characterised as capitation 
fee. In capability part, farmers also had significant disadvantages compared to sala-
ried workers since land, a basic production means of agricultural industry, also was 
regarded as asset. As consequence, average monthly contribution for rural health so-
cieties was 6,096 Korean Won (KRW), which was higher than that for corporate 
health societies (5,787 KRW) and that for public workers (4,510 KRW) 
(Maeilgyŏngje, 1988).  
 
 
Figure 4.1. The basic structure of premium in municipal health insurance schemes 
Source: Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 470 
 
The second source of financing was government subsidy. In the 1990s, it ac-
counted for less than 10 percent of total health spending (Jeong, 2011, 141). As 
Kwon (1998, 66-67) called the role of the government in welfare policy as “regula-
tor” not “provider”, the government was reluctant to take the responsibility of fi-
nancing. The government supported the health plans for the self-employed, provid-
ing subsidies between 20 and 50 percent of benefit expenses. The size of tax-
financed subsidy towards these health funds was subject to change depending on the 
political and economic circumstances.  
The third main source of financing was co-payment. The patients had to pay a 
considerable amount of money for health care services from their pockets. It ac-
counted for more than 60 percent of total health spending in the early 1990s (Jeong, 
2011, 141). Patients were supposed to pay between 30 and 55 percent of co-payment 
57 
 
for covered outpatient healthcare services and 20 percent for inpatient treatment. 
Beneficiaries in Korea had to bear the heavy burden of out-of-pocket payments due 
to the large scopes of uncovered services. Although the government attempted to 
gradually enlarge the boundary of covered services, the pace of expansion was quite 
slow (Jeong, 2011, 6).  
Lastly, there were few structural mechanisms for financial transfers among the 
different types of health insurance funds within the national health insurance system. 
In 1991, the risk adjustment programme for highly expensive medical services start-
ed and it was extended into the expenses on the elderly care in 1995. The health in-
surance funds paid the fixed proportion of money for these transfers, and then re-
shuffled the financial resources according to the rules on these schemes. However, 
these transfers were not helpful to solve fiscal crisis in the municipal health funds 
since they were quite limited. 
 
Benefits coverage  
 
The health insurance system in South Korea offered universal but limited bene-
fits packages strongly controlled by the government. In principle, health care bene-
fits packages were identical across various medical insurance programmes. Benefits 
packages covered not only outpatient costs but also prescription drugs, dental care, 
and hospital stay. However, there were a wide range of non-covered services. When 
patients use non-covered services, they had to pay in full for these services. The 
scopes of covered services were quite narrow. Several important medical services 
such as CT (Computer-aided Tomography) and MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) 
were not covered by the public insurance until the mid-1990s. The public insurance 
covered provided the maximum 180 days of benefits for one’s treatment and, in turn, 
chronic disease patients received limited benefits from it.16 If the treatment was over 
the period, a patient had to pay. However, the medical costs of serious illness often 
exceeded a middle-class family’s financial capacity due to a wide range of non-
covered services. 
 
                                                          
16 It was extended into 210 days a year in 1995.  
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Provider and reimbursement 
 
Physician entrepreneurship was a strong element in the organisation of health 
care in Korea, where most clinics and small hospitals were private. The health care 
sector was exposed to competition among private-sector providers. The privately-
owned hospitals and clinics account for 96 per cent of total numbers of medical insti-
tutes. More than 90% of physicians were hired in private medical institutes (Jones, 
2010, 9). Basically, private physicians were reimbursed by patients and insurers 
through fee-for-service (FFS) mechanism. The FFS is a system under which provid-
ers are paid for each service individually. Patients were to pay for fixed proportion of 
co-payment for medical services and the remainder was reimbursed by health insur-
ance societies. The MOHSA identified the 762 kinds of different medical services 
when the mandatory health insurance programme began in 1977. Each medical ser-
vice had a specific point and medical providers were reimbursed by the amount of 
points.  
The government exercised strong control over the negotiation on national fee 
level with medical providers. The government introduced the “official notification 
system” on medical fees in 1977. The MOHSA could unilaterally set up the price on 
health care services. Instead, medical institutes could opt out for the national health 
insurance system. At the moment, 30 percent of clinics and 15 percent of small hos-
pital did not take part in the public health insurance because the official fee level of 
the national health insurance was much lower than market level. In response to the 
low level of physicians’ participation in the national health insurance system, the au-
thoritarian government made it mandatory for all medical institutes to be included 
into the public health insurance system in 197917. The physicians were strongly dis-
satisfied with significantly low fee level in the national health insurance. Doctors’ 
response to the low fee levels was to provide more services. By increasing the vol-
ume of their services and shortening a consulting time with a patient, they made up 
for the low levels of medical service fees. In addition, they encouraged patients to 
take uncovered medical services, which were free from the governmental regulations.  
 
                                                          
17 It stipulates that “Medical care institutions may not refuse to provide medical care benefits 
without any justifiable ground”. 
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Regulation and decision-making  
 
Before the integration reform in 2000-3, there were more than 300 non-profit 
health insurance societies. The administrative structures of health insurance societies 
were para-public emulating the German and Japanese health insurance system. How-
ever, self-governance in health insurance societies was hardly realised in Korea. 
There were huge gaps between “rule-in-form” and “rules-in-use” in the decision-
making process in the individual company-based health insurance societies (Leach 
and Lowndes, 2007, 185). According to the official regulations, subscribers were 
able to take part in the decision making in their insurance societies. For instance, Ar-
ticle 19 of the 1988 Presidential Decree under the 1987 Medical Insurance Act stipu-
lates that “the employers appoint half of the steering committee members and the 
employees elect half of the members (Presidential Decree No. 12481, 1987).” The 
steering committee members could select directors based on Article 25. One of the 
directors became the head of directors, who would be legally in charge of the admin-
istration of the health insurance society based on Article 26. However, labour was 
hardly able to join the steering committee and board of director in their health insur-
ance schemes in real practice. Business often appointed human resources personnel 
as the representative of subscribers (Han’gyŏre, 1998a). In addition, big business 
unilaterally used the reserved funds in corporate health insurance societies.  
The citizen in municipal health insurance had no channel to express their voice 
in one’s health scheme. Municipal health insurance programme had more authoritar-
ian regulations on the decision-making process. The official regulations granted few 
opportunities for members to participate in the decision making at the municipal 
health insurance scheme level. Article 29 of the 1994 Presidential Decree under the 
Medical Insurance Act stipulates “The body entrusted by a local medical association 
would recommend its steering committee.” Moreover, the municipal health insurance 
schemes were managed by revolving door personnel from the government or the mil-
itary. Most of the directors in these schemes were appointed with the political con-
nection to the ruling party and high-level bureaucrats and they monopolised the deci-
sion-making process (Han’gyŏre, 1989).   
At the national level, bureaucrats had great influences on health insurance so-
cieties. Health insurance societies were also subject to strict regulations imposed by 
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the government. All insurers offered the identical statutory benefit packages and the 
insured person had no freedom to choose their insurance societies. Various health 
insurance societies did not compete with each other in order to attract the insured 
person (Chun et al, 2009, 114). 
 
4.3 Major problems in the health insurance system 
 
Although the Korean health insurance system successfully provided health ser-
vices for the whole population, the insurance programme confronted critical chal-
lenges. There was an uncontrolled upward trend in health care expenditures. Moreo-
ver, the weak gate-keeping system and fee-for-service reimbursement system result-
ed in patients’ frequent visits to doctors and longer stay in hospital compared to oth-
er countries. In addition, the mechanisms to support the residence-based health funds 
were fairly weak. 
 
Cost explosion  
 
The health care expenditure in South Korea has increased more rapidly than its 
economic growth as shown in Table 4.3. For example, South Korea’s health spend-
ing grew by 7.5% between 1990 and 2001 while the GDP rose by 5.2% (OECD, 
2003, 29). There were several factors for the rise in health care expenditures. Firstly, 
as health care benefits extended into more people, they increase the visit for medical 
institutions.  
Year 
Type 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Health 
spending 
per capita 
73 94 121 121 137 147 157 181 219 248 
 
Table 4.3. The trend of health care spending in South Korea  
Unit: US dollars per capita18 
Source: OECD 2015  
                                                          
18 Health care spending refers to the amount of the final consumption of health goods and ser-
vices. This indicator includes public and private spending. It includes long-term care, pharma-
ceuticals, prevention programmes, and health care administration costs. This indicator is meas-
ured in USD per capita (using PPP). 
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The second is a demographic factor, the ageing of the population. The increas-
ing longevity, coupled with decline of birth rates, is producing increasingly the pro-
portion of the elderly. South Korea has increased its life span from 65.9 year in 1980 
to 80.3 year in 2009 (OECD, 2011, 79). The longer human life means more needs for 
medical care services for the elderly. Thirdly, the technical innovations of health care 
have contributed to significant increase in health care costs (Freeman and Rothgang, 
2010, 372). To satisfy public demands for ever expanding services, the state-of-art 
facilities such as CT and MRI were more often used.  
What was worse, the health care system in Korea had few tools to constrain its 
health expenditure. It adopted the fee-for-service (FFS) system, which can cause the 
over-supply of medical services (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2009, 33). The FFS 
system encourages providers to supply more medical services for their profits. As 
Table 4.4 shows, the number of consultations per capita per year in South Korea was 
much higher than the OECD average and patients in Korea tended to stay longer in 
acute care beds than other countries.  
 
 Korea OECD average 
Number of doctor consultations (in 1999) 8.8 6.9 
Average length of stay in acute care beds (In 1998) 10.6 7.5 
 
Table 4.4 Estimates of the volume of health care in the late 1990s  
Source: Colombo and Hurst, 2003, 41-43  
Unit: per capita, days  
 
In addition, medical technologies had also inflated the health expenditure in Ko-
rea by providing incentives for frequent use of high-tech medical measures. As Table 
4.5 shows, Korea more often accessed to high-tech medical equipment than other 
OECD countries.  
In many countries, general practitioners (GP), who provides primary care, play 
a role of gatekeepers.19 With limited choice of medical service, GP refers patients to 
specialists’ out- and inpatient service in hospitals. Some empirical studies show 
countries with GP gatekeepers have lower per capita health spending (Gerdtham and 
                                                          
19 Gatekeepers refer to primary care physicians who coordinate overall patient care and control 
access to higher level of medical service through referring patients to physicians. 
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Jönsson, 2000). However, South Korea had weak gate-keep functions, leaving pa-
tients free to consult any medical provider. Some patients visited several doctors for 
a treatment. The introduction of the strong gatekeeper system was refused by large 
hospitals, which successfully attracted many patients to their out-patient departments. 
These factors contributed to more outpatient contacts per capita in South Korea than 
other countries (Chun et al, 2009, 167). 
 
 1990 2000 2005 
MRIs 1.4 5.5 12.1 
CT Scanners 12.2 28.4 32.2 
 
Table 4.5 Diffusion of medical technology in South Korea  
Source: OECD, 2003, 94; OECD, 2008, 85 
Unit: times per million populations 
 
Inherent inequality in health insurance system  
 
Although the Korean health care system extended its coverage into the entire 
population in 1989, it still contained the serious inequality. First of all, the contribu-
tion of health insurance was regressive, which meant that lower-income group tend-
ed to pay a larger proportion of income for insurance contribution than higher-
income group. In terms of occupational equity, those who were enrolled in municipal 
health insurance suffered a relatively high contribution. Their insurance contribu-
tions were higher on average than employed workers although farmers’ average in-
come was lower than that of waged workers. At that time, wage earners paid 1.19 
percent of their income for contribution and public officers paid 1.68 percent on av-
erage. By contrast, an enrolee in a rural municipal health insurance scheme paid 2.36 
percent and an enrolee in an urban municipal health insurance scheme paid 2.04 per-
cent of their income (Tongailbo, 1990). 20 As remarked earlier, this kind of regres-
sive system in Korea came from the special criteria to calculate the insurance contri-
bution in municipal health insurance schemes. While employment-based health in-
                                                          
20 The source of data was the Korean Consumer Council, which investigated more than 600 
households on the health insurance system. 
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surance schemes charged the contribution solely based on insurers’ income, resi-
dence-based health societies charged the contribution based on property, family size, 
and income.  
 
Fiscal crisis in municipal health insurance schemes 
 
Year 
Type 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Corporate-based 
insurance 
schemes 
Reserves  1,618 1,274 2,259 2,450 2,607 2,503 
Reserve  
ratio 
117.8 119.4 128.7 116.3 103.7 91.0 
Residence-based 
insurance 
schemes 
Reserves 549 762 943 942 786 815 
Reserve  
ratio 
48.1 55.8 59.9 46.5 30.9 27.8 
 
Table 4.6. The financial gap between employment-based and residence-based health 
insurance societies 
Source: Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 606 
Unit: Billion Korean won, (%) 
Note: Reserve ratio = Reserves / Insurance benefits costs for this year 
 
The public health insurance system in Korea had the inefficient financing struc-
ture. First, there was a significant disparity between employment and residence-
based health societies in terms of members’ risks and incomes. Those who were in-
sured in municipal health funds were older than those in employment-based funds. 
Whilst the elderly over 60 years old comprised only 9 percent of company-based 
health plans’ members, they comprised 15 percent of municipal health plans’ mem-
bers in rural areas (Choi, 2003, 28). The subscribers of municipal health societies 
earned smaller income than those of company-based health societies. In addition, the 
municipal health societies had difficulty in collecting contributions. They were able 
to collect between 80 and 90 percent of revenues while the contributions of employ-
ment-based health plans were automatically deducted from employees’ wages.  
Table 4.6 gives more detailed information about a financial gap between resi-
dence and employment-based health plans. The health societies for employees in 
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private firms stocked their reserves equivalent to one year’s benefit costs. For exam-
ple, in 1995, these health societies had 2.45 trillion won as reserves, which account-
ed for 116 percent of their annual medical expenditures. However, municipal health 
plans had only less than half year costs. 
Secondly, some municipal health funds were too small to efficiently pool their 
members’ risks. There were five municipal health societies to cover even less than 
5,000 populations (Jo, 1998, 268). Most of the tiny health funds were quite vulnera-
ble to huge insurance claims by insured persons who suffered from serious diseases. 
In this case, they usually relied on the steep rise in contribution.  
Third, the small size of municipal health schemes led to “diseconomies of 
scale” and high management costs (Sin, 2004). Small health societies spent a signifi-
cant proportion of their expenditures on administrative costs. On average, municipal 
health funds in rural areas paid 15.6 percent of their total spending for administrative 
cost while company-based health funds 8.6 percent and health fund for public serv-
ants 6.7 percent (Tongailbo, 1994). The five health insurance schemes with less than 
5,000 insured persons spent 30 percent of total cost on managerial cost (Jo, 1998, 
268). In 1996, 24 health societies spent more than half of total expenditures on the 
costs.  
 
 1988 1989 1990 
Number of municipal health societies in red 18 118 228 
Number of total municipal health societies 140 254 254 
Proportion (%) 13 46 90 
 
Table 4.7. The proportion of municipal health societies in red 
Source: Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies 1997, 586 
 
For these reasons, municipal health insurance societies had difficulty in tackling 
their fiscal deficits. As shown in Table 4.7, 90 percent of schemes in this category 
recorded deficits in 1990. There were also six municipal health societies which had 
no reserved fund at all, as of the end of 1996 (Jo, 1998, 268). Although the govern-
ment had to increase the subsidy for them to offset this deficit, the proportion of 
governmental subsidies in their expenditures was decreasing.   
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Weak institutional commitment of financial support 
 
There was the commitment problem of financial support in municipal health in-
surance programme in South Korea. When the health plans for the self-employed 
were launched, the government assured them that the programme would be subsi-
dised to a large extent. The government guaranteed it would share the half of contri-
butions for the self-employed as Japan did for its municipal health insurance 
schemes. However, it turned out that the government did not keep the promise after 
launching municipal health insurance schemes in 1988. The financial resources for 
subsidising municipal health plans largely exceeded the government’s initial expec-
tation of how much funding was required because of the steep rise in health expendi-
tures.  
In addition, there were more crucial features of financial structures in the Kore-
an health insurance system than rapid growth of health spending itself. The central 
and local government showed weak commitment to support financially distressed 
municipal health societies. Firstly, the financial support for municipal health insur-
ance schemes was not legally binding strongly. The Medical Insurance Act in Korea 
made financial aid for municipal health insurance schemes arbitrary. Article 48 of 
the 1987 Medical Insurance Act stipulates that “the government could support the 
part of expenses for the health insurance schemes.” In addition, Article 36 of its 
1988 Presidential Decree mentions that “The part of the expenses to be borne by the 
national treasury (….) shall be determined annually by the Minister of Health and 
Welfare within the limits of the budget.” The size of subsidy towards these health 
funds in Korea was subject to change depending on political and economic circum-
stances. 
Secondly, a municipal health society in South Korea was not legally related to 
its local government. A municipal government in Korea did not take any responsibil-
ity for a local health society in its jurisdiction in contrast to the Japanese case. In this 
regard, while local governments in Japan transferred its general account budget into 
its health insurance fund to make up a deficit, those in Korea did not make fiscal 
contributions to the municipal health societies. It also weakened institutional com-
mitment to solve the fiscal problem in the Korean municipal health societies. 
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4.4 Major actors related to the health insurance system  
 
The previous section analysed the problems in the Korean health insurance sys-
tem. This section describes main actors’ roles in health care policy and incentives on 
the health care reforms. Bureaucrats, doctors, labour unions, business, farmers, civil 
movement, and the associations of health insurances were main actors in the process 
of the health insurance reform. This section elaborates how these actors shaped their 
policy preferences on the health care reform. 
 
Bureaucrats 
 
Welfare bureaucrats in South Korea historically played a key role in shaping the 
health insurance system. Given weak demands from society, government elites took 
responsibility to set up the health insurance system. In general, the Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA, later became Ministry of Health and Welfare) 
was the advocate of the universal health insurance system in the 1980s because it 
would bring to enhance their organisational capability. However, its political will 
often was limited by the political processes in the Blue House and cabinet meeting. 
This was because economic bureaucrats who held stronger power to control policy 
agendas did not support a rapid expansion of social welfare benefits. The economic 
bureaucrats controlled welfare expansion that may put significant financial burdens 
on the government (Kwon, 2011, 654). They were more interested in using social 
policy as a tool of industrialisation. In this regard, they preferred to gradually expand 
health insurance coverage. 
The idea of integrating all health insurance funds was raised by some of offi-
cials in the MOHSA in the early 1980s for the fast achievement of the universal 
health care. They claimed that financially strong company-based health insurance 
schemes could support the relatively unstable self-employed group. The Korea De-
velopment Institute (KDI), one of the most influential governmental think-tanks on 
economic policy, backed up the idea of merger since it would utilise the financial 
resources more efficiently (Maeilgyŏngje, 1980). By contrast, other high-level offi-
cials in the Blue House were opposed to this proposal, claiming the integration of all 
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health funds would lead to the escalation of governmental subsidy. Moreover, a 
fragmented health insurance system provided bureaucrats with job opportunities as 
managers of municipal insurance societies, which was often called “revolving doors”. 
For example, more than one hundred governmental officials were appointed as the 
director of health insurance societies in 1988.  
 
Political parties 
 
There were different opinions on the health insurance reform inside the ruling 
party. On the one hand, the leaders were opposed to the integration reform. Since the 
ruling party stressed overall economic performance over welfare policy, the party 
was worried about the burden of massive subsidy which might slow the pace of eco-
nomic development. They also considered the opposition of business associations on 
the reform. On the other hand, individual lawmakers in the ruling party were inter-
ested in a rise in the subsidy for health insurance schemes, which was directly linked 
to their electorates’ needs. Especially, the parliamentary members representing rural 
constituencies had an incentive to support the integration of all health funds based on 
constituents’ voices. In this regard, the ruling party’s position was subject to change 
depending on the electoral circumstances and the level of party discipline. When the 
party lost its popularity, they could lean towards the increase in the subsidy for rural 
residents’ health schemes. And when party discipline in the ruling party became 
loose, more lawmakers in the ruling party could support the subsidisation or integra-
tion of the health insurance system. 
The two centre-left opposition parties, the Peace and Democratic Party and 
the Reunification Democratic Party, were quite interested in the health insurance re-
form. Health insurance was the only universal welfare programme in the late 1980s. 
They fought against the legacy of the authoritarian system and thus it made them at-
tempt to be framed as reformists in the institutionalised political arena. They showed 
sympathy with rural residents and reflected the electorates’ request for the integra-
tion reform. At the same time, liberal parties may seek to balance between economic 
growth and social welfare expansion in order to appeal to the middle class of the 
electorate. In this regard, the integration of health insurance schemes would be an 
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attractive option for them because they thought the reform would bring the equal 
health care with small amount of the governmental subsidies.  
 
Medical providers 
 
The associations of medical providers in South Korea have been strongly in-
volved in health care and insurance policies. While the Korean Hospital Association 
(KHA) represented large medical institutes, the Korean Medical Association (KMA) 
mostly represented physician in primary care sector. These organisations protected 
medical professions’ interests in health policy. They had a strong organisational 
power on the basis of cohesive interests and were dedicated to protecting their social 
and economic interests. The introduction and expansion of health insurance in the 
1970s made them much more active in the political process of health policy.  
They put their priority on the reimbursement such as fee schedules and payment 
methods in health insurance system. In these issues, they confronted the government 
that tried to save the expenditures on health care with strong control of fee schedule. 
The health-care providers insisted that they were underpaid due to low medical fees. 
Doctors’ associations claimed it was impossible to sustain their business under quite 
low fee schedule and low fee for medical service inevitably led to low quality of 
medical service. They have threatened to strike over low fee level several times. Af-
ter democratic transition in South Korea, they claimed that the unilateral decision of 
medical fee level by the government was not democratic and it had to be autono-
mously negotiated with providers and insurers (Kyŏnghyang Shinmun, 1987). More-
over, they argued the review of reimbursement claims had to be handled by an inde-
pendent body, not the government. They also exerted their power to block the reform 
of the payment system. In response to cost explosion, for example, the pilot pro-
gramme for the Diagnostic-Related Group (DRG)21 payment method system started 
in 1997. In spite of the favourable outcome of the project, the introduction of the 
DRG system was rejected by physicians, who were strongly hostile to moving away 
from the fee-for-service system. 
In contrast, they were not dedicated to contributing their resources to the single-
                                                          
21 Diagnosis-related group (DRG) is a system to classify hospital cases into one of several groups. 
Under the DRG payment system, the reimbursement is made on the basis of the DRG grouping not 
the aggregation of total treatments (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2009, 39). 
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payer reform. The representatives of doctor’s associations paid little attention to this 
issue when the health policy committee in the MOHSA was organised in 1988. The 
representative of physicians in the committee said that they were not much con-
cerned about whether health insurance schemes were merged or not so long as the 
reimbursement for providers would work (Han’gyŏre, 1988a). Furthermore, the pro-
vider groups’ positions regarding health insurance integration were often incon-
sistent and ambiguous. One the one hand, some of the medical providers announced 
the support for the merger reform, claiming it was more convenient to be rewarded 
for medical fee from various insurance schemes. In addition, some of health insur-
ance schemes, particularly in rural areas, had difficulty in rewarding physicians for 
covered medical services and often delayed the reimbursement for medical institutes. 
The integration reform was to help to solve this problem. On the other hand, there 
was a serious concern over insurance fund integration, worrying the monopoly of the 
government in healthcare policy. The physicians were worried about whether the in-
tegration reform could significantly enhance the power of the government over them 
by creating a single payer in the health care system. 
 
Business 
 
Employer organisations such as the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and 
the Korean Employers Federation (KEF) played key roles in health insurance policy. 
Without their consent, it was impossible for the government to launch health insur-
ance programmes. They were supposed to pay half of contributions on behalf of their 
employees. In fact, employers had negative preference on health insurance at the first 
time. In this regard, it was not mandatory for companies to join health insurance so-
cieties in the 1960s. It was critical for the origin of health insurance that employers 
changed their preference on health insurance in the late 1970s. The big business in 
Korea already had provided health care benefits with its employees. After the 1970s, 
there was a shift towards heavy and chemical industrialisation in the Korean Econo-
my. They needed to protect skilled workers and a stable relationship with labour that 
were required for new industrial structure. Besides, if health insurance system was 
legalised, they could gain the tax relief for contribution on health insurance. The 
business groups have been willing to provide the generous welfare programs in order 
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to encourage workers to develop firm specific skills but the boundary was strictly 
limited to regular workers.  
The business groups had been most vocal in opposing the proposed consolida-
tion. When the idea of insurance merger was discussed within policy making process, 
they fiercely counterattacked the idea. Firstly, employers were unwilling to discard 
their financial advantages arising from the employment-based health insurance sys-
tem. In South Korea, the employers in big business had de facto right of manage-
ment on the accumulated surplus in health insurance funds (Kim, 1996, 199). For 
example, the Samsung health fund had about 96 billion Korean Won as reserves and 
the LG health fund had around 41 billion Won in 1995 (Kim, 1996, 199). They could 
take out a loan from a bank with quite low interest based on their reserves (Kim, 
1996, 200). And employers could also have a room to move under the fragmented 
system by delaying the payment of their contributions depending on their financial 
conditions. 
Secondly, they were worried about the hike in contributions, which meant high-
er labour costs. Employment-based insurance scheme in big business was designed 
for the exclusive benefit at company level. It consisted of relatively lower risk and 
better-off members than municipal health schemes and thus the fragmented system 
would provide health insurance with lower price for them than the integrated system. 
If health insurance societies were integrated with rural health funds, they would not 
only lose massive reserves but also pay extra contribution for other members. In this 
regard, big business was strongly opposed to the consolidation proposal.  
 
Trade unions  
 
Workers had significantly complicated interests on the health care reform. Un-
ions’ preferences can also be formed in several different logics. According to the 
logic of representational interests, trade unions prefer low contribution rate and 
broad coverage of benefits. The integration reform had serious disadvantages for the 
employee in big corporations. The contribution would rise sharply to support the 
low-income self-employed. When some of welfare bureaucrats suggested the merger 
of health insurance schemes in the early 1980s, the Federation of Korean Trade Un-
ions (FKTU) supported the partial integration only among workers’ health insurance 
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schemes. It claimed that current company-based schemes used higher administration 
fee, than a single insurance body for public workers. The company-based schemes 
used 7.4 % of total revenues as managerial cost while the insurance for public offic-
ers only spent 4.4 %. However, the organisation did not agree on the idea of integra-
tion of all health insurances because it would increase members’ contribution rate. 
During the second debate on the integration in 1988-9, they announced to take a 
stand against the integration with self-employed. It expected to increase their contri-
bution by 50 percent (Maeilgyŏngje, 1986). They were worried that the evasion of 
income and difficulty of income assessment of self-employed workers would result 
in a greater economic burden on them.  
Unions’ preferences can also be formed in order to protect organisational inter-
ests and exert political influence. Health insurance reform became a politically sali-
ent issue among the farmers and civil activists in the late 1980s. If labour is more 
willing to cooperate with other social movement groups in the issue, trade unions 
would gain their political partners.  
 
Rural residents 
 
The farmers in Korea were a less fortunate and relatively old group. Korean 
farmers usually had small size of their own farm due to land reform in the end of 
1940s. About 89 percent of the farms had less than two hectares in size (Powelson 
and Stock, 1987, 181). Farmers would be benefited from the single-payer reform 
through the redistribution of healthcare resources. There was a serious shortage of 
medical institutes in rural areas and the rural residents had difficulty in access to 
medical institutes. Considering a high level of geographical inequalities between ur-
ban and rural areas in healthcare service, the nationalisation of healthcare would be 
the best option for them. It is often said that remote rural communities are more like-
ly to be under-supplied by medical personnel and facilities in health care system 
(Blank and Burau, 2014, 94). In Korea, there were a few private and public health 
facilities in rural areas while most of the health providers were located in urban areas. 
Given the geographical imbalances of physicians, their low incomes, and high health 
risks, the farmers had a strong incentive to support the National Health Service 
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(NHS), which were used in countries such as the UK. However, it was hardly possi-
ble to implement it, considering weak political left.  
A selective subsidy for rural residents would benefit them, too. Japanese gov-
ernment, for instance, provided around half of expenditure of municipal health insur-
ance and local governments transferred their general account budgets into municipal 
health insurance funds to make up for recorded deficits. In Germany, the government 
provided the subsidy for farmers’ health funds and the Farmers’ Cooperation Foun-
dation in Taiwan played a similar role in reducing farmers’ burden on health insur-
ance premiums. However, there was the credibility problem underlying in targeted 
subsidy policy, as mentioned above.  
In this regard, farmers had the perception that the politically feasible commit-
ment to rectify inequality in health insurance was the merger reform. The integration 
reform of health insurance schemes would also be beneficial for them. Although it 
was not able to significantly improve access to medical care, it would reduce quite 
heavy contributions for them by promoting the transfer between different income 
groups and risk groups. At the same time, it could be a substantially strong commit-
ment to correct inequality in the national health insurance system because the gov-
ernment would hold direct responsibility for the fiscal problem of healthcare system. 
 
Civil organisations 
 
The political attention on the healthcare and health insurance system in the late 
1980s could provide a crucial opportunity for civil organisations to present their 
blueprint of welfare state. Most of the progressive civil activists preferred universal 
and large welfare states and linked the health insurance reform to welfare expansion. 
The government contributed less than 10 percent of the national health spending in 
1988 and patients bore huge health care costs (Jeong, 2011, 138). 
NGOs and civic groups in Korea had the potential to play critical roles in health 
care reforms. First of all, they were able to provide the political base where different 
groups were united. Korean civic groups were organised through democratic move-
ment under authoritarian regime and led by activists for democratic transition and 
progressive academics. The democratisation in South Korea led to the mobilisation 
of NGOs, which heightened the political awareness of social policy. They included 
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diverse groups and could form a broad political coalition for policy changes. Second-
ly, NGOs had close connections with progressive academics and thus provided re-
formist groups with a theoretical rationale for the health insurance reform. Those 
who were discontented with the current health insurance system lacked the policy 
expertise and it effectively discouraged them from participating in policy debate and 
discussion. The health care is a fairly technical issue and a relatively new issue in the 
reformer group. NGO which were linked to progressive academics generated solid 
arguments against the business groups and conservative media. They also contribut-
ed to the diffusion of their policy rationales into grassroots activists through organis-
ing a series of lectures and publishing booklets. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the historical and political background of health re-
form in South Korea. The health insurance system in Korea has dramatically devel-
oped over the last four decades. It began in the 1960s but came into effect in 1977 
based on employees in large companies. The coverage of the national health insur-
ance continually expanded into other occupational groups such as government em-
ployees, workers in small firms and the self-employed.  
In spite of the rapid expansion of the health insurance system in Korea, it had 
several significant problems, demanding immediate solutions. There was the upward 
trend of health care spending. The fragmented system, comprising more than 400 
different health insurance societies, made it worse since there was a serious gap of 
financial capability between residence-based and employment-based health insur-
ance schemes. The health insurances for the residents in rural areas covered relative-
ly old and poor insured persons than employment-based insurance funds. In this re-
gard, municipal health insurance funds struggled to tackle their deficits from onset.  
Faced with the critical challenges in the national health insurance system, main 
actors who were involved in health policy had different opinions for health insurance 
reform. The farmers and progressive civil movement groups strongly supported the 
integration of all health insurances into a single body, claiming that it could solve the 
fiscal problem in rural health insurance through massive reserves in company-based 
health funds. Furthermore, the reform would make the system not just more equal 
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but also more efficient through the transfer of financial resources and the reduction 
of administrative costs. By contrast, the business groups and government economic 
officials were strongly opposed to the merger proposal, claiming that the move 
would increase employers’ contributions and governmental subsidy. Moreover, they 
were worried that it would bring inefficiency into social insurance system and in-
crease the total health spending. The medical providers set their priorities on reim-
bursement for them but did not have strong incentives to make collective actions on 
the administrative structure reform. The labour union also took an ambiguous posi-
tion at the beginning. 
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Chapter 5 Political context of the health insurance reform in Japan 
 
This chapter examines the political background of the health insurance reform 
in Japan. The chapter begins with an overview of the historical development of the 
Japanese health insurance system. The subsequent section examines the problems 
inherited in the Japanese health insurance system in order to explain why the pro-
posal for the integration of all health insurance schemes was raised in Japan. Lastly, 
the chapter analyses main actors’ interests and ideas on the health care policy and the 
health insurance reform. It elaborates how actors shaped their policy preferences 
based on the incentive structures and their ideas.   
 
5.1 Historical development of health insurance in Japan 
 
There are three phases of development of social health insurance in Japan. The 
first phase is between its onset and the Second World War. After the late nineteenth 
century, there was the demand for health insurance system in Japan in response to 
economic transformations and industrialisation. Japan built up the social health in-
surance in 1927 to protect skilled workers and prevent labour unrest. The second 
phase is between 1945 and the 1970s, characterised by the universalisation of the 
health insurance system. The Japanese health insurance system expanded into the 
whole population in 1961, and the dramatic change was the move towards free 
health care for elderly the in the 1960s and 70s. The third phase is after the 1980s, 
when health care policy was moved in the opposite direction for retrenchment. With 
the economic downturn and cost explosion of health expenditures, Japan was strug-
gling to streamline its welfare payments including health care expenditures. 
 
The introduction of statutory health insurance between 1920s and 1945 
 
The public health insurance system in Japan could trace back to the 1890s, 
when medical insurance was firstly proposed by the Central Hygiene Committee. It 
proposed that a workplace with 100 or more workers would set up its statutory 
health fund and yet the proposal was turned down. After a while, some of the volun-
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tary health insurance schemes such as railroad workers’ mutual aid fund were built 
up. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce drafted the first bill on the statutory 
health insurance programme in 1922. It was enacted in 1923 and came into effect in 
1927. The first health insurance programme was for manual employers just as the 
German social health insurance model (Shimazaki, 2005, 3-4). Business with over 
10 employees was required to offer health insurance benefits to their employees in 
this bill (Yoshihara and Wada, 2008, 44-6). When it came into effect, some of the 
manual workers in limited sectors could receive health insurance coverage, which 
accounted for 3% of the whole population in 1927. The employment-based health 
programme expanded its coverage into small-scale manufacturing employees in 
workplaces with more than five workers in 1934 and then white-collar employees in 
1937.22  
The Citizen Health Insurance programme (CHI)23 was proposed to cater for 
farmers and other occupational groups in the 1930s. The Great Depression and the 
following Showa Depression in the late 1920s damaged living conditions in farming 
villages. The average income of farming households had halved from 1929 to 1931. 
In response to the economic crisis, voluntary and community-led movements were 
organised to provide health care services in rural areas. Moreover, as Japan entered 
into the stage of total war in 1937, it was requested to supply a “healthy military and 
labour force” (Takaoka, 2011). For these reasons, the government enacted the 1938 
Citizen Health Insurance Act.  
 
Universalisation and benefit expansion between 1945 and 1970s 
 
The effort to expand health insurance coverage reached its peak in 1943, around 
70% of the population. However, health insurance schemes were crumbling in war-
time and post-war time chaos. After the Second World War, almost half of the mu-
nicipal health insurance societies did not work and health insurance coverage rate 
fell to around 50 percent of the whole population (Reich et al, 2011, 1108). The gov-
                                                          
22  The regulations of the mandatory health insurance schemes in the first stage were quite 
complicated depending on the sectors and size of business. It is well described in Yoshihara and 
Wada (2008, 44-6). 
23 The Japanese translation of this programme is close to the National Health Insurance(NHI). 
But the NHI is often used to refer to the whole public health insurance system. In this regard, this 
thesis call this programme as Citizen Health Insurance.   
77 
 
ernment set out the rebuilding of the CHI schemes by revising the Citizen Health In-
surance Act (Ishioka, 2014, 5).  
In the mid-1950s, the “Seven Committee” and “Committee for Social Security” 
recommended that the government should universalise health insurance coverage 
(JMA, 1997, 46). At that moment, both right- and left-wing parties pledged to 
achieve the “health insurance for all” and the 1958 Citizen Health Insurance Act was 
passed, which would extend coverage into the whole population. As all local gov-
ernments built up their municipal health insurance schemes, Japan achieved the uni-
versal health coverage in April 1961. After the universalisation of health insurance, 
the elderly medical care became a main political issue in election campaigns. In 1969, 
several local governments including the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Akita 
prefecture began to provide free medical services for the elderly. It was widely 
spread across the nation amid high-speed economic growth. In this background, the 
1972 Elderly’s Welfare Act was passed to guarantee free access to medical care for 
the elderly across the nation.  
Moreover, in this period, the Japanese health insurance system became more 
generous to all citizens. A ceiling of patients’ cost-sharing was introduced in 1973 to 
relieve their burdens of serious disease. When a monthly out-of-pocket payment ex-
ceeded a ceiling, insurance fund paid back the excess amount to the patient. In this 
regard, 1973 is often regarded as an “epoch-making move towards a welfare state 
(Fukushi gan'nen)” (Tsuchida, 2011, 251).  
 
The efforts towards cost-containment in the 1980s 
 
The Japanese welfare state took some measures for retrenchment in the 1980s. 
Unfavourable economic conditions and rising health-care costs created the new polit-
ical environments for welfare reforms in the 1980s. The elimination of co-payment 
for the elderly resulted in the excessive demands for health care and thus the national 
health expenditures had increased from 250 billion yen in 1970 to 1.1 trillion yen in 
1979. Moreover, the Japanese yen significantly appreciated against the US dollar and 
oil crisis also hit the Japanese economy in the 1970s. As the government accumulat-
ed a budget deficit in the 1980s, it attempted to cut welfare spending (Tsuchida, 2011, 
250-1). The burgeoning health care expenditures became one of the main targets for 
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streamlining the public expenditures. To advance the major “administrative reform” 
(Gyosei Kaikaku or Gyokaku), Prime Minister Nakasone established the Second Pro-
visional Administrative Reform Commission under the banner of ‘fiscal reconstruc-
tion without tax increase’. The government also initiated a policy discourse about a 
“Japanese-style welfare society” to justify welfare retrenchment. They reconfigured 
not only national economic frameworks but also a cultural ethos which rewarded tra-
ditional values of ‘self-help’ (jijo). It sought to assign the responsibility of basic wel-
fare into individual, family, and community rather than the government.  
Based on the new policy orientation, the government embarked on attempts for 
the retrenchment of health care services. The ‘health care system for the elderly’ 
(Rōjin Hoken Seido or Rōken) was designed to constrain the growing health expendi-
tures by re-introducing elderly patients’ co-payment and sharing the elderly care 
costs with public health insurance programmes (Graig, 1999, 106-7).  
 
Searching a new era in the 1990s  
 
 In the 1990s, there were more complicated policy features in Japanese health 
care policies. The government sought further cuts in health care expenditure. How-
ever, the government wanted to make some measure to tackle aging society and bur-
geoning elderly care costs at the same time (Izuhara, 2003, 396). In Japan, the elder-
ly had been reliant more on hospitals for long-term care than social services. This 
practice resulted in the large number of hospitals beds and the long average stay in 
Japan (Jones, 2009, 13). A significant proportion of acute care beds were used for 
the long-term care function for the elderly, the phenomenon known as “social hospi-
talisation” (Imai, 2002, 7). 
In this background, “kaigo hoken” (long-term care insurance, LTCI) was intro-
duced in the process of several steps. First, in 1989, the Ministry of Welfare pub-
lished the Ten-Year Strategic Plan for Health and Welfare Services for the Elderly, 
known as the Gold Plan. It focused on the expansion of care services for the frail 
elderly. In 1994, all municipal governments had to initiate their plans for “Health 
and Welfare Plan for the Elderly”. The Long-term Care Insurance Act was passed in 
1997 and the Long-term Care Insurance took effect in April 2000. It offered institu-
tional or domiciliary services for people aged 65 or over (category I) and some peo-
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ple aged 40–64 with specific disabilities (category II). 
 
5.2 The Structure of Japanese health insurance before reform 
 
This section examines the structural features of the organisation, financing, and 
delivery of the Japanese health insurance system in the 1990s. The goal of this sec-
tion is to analyse the pre-condition of the health insurance reform. ` 
 
Organisational structure of health insurance system 
 
The Japanese health insurance system was fragmented on the basis of occupa-
tion and labour market status. There were four different types of health insurance 
programmes in Japan. First, the SMHI (Society-Managed Health Insurance) or 
“Kempo” was for the employees in large firms. The SMHI covered 32.5 million, 
about 26 percent of the population in 1999. This programme made its own associa-
tion, National Federation of Health Insurance Societies, much well known as “Ken-
poren”. Second tier was the programme for employees in small and medium-sized 
corporations and their dependants, called “Government-Managed Health Insurance” 
(GMHI, Seifu kanshō kenkōhoken). When Japan began its health insurance pro-
gramme, some of the companies were too small to organise their own health socie-
ties. The government decided to directly provide their employees with health insur-
ance coverage. This programme evolved into the GMHI. The GMHI plans covered 
30.7 percent of the population in 1997. It was a single body managed directly by the 
Social Insurance Agency. Third type was the mutual aid funds for public workers. 
These three programmes were for the employees.  
The last programme was the Citizen Health Insurance (CHI, Kokumin 
kenkōhoken or Kokuho). It was designed for those who were not covered by any 
types of the employment-based health insurance schemes and thus covered various 
groups such as farmers, the self-employed, the retired, and the unemployed. As 
shown in Table 5.1, there were more than three thousand municipal plans and 166 
CHI plans for the self-employed associations in 1999. The CHI societies built up 
their association, the “All-Japan Federation of National Health Insurance Organisa-
tions” (Kokumin kenkō hoken chūōkai). 
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Type Insurer 
Number of 
insurer 
Number of insured 
(thousand person) 
Occupation 
SMHI 
Health insurance 
societies 
1,794 32,578 
Employee in large 
company 
GMHI Government 1 37,575 Employee in SME 
Sailors’ 
health in-
surance 
Government 1 259 Sailor 
MAI24 Mutual aid funds 79 10,139 Public workers 
CHI 
Local government 3,249 41,021 
Farmers, fisherman, 
self-employed, unem-
ployed, and retired 
Special CHI funds 166 4,433 craftsman 
Total 3,415 45,454 - 
 
Table 5.1 the structure of health insurance system in Japan (As of March 1999) 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2001 
 
Financial structure 
 
There were three main sources to finance health care in Japan: contributions, 
government subsidies, and co-payments by patients. Firstly, insurance premiums 
were the largest source of financing health care, which accounted for around half of 
total health expenditures. In employment-based health plans, employees and em-
ployers contributed a premium together. The legal premium rate of the insurance so-
cieties varied from 3 percent to 10 percent of wages. The average contribution rate 
was 8.5 percent of employees’ wages in 1997. A large proportion of employers paid 
more than half of workers’ contributions in Japan.25 The GMHI scheme set up flat 
contribution rate at 8.5 percent of monthly gross salary in 1999, which was equally 
shared by employers and employees. The CHI schemes had a more complicated sys-
                                                          
24 There are mutual aid funds organised for employees in central and local government and 
teachers including their dependants. The operation is similar to other company-based health in-
surance.  
25  On average, employers in the society-managed paid around 55 percent of the total 
contributions and employees paid 45 percent. Big companies often pay more than half of total 
contribution and sometimes up to 80 percent of the contribution.  
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tem for the calculation of subscribers’ contributions. The insurance premium per 
household was calculated by the basic premium, the earnings-related insurance pre-
mium, and the assets-related insurance premium, similar to the Korean case. 
 
Year 
Source 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Tax 
Total 15.9 25.9 33.5 33.4 31.7 36.4 
Central gov-
ernment 
11.6  22.1 28.9 26.2 24.2 25.1 
Local gov-
ernments 
4.2  3.9 4.6 6.8 7.5 11.4 
Premium 45.5 53.2 53.5 54.3 56.4 49.2 
Patients’ co-payment 38.7 20.6 13.0 12.3 11.9 14.4 
 
Table 5.2 Financial source of national health spending (%), 1955–2005 
Source: Tatara and Okamoto, 2009, 61  
 
Secondly, as shown in Table 5.2, over one third of the national health spending 
came from general tax. It was fairly higher than other Bismarckian healthcare states 
in Europe. While providing only limited subsidy for administrative expenses to the 
SMHI schemes (Fukawa, 2002, 5), the government provided 796 billion yen for 
GMHI, which counted for 13 percent of its total costs, and provided 3,192 billion 
yen for the CHI schemes in 2005.  
The CHI members’ capability to pay contribution was limited with absence of 
employer. The central and local governments paid around half of the total costs in 
CHI plans. Municipal governments which were responsible for managing their mu-
nicipal health plans allocated significant extra funds to cover deficits in the CHI 
funds (Tatara and Okamoto, 2009, 38).  
Lastly, the proportion of health care cost borne by patients was lower than other 
financial sources. Users were supposed to pay small parts of money for health ser-
vice from their pockets, ranging between 10 and 30 percent of co-payments, depend-
ing on age and health insurance programmes.  
There were special mechanisms of risk pooling and redistribution of financial 
resources in the Japanese health insurance system. The fragmented health insurance 
system chronically suffered fiscal crisis due to the discrepancy of the elderly enrol-
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ment between residence-based and employment-based health insurance schemes. To 
cope with the rising health care costs and unequal burden for the elderly, the risk-
adjustment mechanisms26 that transferred revenues from employment-based schemes 
to municipal health schemes were created in the early 1980s. In 2005, the SMHI 
programme paid 1.2 trillion yen for the elderly health programme, which accounted 
for about 30 percent of its premium revenue.  
 
Benefit coverage  
 
The health insurance system in Japan offered comprehensive and universal cov-
erage and the benefits packages were strongly controlled by the government (Tatara 
and Okamoto, 2009, 56). Benefits packages covered outpatient cost, prescription 
drugs, dental care, and hospital stay. While they were roughly identical across vari-
ous health insurance schemes, company-based plans provided favourable extra bene-
fits for their members (Fukawa, 2002, 6).  
Patients paid directly out-of-pocket for some portion of their health care. The 
enrolees in the employment-based health plans paid 10 percent co-payment for med-
ical care while their dependents paid 30 percent for outpatient care and 20 percent 
for inpatient care in the mid-1990s. The enrolees in the CHI plans paid 30 percent 
co-payment. The old who joined the elderly health programme paid 10 percent in 
general.  
There has been a ceiling for the out-of-pocket cost since 1973. Because the 
medical costs of serious illness or injury sometimes could far exceed an individual’s 
saving, the government set up the maximum out-of-pocket ceiling of medical costs. 
If the amount of out-of-pocket payment was larger than the ceiling, a patient could 
pay back the gap from one’s insurance fund.  
 
Provider and reimbursement 
 
In general, the Japanese health insurance system paid both physicians and hos-
                                                          
26 The risk-adjustment mechanism in the social insurance system refers to compensating for dif-
ferences in risk profiles between various funds by shuffling financial resource between different 
health plans based on unequal distribution of high risk groups in health insurance schemes (Schut 
and van Doorslaer, 1999). 
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pitals on a fee-for-service (FFS). The fee schedule played a crucial role in the deliv-
ery and finance of the health insurance system. It was one of the most important pol-
icy tools in health care policy. This was because it not only determined the doctors’ 
incomes but also shaped the incentive structure of whole health care industry through 
price setting. To operate the FFS payment method under the public health insurance 
system, the government offered the official table for medical fee points. The fee 
schedule in Japan revised every two years. The Central Social Insurance Medical 
Council including providers, insurers, and consumers was involved in this process. 
In practice, a negotiation between the Japan Medical Association (JMA) and the 
government was the most important factor to determine national fee level (Ikegami 
and Campbell, 1999, 63). All covered medical services were paid by third parties, 
health insurance schemes. After providers claimed their medical services, these 
schemes were supposed to review these claims and paid back to physicians. Since 
the screening process was quite technical, special bodies were in charge of the reim-
bursement process on behalf of individual health societies.  
 
Regulation and decision-making 
 
Health insurance societies in Japan have been subject to strict regulations by the 
government. In the Japanese system, consumers had no right to choose their health 
insurer and insurance schemes could not choose their consumers. Enrolment in the 
public health insurance programmes was mandatory and whole population was regis-
tered in one specific insurance society according to their employment status or resi-
dence (Imai, 2002, 5). In this regard, there was no competition among health insur-
ance schemes for the attraction of consumers. Instead, the health system in Japan al-
lowed consumers’ freedom to choose medical providers.  
At the individual health society level, there were strict rules on decision mak-
ing.27 There were two main bodies of decision making at company-based health in-
surance society level; the Society Committee and the Board of Directors (Kenporen, 
2014, 15). The Society Committee was the place to make important decisions on 
budget, rule changes and annual business plans. Employers would nominate their 
                                                          
27 This part is written on the basis of the interview with one executive of a company-based health 
soceity and one official in a municipal health soceity. 
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appointed members of the society committee and employees (the insured) would 
elect their committee members. The management and the insured would have the 
same number of committee members. The board of directors would be in charge of 
executing the operation of its health insurance scheme. The board of directors would 
be made up of directors representing business and workers. The managers would 
nominate the appointed directors among its committee members and the insured 
would elect their directors among their committee members.28 Besides two commit-
tees, there would be audits members to oversee a health insurance society. The 
health insurance scheme’s assets would be kept apart from the corporation’s and 
could be used only for the health insurance scheme (Interview with an Executive of a 
Company Health Insurance Society, Tokyo, December 2014). Previously, some of 
the health societies invested their reserved funds into risky assets. However, the Min-
istry of Health and Welfare began to regulate the risky investment. Recently, most of 
the company-based health societies invest their reserves into low risk assets such as 
central and local government bonds (Interview with an Executive of a Company 
Health Insurance Society, Tokyo, December 2014).  
In the CHI schemes, there would be several institutional arenas for citizens to 
take part in their health societies. The “operation council” would be an advisory in-
stitution in a municipal health insurance scheme. This council would decide the con-
tribution rate, contribution levy method, and the scope of benefits. The operation 
council of the Kunitachi City29 health insurance society I interviewed was composed 
of the 14 representatives: four representatives of subscribers, four representatives of 
providers (including pharmacists), four representatives of public interests, and two 
representatives of company-based insurance schemes in its jurisdiction (Interview 
with a public officer in Municipal Health Insurance Division of Kunitachi City, To-
kyo, January 2015). When a CHI health scheme attempts to initiate significant 
changes on its rules, it often opened the public hearings on these issues. The citizens 
were able to participate in public hearings. Moreover, the municipal council moni-
tored its health insurance society on the budget and business plans.  
 
                                                          
28 The company health society I interviewed was made up of 259 thousand members in2014. 
There were 46 members in society committee and equally allocated for the business and labour 
(Interview with an Executive of a Company Health Insurance Society, Tokyo, Dec 2014). 
29 It is a city located in the western part of the Tokyo metropolitan area. 
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5.3 Major problems in the health insurance system 
 
The Japanese health insurance system was challenged by several problems. The 
main problem was a sharp rise in health care costs. In addition, the weak gate-
keeping function and fee-for-service reimburse method resulted in more frequent vis-
iting outpatient clinic and longer stay in hospital. Too much fragmented health insur-
ance system led municipal health insurance schemes to record chronic budget defi-
cits, too. 
 
Cost explosion and aging population 
 
There was an increasing concern on how to control health expenditures in a sus-
tainable manner. As shown in Figure 5.1, since the early 1970s, the health spending 
in Japan had dramatically increased. The national health expenditures had skyrocket-
ed from 2.5 trillion yen in 1970 to 11 trillion yen in 1979. The concern over increas-
ing health care costs was burgeoning in the mid-1990s, as Japan entered into long 
economic recession. The pace of the rise in the national health care spending was 
faster than that that of the GDP. For example, from 1990 to 2001, Japan’s health 
spending had grown at 3.8 percent while overall GDP growth was just 2.3 percent 
(OECD, 2003).  
Some institutional features of the Japanese health care system were responsible 
for the steep rise in the health expenditures. Firstly, a fairly generous elderly health 
care programme caused excessive use of medical services, as mentioned above. Sec-
ondly, the Japan’s primary care system contributed to the cost explosion due to its 
weak gate-keeping function. This system guaranteed access to treatment at higher 
specialist medical institutions. A patient was able to go directly to highly specialised 
hospital without primary care physician’s referral although they were supposed to 
pay more than usual fee (Tatara and Okamoto, 2009, 42). This feature led to more 
visits to specialists in Japan. Thirdly, the Japanese health care system mainly used a 
fee-for-service system in a wide range of medical services while other OECD coun-
tries widely introduced the package reimbursement system. It is often said that the 
fee-for-service system tends to increase the health spending since it gives providers 
an incentive to provide more services.  
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Figure 5.1 The trend of the national health expenditure per GDP in Japan, 1990-200930 
Source: MHLW 2013 
Unit: Trillion Yen, % 
 
As shown in Table 5.3, in outpatient care, patients in Japan tended to more fre-
quently visit doctors than other counties. The number of consultations per capita per 
year was more than twice the OECD average in 1998 (Jeong and Hurst, 2001, 30). 
Moreover, the average length of stay in hospitals was about four times more than the 
OECD average in 1998, which was the longest record among the OECD countries 
(Jones, 2009, 12). When it comes to drug consumption, Japan showed the third high-
est consumption level. In addition, Japan ranked high on most of the indicators as 
shown in Table 5.4. One million people accessed the MRI around 40 times and used 
the CT scanners around 90 times in 2005, which was the most frequent access 
among the OECD countries.  
The trend was also closely related with an aging population in Japan. This is 
because the elderly tend to spend much more health expenditures than others. For 
example, those aged 85 or over in Japan were 957,000 yen per person in 2007 while 
the age group 15 to 19 spent only 57,000 yen per person as shown in Figure 5.2 
                                                          
30 The ‘national health spending’ is larger than as total health expenditure calculated by the 
OECD. The indicator of the OECD excludes maternity, childbirth expenses, preventative medi-
cal care, and non-prescription drugs (Imai, 2002). However, the Japanese government prefers to 
publish documents based on the ‘national health spending’ since it is better to show the total 
health expenditures including health insurance costs.  
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(Reich et al, 2011, 1110). With a plummeting birth rate and the long life expectancy, 
Japan’s population was aging faster than that of other developed nations. According 
to the OECD health care data (OECD, 2010), Japan’s life expectancy had increased 
from 76.1 year in 1980 to 83 year in 2010. The proportion of people aged 65 years or 
over in Japan had nearly doubled in the past two decades, growing from 9.1 percent 
in 1980 to 17.3 percent in 2000.  
 
 Japan OECD average 
Number of doctor consultations 16 6.6 
Average length of stay in acute care beds 31.5 8.2 
Drug expenditures 301 259 
 
Table 5.3 Estimates of the volume of health care in 1998 
Source: Jeong and Hurst, 2001, 40-45 
Unit: per capita, day, per capita US$ in PPP’s  
Note: For several countries data are for either 1996 or 1997 
 
 MRIs CT Scanners Lithotripters 
Japan 40.1 92.6 7.1 
Germany 7.1 16.2 3.7 
Canada 5.7 11.5 0.5 
OECD average 9.5 21.5 2.9 
 
Table 5.4 Access to medical technology in the Japan and OECD in 2005  
Unit: times per million populations 
Source: OECD, 2008 
 
In addition, the demographics change in Japan stressed the health care financing 
system that relied on payroll taxes. Consequently, the proportion of the elderly com-
pared to working generation has sharply increased. There is the index of “old age 
support rate”, which refers to how many people in working generation support one 
elderly. It is measured by the ratio of the population who are more likely to be eco-
nomically active - aged 20 to 64 - to older people who are more likely to be econom-
ically inactive - aged 65 or over (OECD, 2011). While ten working generation peo-
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ple supported one elderly in 1950, as shown in Figure 5.3, only 3.6 people in work-
ing generation supported one elderly in 2000. Because the capability of working 
generation to support the elderly was quite limited, an aging population posed a seri-
ous threat to the whole Japanese welfare system.  
 
Figure 5.2 The trend of an ageing population in Japan*  
Unit: % 
Source: MHLW, 2008 
Note: It refers to the proportion of people aged 65 or over among total population 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The old age support rate in Japan, 1950-2005  
Unit: people 
Source: OECD, 2011 
Note: The old age support rate refers to number of people of working age (20-64) per person of 
pension age (65+) 
 
Financial crisis in the Citizen Health Insurance (CHI) 
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Increasing cost pressures were evident in the fact that about two-thirds of the 
municipal health insurance societies suffered losses in 1996 as shown in Figure 5.4. 
The cost explosion in health care expenditures led to the financial problem in munic-
ipal health insurance societies, which were much more vulnerable health programme 
than the others. In order to make up the deficits in these societies, around 331 billion 
yen was transferred from the general account of local governments into local health 
plans in 1998 and around 387 billion yen in 2003. 
There were some structural problems in municipal health insurance schemes. 
Firstly, its financial condition had been threatened by aging structure. The proportion 
of the elderly in the CHI was much higher than employment-based health plans. The 
total insured in the programme was 51.6 million in 2004 and there were 20.7 million 
aged 65 years or over among them, which was 40.1 percent of the total insured 
(MHLW, 2006). The SMHI schemes consisted of only 3.9 percent of those aged 65 
years or over. These aged 75 and over accounted for only 0.2% in the SMHI plans. 
The average age of insured persons in the CHI schemes was 53.7 year olds while that 
of SMHI schemes was 34.2 year olds in 2004. Higher proportion of the elderly in the 
CHI schemes led to higher health spending per person in these schemes. While 3.2 
young people supported an old person in overall health insurance programmes in 
2004, only 1.2 young people in municipal health insurance supported an old person 
(MHLW, 2006). Figure 5.4 shows the proportion of the CHI members among the 
whole Japanese population by age groups. While one in four was the CHI member 
among those aged 20s-50s, three in four were the CHI member among those aged 65 
or over.  
Moreover, the CHI plans suffered their small revenues. As the proportion of the 
unemployed and low-income in these plans had risen, the CHI plans were on the 
verge of the collapse. It was related to the shift of industrial structure. While two-
fifths in the CHI schemes worked for farming and fishery in 1965, these industries 
made up only 5 percent in 2002 as shown in Table 5.5 (MHLW, 2003). Instead, the 
number of households with no job has sharply increased. The half head of the house-
holds in these schemes had no job in 2002.  
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Figure 5.4 The number and proportion of the CHI members by age groups in 2004 
Source: MHLW, 2006 
 
 
Number of municipal insurers Insurers in red Proportion in red (%) 
1996 3,249 2,117 65% 
1997 3,249 1,543 47% 
1998 3,249 1,817 56% 
1999 3,245 1,967 61% 
2000 3,242 1,722 53% 
2001 3,235 2,012 62% 
2003 3,144 2,289 73% 
 
Table 5.5 The proportion of municipal insurers in red, 1996-2001 
Source: MWHL, 2003 
Note: Municipal insurers mean the CHI schemes excluding special craftsmen’s health insurance 
schemes. 
 
Moreover, one quarter of households earned income below the taxation thresh-
old (MHLW, 2003). This change led to the dramatic decrease in members’ average 
income in the CHI schemes, as shown in Table 5.6. While the average income of 
household in these schemes was 1.975 million yen in 1998, it was 1.65 million yen 
in 2004. The members’ average income in these schemes - 1.8 million yen - is less 
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than half that of employment-based health plans - 3.8 million yen in 2004. This 
change undermined the financial base of the municipal health insurance programme.  
 
Year 1965 1983 2002 
Head of house-
hold occupation 
Farming· Fishery  42.1 13.6 4.9 
No job 9.4 23.7* 51.0 
Proportion of no income household - 15.1 26.6 
Proportion of the elderly* 5.0 11.7 26.6 
Proportion of small insurer with less 
than 3,000 members 
10.0 25.7 34.7 
Collection rate (%)   90.4 
 
Table 5.6 The structural change of the Citizen Health Insurance  
Source: Shimazaki, 2005, 20 
Unit: % 
Note: The elderly means over 70 in 1965 and then those who obtain the subsidy based on the elderly 
health programme in 1983 and 2002.  
 
  In this regard, premium revenue was decreasing even though premium rate 
increased. Average premium rate had increased from 6.68 percent in 1995 to 8.63 
percent in 2004. However, the premium revenue had decreased from 154,000 yen in 
1995 to 142,000 yen in 2004. This was because the average income of insured per-
sons in the CHI had much sharply decreased than rise in premium rate. These 
schemes also encountered the problem in collecting contributions. While they col-
lected about 96 percent of total expected premiums in 1974, they did only 90 percent 
in 2004 (MHLW, 2009).  
Lastly, the small size of insurance societies made the crisis more serious. For 
example, 35 percent of these schemes had less than 3,000 members in 2002 while 
only 10 percent had less than 3,000 members in 1965. It is important for insurers to 
adequately gauge the hazards of a risk. Some small health societies had a serious fis-
cal problem because it failed to diffuse risks. It also caused the inefficient admin-
istration of the health insurance societies. Small health societies put more proportion 
of money into administration fee than those in larger size.  
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Inherent inequality in the health insurance system  
 
Although the Japanese health insurance system showed the strong equity, there 
were some factors that contained the inequality between different health insurance 
schemes. Firstly, the co-payment rate was different depending on the health insur-
ance scheme to which people belonged. While those who were covered by employ-
ees’ health plans only paid 10 percent of co-payment, the insured persons covered by 
Citizen Health Insurance had to pay 30 percent of co-payment. Although the scope 
of official benefits was the same across different programmes, company-based health 
plans provided favourable extra benefits compared to municipal health insurance 
schemes.  
Secondly, the payment of health insurance system was regressive. The insured 
in company-based health insurance scheme made higher income than those in mu-
nicipal health insurance schemes. However, subscribers of municipal health insur-
ance programme paid 8.3 percent of their income as insurance fee while those of 
company-based health insurance programme only paid 3.3 percent, as shown in Ta-
ble 5.7.  
 
 CHI SMHI GMHI 
Average age of insured (year old) 53.7 40.9 43.1 
Proportion of over 65-year-old (%) 40.1 3.9 8.0 
Average income of insured (thousand yen) 1,650 5,462 3,832 
Average real premium rate (%) 8.63 3.34 4.10 
 
Table 5.7 The comparison of different health insurance programmes in 2004  
Source: MHLW, 2004 
Unit: thousand yen 
 
5.4 Major actors related to the health insurance system  
 
This sub-section analyses the roles of main actors related to the health insurance 
system in Japan. It also examines the institutional framework of health care policy 
making processes. It is often said that the health care policy in Japan has been mainly 
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determined by the negotiations between the government and medical professionals. 
However, other important actors were also deeply involved in the maintenance and 
operation of the health insurance system. These main actors included bureaucrats, 
medical providers, business, labour unions, local governments, and associations of 
health insurance societies. 
 
Bureaucrats  
 
The Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW) became the primary 
governmental body in charge of the health policy in Japan, as a result of the merger 
between the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and the Ministry of Labour in 
2001. The MHW was originally built up in 1938 in response to the need for healthy 
solders and workers, and it had played a key role in shaping the Japanese health care 
system since then. The MHW inclined to take full control of health care policy based 
on the concept of public health paradigm, an ideal of good health care across all the 
population by the public bodies (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998, 27). During the Sec-
ond World War, the government took almost entire initiatives for health care policy 
in hands. This practice left important policy legacies in the Japanese health care poli-
cy and the health insurance system was regarded as a crucial tool to achieve this goal 
(Ikegami and Campbell, 2004, 32). There had been a long sharp conflict between the 
MHW and the doctors’ associations. Welfare bureaucrats were in an effort to hold 
down the rise in medical service fee. In the 1980s, “the project for stabilisation of 
health cost” was launched by the ministry. It was a crucial turning point to take an 
initiative in health care policy against the doctors’ associations (Yuki, 2004, 39). 
They had complicated incentives on the integration of all health funds. On the one 
hand, it could reduce the administration fee and enhance the equity. On the other 
hand, it could make the whole health insurance system less efficient.  
Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) affected health care policies by 
controlling the national budget. In addition, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Pol-
icy and the Regulation Reform Council had a significant power to propose policies at 
macro level (Tatara and Okamoto, 2009, 35). Firstly, economic bureaucrats pursued 
cost containment measures in health care policy. They were concerned about the fi-
nancial integrity in Japan. They called for increasing co-payment to curb the national 
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health spending and the introduction of target for financial limits for health insurance 
expenditure. 31  For cost containment, on the one hand, they occasionally fought 
against welfare bureaucrats who were reluctant to take these measures. On the other 
hand, they backed up welfare bureaucrats in their struggle against medical profession 
with regard to the level of the medical fee schedule. Secondly, economic bureaucrats 
attempted to lessen the scope of governmental involvement in health care policy. 
They sought to get rid of rigid regulations in healthcare service such as “mixed 
treatment”32 and the ban on investor-owned hospitals (Ikegami and Campbell, 2004, 
32). Lastly, economic bureaucrats preferred to the fragmented health insurance sys-
tem rather than the integrated system. They supported to strengthen the competition 
among insurers in a fragmented system like the Dutch and German health insurance 
system. In this regard, they were opposed to a merger between employment-based 
and residence-based health plans, which would get away with the competition be-
tween health insurance schemes.  
 
Political parties 
 
It is often said that political parties in Japan, including the LDP, are reactive ac-
tors in health care policy. Health reforms driven by the party leadership were often 
frustrated by particular interest groups. The policy making process in the LDP left 
little room for the prime minister's initiatives in health care policy (Leduc and Leduc, 
2003). Before the 2000s, party leaders’ political support was vacillating between bu-
reaucrats and medical providers and usually failed to take an initiative in health care 
reforms. There were some reasons why political parties, especially the long ruling 
party, left the health policy in control of bureaucrats and medical providers.  
First, the LDP had a strong connection with medical providers’ associations for 
the sake of campaign contributions. The Japanese Medical Association (JMA) was a 
key constituency for the party (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998, 32). They provided 
substantial campaign funds for the party. For instance, the JMA donated around 305 
                                                          
31  If the total cost of health spending exceeded the target, the fee schedule would be 
automatically decreased next year. 
32 “Mixed medical care” refers to the provision of uninsured and insured medical services at the 
same time. In principle, the mixed treatment of uninsured and insured service could not be 
covered by public health insurance. 
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million yen to the LDP in 1998 (Leduc, 2002, 68). The organisation was also a cru-
cial source of votes by mobilising votes for the party at the local level. 
Second, the decision-making process in the LDP had allowed particularistic in-
terest groups to have significant influences on policy decisions (Krauss and Pek-
kanen, 2010). All proposed legislations and policies adopted by the party should be 
examined and approved by the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) in the party 
and then send it to Cabinet and Diet (Martin and Stronach, 1992, 244–47). The 
PARC was divided into several sections and the “Social Affairs Division” and the 
“Medical Care Committee” deal with health policy. This Committee was usually 
dominated by policy tribes who acquired expertise in specific areas, so-called “zoku” 
politicians. In the health policy, the welfare-related group of Diet members had been 
closely linked to the medical associations, highly influencing the decision making in 
the PARC. The Committee in the LDP was used to defend the interests of medical 
professionals.  
On the health insurance governance, the LDP was opposed to the integration re-
form. They were worried about the moral hazard from the single-payer system. They 
claimed the proposal would reduce the efficiency of the health insurance system. 
While an individual insurer would do its utmost to control medical costs under the 
multiple insurer system, it would be not easy for a single insurer to control medical 
costs. Instead, they supported the creation of a new health insurance programme for 
the elderly. They claimed that such a programme would be helpful to curb the health 
care spending. 
 
Medical providers 
 
The associations of medical providers in Japan had long been involved in health 
policy. There were several medical associations but the Japanese Medical Associa-
tion (JMA) had a pivotal role in health policy making (Mano, 2012; Somae, 2012; 
Yūki, 2004). It was founded in 1916 based on private primary care sector and re-
established in 1947. The core interest of medical profession was its reward for their 
work and professional autonomy. The association was successful in prompting and 
protecting its interests based on substantial resources.  
They had a strong organisational power on the basis of high density. While 60 
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percent of doctors joined the JMA on average, most of the private-practice physi-
cians joined this association (JMA, 2010). Since their organisational power was 
strong, the consent from the JMA was fairly crucial to operate the public health in-
surance system. For example, in February 1961, at the eve of launching the universal 
health insurance system, physicians took a strike action calling for increasing fee 
level and in September they announced to withdraw from the health insurance sys-
tem (JMA, 1997, 77). In addition, they had created strong connections with the rul-
ing party, as explained above. 
With regard to the health insurance system, the priority of this organisation was 
reimbursement such as fee level and payment methods (Somae, 2012, 126). In this 
issue, they made confrontation with the government which attempted to save the 
health care expenditures. They also exerted their power to block the introduction of 
the comprehensive payment system. Secondly, physicians advocated the autonomy 
of medical profession, which was often threatened by the government. The govern-
ment sought to interfere with physicians through standard guideline of healthcare. 
However, physicians requested the right to choose the best treatment themselves 
based on high ethical standards and professional skills. Thirdly, physicians favoured 
generous health service covered by massive subsidies (Somae, 2012, 126). When the 
government sought to grapple with cost containment in health care, physicians were 
against this measure. If the public health insurance system reduced its scope of cov-
erage or increased co-payment for patients, people would reduce the visit of medical 
institutes. Later, the physicians proposed the tax-based independent ‘medical care 
scheme for the senior elderly’, which would be financed by general tax. 
However, the medical profession in Japan was not much interested in the re-
forms of health insurance governance. Although the JMA was in favour of the health 
insurance integration in the 1980s under the president Takemi’s leadership (Arioka, 
1997), this organisation was not dedicated to changing the health insurance govern-
ance (Jeong and Niki, 2012; Yoshihara and Wada, 2008). This was because it did not 
directly affect physicians’ income and working conditions.  
 
Business 
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The Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and Japan Fed-
eration of Employers’ Associations (Nikkeiren) had been involved in the health care 
policy.33 The business groups in Japan were worried about the increase of health cost. 
The burden of contributions for the elderly coupled with long-term care insurance 
payments placed the employment-based health insurance societies under financial 
pressure. The increase in health insurance premiums would result in the hike in la-
bour cost and the loss of competitiveness in international market. Instead, they had 
an incentive to support the measures to control health care expenditures and the tran-
sition into tax-based system. Later, business suggested it seemed more appropriate 
that government would finance health expenditure through consumption taxation ra-
ther than payroll taxes. 
In addition to the control of health care expenditure, business groups had strong 
incentives to resist the consolidation of all health insurance funds. The integration 
reform means pooling high risk group with low risk group, financially healthy funds 
with deficit-ridden funds, and the wealthier with the poorer. If company-based health 
insurance societies were integrated with municipal health funds, business would pay 
extra finance for other health insurance societies as a sort of cross-subsidy. Moreover, 
company-based health funds could be used as a tool to provide their employees with 
exclusive benefits.  
 
Trade unions 
 
The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengō) had been involved in the 
health care policy. Trade unions had strong incentives to be opposed to the integra-
tion reform. There were some reasons why labour supported the fragmented health 
insurance system in Japan. Firstly, the prevailing system provided an economic ad-
vantage for members in employment-based health schemes. In practice, most large 
firms paid more than half of employees’ premiums, around 60 percent on average as 
shown in Table 5.8. Furthermore, the company-based health schemes provided more 
generous benefits than other health schemes. In the mid-1990s, society-managed 
                                                          
33 In 2002, Keidanren and Nikkeiren merged into the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). 
98 
 
health insurance schemes (SMHI) provided the health care benefits with only 10 per-
cent of co-payment while municipal health plans with 30 percent.  
If all health insurance schemes were integrated into a single health insurance 
scheme, high income workers’ premiums would significantly increase and health 
care benefits for them would be cut. It was expected that the enlargement of the risk-
adjustment programme put additional burden on the SMHI programme, which was 
0.3 trillion yen in total and 110,000 yen per person (Asahi Shimbun, 2002a).  
 
 employer employee total 
NEC Health Insurance society 4.2% 2.8% 7% 
Kawasaki Steel Health Insurance society 5.6% 3.2% 8.8% 
 
Table 5.8 The rate of premiums shared between employer and employee in 1990 
Source: Graig, 1999, 102-3 
 
Secondly, the prevailing system strengthened labour’s influence on healthcare 
policy through the co-administration of company-level health insurance schemes. It 
is often said that the labour in corporatism occupies an important governance role on 
the social insurance side of business, which is commonly the case in Continental Eu-
rope (Giaimo, 2002). For example, in Germany, the sickness funds managed by both 
unions and employers allow organised labour and capital a voice in the health care 
administration (Manow, 1997). Under this system, organised labour could play two 
roles as payer and insurer. As major financial contributors, the employees would pay 
a substantial proportion of the premium revenues in the public health insurance sys-
tem. At the same time, they occupy the role as insurers, which means that they are 
directly involved in the administration of health insurance schemes at company level. 
Combining these two roles gave labour greater leverage in the health care policy.  
 
Local governments 
 
In Japan, a local government has a considerable fiscal responsibility to its mu-
nicipal health plan. Faced with post-war chaos, the 1948 revision of National Health 
Insurance Act stipulate that a municipal government would directly operate its local 
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health insurance programme. The role of local governments on health policy had be-
come increasingly important in providing and organising health care and social ser-
vices. However, they had difficulty due to on-going deficits in their municipal health 
insurance schemes. In this regard, the municipal governments had strong incentives 
to support the integration of the health insurance system. If all health funds were 
merged, it was more likely that the health insurance system would be controlled by 
the central government or an independent administrative body. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the background of the health insurance reform in Ja-
pan. The first section has provided a systematic analysis of the origins and evolution 
of Japanese health insurance system from the 1920s through the late 1990s, along 
with subsequent policy initiatives. The following section has provided an analysis of 
the health insurance system in terms of organisation, finance, benefits, and regula-
tions.  
The third section has examined why the reform of the health insurance system 
emerged as a critical issue in welfare policy. The upward trend of health spending 
exacerbated by demographic change pressured the Japanese economy. Moreover, 
there was a serious gap between company-based insurance and self-employed insur-
ance. The health insurances for the unemployed, the self-employed and so on cov-
ered older and poorer people compared to employed-based health insurance plans. 
The municipal health insurance funds and local government had struggled to tackle 
their fiscal problems.  
The last section has analysed the position of main actors in the health care re-
form drawing on the institutional arrangements and incentive structures. Faced with 
the critical challenges in the health insurance system, political actors who were in-
volved in health policy had totally different opinions. On the one side, the local gov-
ernments and municipal health insurance schemes had incentives to support the inte-
gration of various health plans into a single body, arguing the fiscal problem in mu-
nicipal health insurance schemes could be solved only by this reform. On the other 
side, business, labour, and company-based health insurance schemes had incentives 
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to support the status quo in the health insurance system, worrying that they would 
bear more costs for other groups after the integration reform.  
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Chapter 6 The political dynamics of health insurance reform  
in South Korea 
 
This chapter analyses the political dynamics behind the health insurance reform 
in South Korea between the late 1980s and the early 2000s. South Korea integrated 
its multiple health insurers into a single national health insurance between 2000 and 
2003. The first section examines the unsuccessful reform trial in the late 1980s. In 
1989, Korea achieved a universal health insurance system but one which was divided 
by workplaces and regions. Farmers protested that their health insurance system was 
unequal and ill-managed. An integration bill on the health insurance system was 
passed in the National Assembly, which was led by liberal opposition parties. How-
ever, President exerted his veto power to scrap the merger reform. Absence of labour 
in a coalition for the health care reform contributed to its failure. The second section 
explains the process of coalition formation for the health insurance reform. Frustrat-
ed by failed militant strategies, labour sought to change its identity and orientation 
towards embracing social reforms and other progressive issues. The farmers, labour, 
and civic movement groups organised the “Coalition for the Integration of the NHI”, 
a crucial organisation for the health insurance reform. The broader coalition led to 
the partial integration reform between the health insurance societies for public offic-
ers and the self-employed on the eve of the 1997 presidential election. The third sec-
tion explains how the reformers achieved the full-scale health insurance merger un-
der the Kim Dae-jung administration. This section provides an analysis on how soli-
darity between farmers and labour and new president’s strong leadership overcame 
the persistent obstruction by a conservative party and its followers.  
 
6.1 Reform attempt after democratisation between 1987 and 1989 
 
This section explains why the trial of health insurance reform led by opposition 
parties, farmers, and progressive civil movement ended up with failure in 1989. In 
1988, the Korean health insurance system extended its coverage into rural residents 
under the fragmented system. However, the Korean health insurance system had the 
defects of inequality and inefficiency, as mentioned in Chapter 4. The organisational 
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differentiation of health insurance societies along labour market status produced se-
rious inequalities among the insured persons since the municipal health funds in Ko-
rea covered a disproportionate share of poorer and sicker segment of the population. 
The rural population were frustrated by not only unequal but also poorly-managed 
health insurance system. They organised themselves in defence of equal right of so-
cial protection.  
 
6.1.1. Passage of reform bill in the National Assembly 
 
An emerging idea for the integration reform 
 
In response to the serious fiscal problem in the municipal health societies, some 
called for the integration of all health insurance schemes. Initially, the idea of inte-
grating all health insurance funds had been raised by some of the high officials in the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) in the early 1980s. They argued 
that it would enhance the efficiency of the health insurance system by streamlining 
its managerial bodies (Won, 2006, 162). Although Minister Chun Meoyng-gi was in 
support of this idea, President Chun Doo-whan did not approve of the proposal, wor-
rying about a heightened political responsibility for the health insurance system after 
the integration reform. The dispute on the integration reform ended up dismissing the 
high-level bureaucrats in the MOHSA who were in favour of the reform in 1983. Af-
ter that event, the integration idea had lost the political base inside the government 
and bureaucrats moved to lean towards the fragmented system. 
The second debate on the merger reform was mainly triggered by the govern-
ment’s announcement of the universal health care in the 1986. When the government 
released the plan on the extension of health insurance coverage into the self-
employed, it did not have a clear idea on financing this new programme (Yu and 
Anderson, 1992, 295). Some scholars claimed the integration of all health insurance 
schemes could effectively finance the universal health insurance through the mecha-
nism of internal transfers from the wealthy and healthy section to the poor and un-
healthy section of population (Won, 2006, 167).  
 
Mobilisation of frustrated farmers 
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When the health insurance schemes for the self-employed in rural areas began 
in 1988, it turned out that the rural population was frustrated by not only unequal but 
also poorly-managed health insurance system. When farmers received the first bill 
for their insurance contributions in January 1988, they began to organise the protests 
against high contributions. They returned the bill to their health insurance associa-
tions and refused to pay contributions as means of protests. In addition, they signed 
the petition calling to redress the major problems in their health insurance schemes. 
The outcry over poorly-managed health insurance programme sparked the communi-
ty-wide protests, so called “Health Insurance Rectification Movement”. The protests 
on the health insurance reform in rural areas began in Gui-San, Chung-Nam Prov-
ince and quickly spread across the nation. The number and intensity of collective ac-
tions in local areas were proportional to the organisational power of local farmers’ 
associations to a large extent (Kyŏnghyang Shinmun, 1988). The Rectification 
Movement became a main vehicle for farmers and protesters to attempt to raise the 
political awareness of healthcare issues among mass public. 
The fact that farmers successfully mobilised in the health insurance reform 
could be explained by the gap between farmers’ expectation and reality. The gap be-
tween the idea of social welfare and institutional incapability in Korea led to farm-
ers’ mobilisation as Lieberman (2002) mentions institutional changes come from the 
friction between institutional capacities and ideational patterns. Institutions them-
selves are not neutral structures of incentives but, rather, the carriers of specific ideas 
(Rothstein, 2005; Schmidt, 2010). Before the introduction of the health insurance 
programme for the self-employed and farmers, the certificate of public health insur-
ance was conceived as a symbol of the privilege for public officers and employees in 
large corporations. The population had the idea that the health care benefits were 
their exclusive rewards based on their social status. The introduction of a universal 
health insurance system, however, had changed the public attitudes and ideas on 
healthcare by bringing the idea of social inclusion and governmental responsibility 
for healthcare in the Korean society. They realised that all citizens were entitled to 
acquire the basic right of healthcare. The ideational shift generated a high level of 
political awareness of inequality among different health insurance programmes. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, there were some critical problems to sustain the municipal 
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health insurance programme. The ideas and discourses carried by the universalisa-
tion of healthcare had made frictions with its poor institutional capacity to achieve its 
ideal goal.  
 
Mobilisation of civil society 
 
After well-organised farmers took lead in protests, progressive civil movements 
were joined to achieve health insurance reforms. There were progressive civil 
movement groups in South Korea as a legacy of the democratisation movement and 
they pointed out serious defects in the health insurance system. There was inequality 
between corporate and municipal health insurance plans and civil activists were 
sympathetic to disadvantaged agrarians. In addition, they criticised the government 
for not being responsible for municipal health insurance schemes. The two grassroots 
movements such as farmers and civic associations spontaneously joined forces to 
fight for better healthcare services. At first, their demands were fairly broad and 
vague. They called for a rise in subsidy to sustain municipal health insurance 
schemes, discount on insurance contribution, and the modification of current contri-
bution formula which was disadvantageous to the farmers. In addition, they called 
for delaying the payment of their contributions until harvest. However, their de-
mands became more directed towards the consolidation of all health schemes. The 
Catholic Farmers’ Council, Christian Farmers’ Council, National Farmers’ Associa-
tion, and other 48 organisations built up the “National Committee for Medical Insur-
ance Integration (NCMII)” in June 1988, calling for the integration of all health in-
surance funds (Han’gyŏre, 1988b). The incorporation of civic associations into the 
reform coalition provided the rationale for health insurance reform because civic 
movements had strong connections with several influential progressive academics on 
healthcare policy.  
The supporters for the health insurance reform in Korea tailored their tactics, re-
flecting the institutional commitments and political possibility. There were several 
reason why reformers in the healthcare arena opted for the consolidation of all health 
funds as their policy alternative. First, there was the low level of institutional and 
political commitments on the subsidisation for the municipal health insurance socie-
ties. While the subsidisation was considered as an option by farmers at first, they had 
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realised that it would hardly be possible that their health funds could receive massive 
governmental subsidies. While the government pledged to raise the financial sup-
ports for health insurance schemes in rural areas, it did not keep the promise. Since 
the subsidy for health insurance programmes had a critical problem of commitments, 
the farmer and civil activists thought the integration of all insurance societies could 
be a politically feasible and strong commitment to rectify inequality in the health in-
surance system. 
Secondly, the reformers also considered a winning reform coalition on the 
health insurance reform in political arena. Since their political power was not strong, 
they needed to appeal to liberal opposition parties. At that time, there was no left-
wing party in the National Assembly. Instead, the two liberal opposition parties - the 
“Party for Peace and Democracy” and “Reunification Democratic Party”- were 
available political partners to support the health insurance reform. These opposition 
parties fought against the legacies of the preceding authoritarian regime, identifying 
themselves as “reformists” in the mainstream political arena. Based on their reform-
ist image and the electorates’ demands to amend the health insurance system, they 
were deeply involved in the reform. However, these parties as liberals sought to bal-
ance the economic growth and the expansion of social welfare. They were reluctant 
to sharply increase welfare spending, which may slow the growth of the national 
economy. In this regard, the integration proposal had the crucial advantages com-
pared to other reform ideas. It could enhance the quality of the health insurance sys-
tem within constrained budget since it would contain the financial transfers between 
different sections of population. It could also lower the managerial costs of the health 
insurance schemes by the reduction of overlapping administrative activities. For 
these reasons, the reformers thought that the integration proposal could obtain the 
support from the liberal parties.  
In the same vein, the reformers ruled out the radical transition towards the Na-
tional Health Service. There were small groups such as the “Humanitarian Doctors’ 
Association”, which advocated the tax-based nationalised health care service 
(Han’gyŏre, 1988c). Nonetheless, most reformers dismissed the proposal for the 
NHS. In Korea, most of the medical institutes were private and doctors hardly agreed 
the transition towards this system. In addition, most of the politicians regarded it as a 
communist idea (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources Department 
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in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015).  In this regard, the re-
formers spontaneously ruled out the proposal for the NHS. 
 
Reform bills by liberal opposition parties 
  
The 13th general election in April 1988 gave a big boost to the health insurance 
reform. The ruling party did not obtain a majority in the National Assembly. The two 
liberal opposition parties formed a policy alliance for political and social reforms 
against the legacies of previous authoritarian regimes. The agrarian uprising for 
health care reforms gave these liberal parties a political opportunity to represent 
farmers’ interests. The civil movement groups drafted their own health insurance re-
form bill. In September 1988, the “National Committee for Medical Insurance Inte-
gration (NCMII)” drafted the new National Medical Security Act which called on the 
government to introduce the integration of all health schemes (Federation of Korean 
Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 521). Two liberal parties also prepared the revi-
sion on the Medical Insurance Act reflecting the voice for the integration reform. At 
the end of 1988, the two opposition parties submitted their own health insurance re-
form bills respectively, embracing the integration of different health funds. Later, the 
New Democratic Republic Party, a relatively conservative opposition party, also 
shifted its position to support the integration reform and these three opposition par-
ties made a single reform bill including the integration of all health funds. In contrast 
to the bill proposed by the opposition parties, the government made a counter-
proposal for the partial merger of 254 municipal health societies into sixteen socie-
ties at the greater local government level. The governmental proposal did not tackle 
company-based health societies and public officers’ health society. 
The ruling party was opposed to the integration reform but it did not vote 
against the bill proposed by the opposition parties. The ruling party could not block 
the bill since the three opposition parties in favour of the reform held majority in the 
National Assembly (Sin, 2010, 173). Instead, the ruling party attempted to partially 
revise some clauses such as contracts with medical providers and patients’ co-
payment in order to reduce additional burdens on the government. In March 1989, 
the National Assembly passed a bill for the merger of health insurance societies.  
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Reactions of interest groups 
 
The Federation of Korea Trade Unions (FKTU), which had been co-opted by 
the authoritarian regimes, expressed the opposition to the integration bill although it 
admitted the long-term merits of the plan. The organisation said they could accept 
the bill only when the government would implement two prerequisites (Welfare and 
Society Committee, 1989, 37). They called for increased governmental subsidy for 
the public health insurance programme since otherwise the reform may shift the bur-
den to salaried workers. In addition, they called to return the reserves in company-
based health funds to workers. This was because the reserves were solely contributed 
by salaried workers’ efforts to save medical expenditures (Welfare and Society 
Committee, 1989, 39).  
The medical providers were in favour of the integration reform and made the 
petition for it in November 1988. This was because the municipal health insurance 
schemes were financially weak and thus had difficulty in reimbursing physicians 
(Sin, 2010, 173). However, it should be noted that medical providers were not com-
mitted to the integration reform and their support for the reform was instrumental 
(Han’gyŏre, 1988a). They did not agree the core ideas conveyed by reformers such 
as equality and solidarity in health care policy. The physicians regarded the reform 
as a political opportunity to increase their economic incomes and their professional 
autonomy. They called for rise in the level of medical fee and freedom to opt out of 
the public health insurance system. 
 
6.1.2. Coalition without labour  
 
Labour in Korea did not show solidarity with health care reform groups in the 
late 1980s, which made a sharp contrast with its vigorous mobilisation after the mid-
1990s. At that moment, the labour movements reflected more particularistic interests 
such as working conditions and wages rather than social policies (Mo, 1996; Wong, 
2004). To answer the question of why labour did not support the grassroots demands 
for the better health insurance system, we need to delve into the Korean labour 
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movement in the late 1980s, which was the era of successful mobilisation by “mili-
tant unionism”.34  
 
1987 Great Workers' Struggle and the 1987 Labour System 
 
Democratisation in 1987 opened up a new political arena for labour who were 
dissatisfied with authoritarian regimes. In the aftermath of the democratic transition, 
workers massively mobilised themselves during the “1987 Great Workers' Struggle” 
in July-September of 1987. Outbursts of labour movements occurred when the gov-
ernment relaxed labour control. The 1987 Great Workers' Struggle started in the 
large factories of export-led industries and soon expanded into other industrial sec-
tors including white collar workers. Workers’ revolts were focused on immediate 
grievances over their salaries and working conditions. There were huge gaps of sala-
ry and status between white collar and blue collar workers in the same companies. 
Moreover, workers had to tolerate the harsh labour discipline in factories unilaterally 
imposed by managers (Koo, 2001, 64). They also sought to establish their “demo-
cratic” trade unions, independent from the previous co-opted ones, to achieve these 
goals. Faced with workers’ uprisings, managers were reluctant to negotiate with 
workers at first because they did not regard labour as an equal partner for a long time. 
Instead, managers attempted to disrupt the construction of democratic trade unions in 
their firms. In response to the suppression, workers mainly relied on the repeated 
mobilisations such as strike actions and protests in defence of workers’ rights.  
As shown in Table 6.1, the Great Workers' Struggle in 1987 was, to a large ex-
tent, successful in advancing workers’ rights and invigorating union organisations. 
Firstly, they organised more than 3,000 strikes in the period and 1.3 million workers 
participated in these industrial actions. Secondly, it brought about the creation of 
new trade unions at 1,131 firms with 363,760 new union members (KLI, 2002, 135). 
The proportion of organised workers increased from 12.3 in 1986 to 17.8 percent in 
1988 (Pae, 2008, 28). Based on the experience of victory during the Great Workers' 
Struggle, newly emerging trade unions established a loose consultation body of the 
                                                          
34 Kelly (1996) suggests militant unions are defined by a willingness to engage in industrial ac-
tion and have an ideology of conflicting interests. See Connolly and Darlington 2012 and Murillo 
2001. 
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democratic unions at the national level, National Confederation of Trade Unions 
(NCTU, Chunnohyup) in January 1990. Thirdly, in terms of workers’ economic ben-
efits, there was a significant rise in wages. Real wages rose by 7 percent in 1987 
while it rose by 5 percent in 1986 (KLI, 2002, 12). Lastly, the Great Workers' Strug-
gle contributed to the construction of “labour class” in Korea. The nascent labour 
movements in the period boosted workers’ confidence, collective identity, and class 
consciousness (Koo, 2001, 153). 
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 
GDP growth (%) 11.0 11.0 10.5 6.1 
Increase of Consumer Price Index (%) 2.8 3.1 7.1 5.7 
Real wage Increase (%) 5.3 6.9 7.8 14.6 
Union Density (%) 12.3 13.8 17.8 18.6 
Labour Disputes (Number) 276 3,749 1,873 1,616 
 
Table 6.1. The index related with labour movement in South Korea, 1986-1989 
Source: Pae, 2008, 28  
 
The two events held in 1987 - democratic transition and the Great Workers' 
Struggle - shaped a new labour system, which is often called “the 1987 labour sys-
tem” (Yun, 2008, 278-81). First, it was shaped by democratic politics in contrast to 
the preceding authoritarian system. The government had to discard previous labour 
policy of state-sponsored unionism. In spite of continuing illiberal labour practices, 
Korean workers could enjoy legal rights as a citizen. Secondly, however, the 1987 
labour system had continued labour exclusion from the official policymaking process. 
Labour was not invited in policy concertation in governmental councils nor inter-
linked to political parties. It meant Korean workers could not enjoy political rights as 
a collective group. The final characteristic of the 1987 labour system was the con-
tainment of labour movements at the enterprise level. Without effective linkage to 
political parties, trade unions concentrated on the struggle for wage increases. It was 
not allowed for unions to fight for political issues. The legal and political limitations 
deterred the labour movements from going beyond the enterprise level. 
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Labour position on the health insurance reform 
 
Although workers were united for enhancing their political and social influence 
during the Great Workers' Struggle, most of them were less sympathetic to grass-
roots demands for health care reforms (Wong, 2004, 147). Only the employees in the 
municipal health insurance schemes were aligned with the health reform groups (In-
terview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in National Health 
Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). For several reasons, the “democratic un-
ion movement” not interested in allying with farmers and progressive civic groups to 
create the solidaristic health insurance system in the late 1980s. First, the fragmented 
health insurance system was beneficial for employees in large firms and thus union 
leaders were not able to find the common interests with the reformers for health in-
surance consolidation at that time. Second, labour movements were more preoccu-
pied with wages and working conditions. They were eager to organise workers and 
enhance incomes and working conditions. They thought that struggles for other is-
sues would diminish the power of trade unions and distract workers’ attention (Inter-
view with a former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015; Interview 
with a Senior Director of Policy Division in the KCTU, Seoul, April 2015). The un-
ion movements heavily relied on the mobilisation of union members and bargaining 
at individual company level.  
 
Component Militancy 
Goals Ambitious demands with few concessions 
Membership 
resources 
Strong reliance on mobilisation of union membership 
Institutional 
resources 
Exclusive reliance on collective bargaining 
Methods Frequent threat or use of industrial action 
Ideology Ideology of conflicting interests 
 
Table 6.2 Components of militant strategy in the union movements 
Source: Kelly, 1998, 60 
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Third, Korean labour movements adopted “militant unionism”. Their combative 
stance is often characterised by the concept of militant unionism, as shown in Table 
6.2. Most of the union leaders embraced left-wing ideological opposition against the 
government and business. They were more preoccupied with radical transformation 
of the political order rather than gradual social reforms (Interview with a Senior Di-
rector of Policy Division in the KCTU, Seoul, April 2015). They regarded industrial 
relations as zero-sum games between labour and business and thus radical industrial 
actions were justified by the logic of class struggle. In this regard, the Korean labour 
movements did not adopt the health insurance reform as their policy goal.  
 
6.1.3 Presidential veto and failed reform 
 
The bill for the integration of the health insurance system in the late 1980s was 
overridden by President Roh Tae-woo. On 16 March 1989, the Cabinet Council rec-
ommended that the President veto the bill on the health insurance merger and he ex-
ercised the constitutional power of presidential veto, returning the bill to the National 
Assembly on 24 March.35 The President mentioned the bill should be re-voted in the 
National Assembly since it was against constitutional rules. Firstly, it was against the 
principle of equality since the contribution of the insurers in corporate health insur-
ance would be used for the non-contributors. Secondly, it also violated the property 
right since the reserves in corporate health insurance schemes had to move to a new 
insurance body although the reserves were the property of the subscribers in the 
company-based health societies (Sin, 2004, 116).   
In addition to the constitutional rows, there were political reasons behind the 
presidential veto. First of all, there was a strong lobby to scrap the bill from business 
(Kwon, 2007, 157; Wong, 2001, 335). Second, most of the workers did not support 
the integration bill at that moment, as mentioned. The conservative media also re-
peatedly asserted that the integration reform would increase the burden of employees 
and it affected the citizens’ attitudes towards the integration reform (Interview with a 
Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in National Health Insurance Cor-
                                                          
35 According to the Ninth Amendment of Constitution in Republic of Korea, any bill vetoed by 
the President is sent back to National Assembly. Unless it gains votes from the two thirds of the 
members who are present in the same assembly period, the legislation would be aborted.  
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poration, Seoul, May 2015). Third, most government officials in the Blue House and 
the MOHSA were opposed to the reform. They thought the integration reform might 
aggravate a fiscal problem in the public health insurance system and over-politicise 
health care policies (Wong, 2001, 334).  
 
6.2 Labour, the reshaping of a coalition, and the introduction of a partial re-
form between 1990 and 1997 
 
This section explains the process of forming a broader coalition for the health 
insurance reform in South Korea that resulted in the partial integration reform be-
tween the health insurance programme for the self-employed and public officers just 
before the presidential election in 1997. Labour changed its identity and orientation 
towards embracing social reforms, and the broad coalition sparked fierce debates and 
mobilised the political campaign for the reform.  
 
6.2.1. Political condition for the redirection of labour 
 
The democratic labour movement in Korea became more sympathetic to the 
health care issue and willing to build up a broad coalition with civil society in the 
1990s. It was remarkable since labour movements could dilute its revolutionary ori-
entation and accept the rise in their insurance contributions. To explain this shift, this 
sub-section traces back to the failure of militant tactics between the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s.  
 
The crisis of labour movement 
 
In light of meagre political resources and isolation in public arena, the failure of 
the General Strike in 1991-2 created a sense of crisis in labour movement. While un-
ions’ strike mobilizations were successful in obtaining bargaining gains in the late 
1980s, the effectiveness of combative strategy was declining. The trade unions took 
offensive posture at spring fights in 1990 and 1991, organising the first general strike 
since the Korean War. However, the government effectively lashed back the general 
strikes through physical violence and appeal to public opinion. Middle class also 
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quickly took back their supports on radical labour movements, worrying that militant 
labour movements could negatively affect the national economy.  
After the defeats in the early 1990s, the democratic labour movement did not 
have sufficient resources to fight against business and government. First of all, in 
terms of union membership, as shown in Table 6.3, the proportion of organised 
workers in Korea peaked at 19 percent in 1989 but fell back to about 15 percent in 
1992. Secondly, trade unions in Korea were unsuccessful in cultivating connections 
with political parties in contrast to European trade unions (Anderson and Meyer, 
2003, 30; Lee, 2006, 734). No left-wing party acquired a single seat in the National 
Assembly until 2002.36 The majority electoral system with limited proportional rep-
resentative (PR) and region-based voting behaviour in Korea had strong negative 
effects on third parties (Mo, 1996). In addition, trade unions denied the role of con-
struction of left-wing party because they were more interested in organising workers 
at the workplace level. Aside from a left-wing party, there was little possibility of 
coalition between labour movements and liberal progressive parties (Lee, 2006, 736). 
The liberal parties were reluctant to fully embrace labour movements, worrying 
about their radical image. The labour movements did not trust liberal progressive 
parties, which focused on the gradual modification of society rather than radical 
formation of economic order.   
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Union Density  12.3 13.8 17.8 18.6 17.2 15.8 14.9 
Labour Disputes 276 3,749 1,873 1,616 322 234 235 
 
Table 6.3 Union density and labour dispute in South Korea, 1986-1992 
Source: Pae, 2008, 32  
Unit: %, Number of case 
 
Thirdly, it was hardly possible for labour to participate in official institutional 
bodies which would decide social, economic, and labour policy in Korea (Lee, 2011; 
Yun, 2008). One of the main characteristics of the 1987 labour system was to contain 
                                                          
36 The “Democratic Party of One Nation” (Han’gyŏreminjungdang) won one district in the 1988 
general election in the midst of disqualification of a liberal candidate in this district. However, 
the only lawmaker left the let-wing party just after the election. 
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labour collective actions at factory level (Yun, 2008, 295). Basically, labour related 
laws did not allow unions to carry out centralised bargaining beyond individual 
company-level. Moreover, the government and business did not regard labour as an 
equal partner and instead repressed labour movements through physical intervention. 
In this regard, the Korean labour movement had excluded labour from the policy-
making process. Lastly, the labour movement was isolated from other social groups. 
The middle-class had gradually shifted to a hostile posture towards labour move-
ments (Wong, 2005, 102). They thought continuing unions’ industrial actions would 
deteriorate national economic conditions and competitiveness in the international 
market. 
 
The debate on new direction of labour movement in 1992-94 
 
The limited political resources and failed mobilisation of labour pushed it to 
search for new partners. Some scholars claim that it is more likely that unions en-
gage in a coalition when they face a serious crisis (Frege et al, 2004, 145). The fail-
ure of the militant labour movement in the early 1990s gave rise to internal and ex-
ternal debates on new orientation and strategy for the labour movement (Gray, 2007, 
70). Some of the union activists and scholars raised the question over whether mass 
mobilisation strategy including repetitive strike actions had really promoted workers’ 
industrial rights and political influence. They claimed that the Korean labour move-
ment had to adopt a more socially conscious orientation, pursuing the wider public 
interest and proposing a closer partnership between labour and civil movements. In 
contrast to militant unionism, this new orientation was called as “social unionism” or 
“social movement unionism”. Social movement unionism refers to the orientation 
that “unions act in concert with other progressive social forces and particularly the 
new social movements, grounded in the politics of social identity, the environment, 
and globalisation” (Frege et al, 2004, 137). 
The argument for a new direction of labour movement rested on the ineffective-
ness of unions’ militant strategy. They argued the Korean labour movement was 
stuck in a serious crisis, caused by not only government repression but also union 
militancy (Choi, 1992; Kim, 1992). The repeated mobilisations of union members 
through strike actions undermined the base of the labour movement, rather than 
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strengthening the organisational capacity of trade unions due to high risks and costs. 
Workers may lose their wage for a strike period and unions may lose its members 
(Golden, 1997, 16). Militant actions could weaken unions’ organisational capacities 
through undermining their membership and rationale (Connolly and Darlington, 
2012, 245). Particularly, a significant proportion of collective actions were outlawed 
in Korea at that moment and, in turn, the cost of illegal actions was quite high. 
Moreover, militant unionism would be markedly vulnerable to counter-attack from 
employer, government, and public opinion (Gray, 2007, 71-3; Kelly, 1998).37 Re-
petitive strike actions may lead to the erosion of the legitimacy of trade unions and 
this kind of backfire happened in South Korea. Most newspapers blamed trade un-
ions for posing potential threats to Korea’s economy.  
The new orientation of the labour movement put more emphasis on new agen-
das and partners with social movement groups. Militant labour movement focused 
on narrow scopes of interests of male regular workers in the manufacturing indus-
tries (Chun, 2009; Rowley and Yoo, 2008). New thinkers thought that militant tac-
tics and worker-centred demands isolated the labour movement from society and 
mass public support (Kim, 1992; Park, 1992). Instead, they urged to embrace a wide 
range of agendas such as the environment, gender equality, consumer, and peace 
movement by upholding solidarity with other progressive civil actors. They argued 
that the formation of coalitions with progressive civic movements could fortify the 
legitimacy of trade unions and their activities (Choi, 2006; Kim, 1992).  
It should be mentioned that the social movement unionism in “democratic la-
bour movement” was different from the orientation of the FKTU, former official 
partner of the authoritarian regime (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Re-
sources Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). 
Although the FKTU was more willing to accept social dialogues with the govern-
ment and business, it rather put emphasis on economic interests for its members. The 
organisation hardly paid attention to the social movement agendas. In addition, the 
FKTU had few networks with civil activists while the KCTU had dense network 
with them. Most of civil activists thought the FKTU could not be their partner for 
                                                          
37 For instance, there were commuters’ backlashes against some workers’ strike actions such as 
New Year’s Eve strikes at the London Underground. These industrial actions also provoked em-
ployers’ counter-mobilisation (Connolly and Darlington, 2012, 245) 
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social movement since the organisation was just ‘interest group’ (Interview with a 
Senior Director of Strategy and Planning in Korea Health and Medical Workers’ Un-
ion, Seoul, May 2015). 
In contrast to new thinkers who embraced social movement orientation, other 
union activists were opposed to the transition of the labour movement for some rea-
sons. They cast doubt on whether social movement unionism could fit into the Kore-
an situation (Noh, 2008). According to them, the Korean government brutally re-
pressed labour movements and thus they should be militant in defence of workers’ 
rights (Interview with a former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015). 
The militant approach adopted by the democratic union movement had efficiently 
improved wages and other benefits for workers. Moreover, they argued that social 
unionism would dilute class consciousness in the labour movement (Kim, 2002).  
The debate on the new labour movement lasted quite long time. There was 
roughly equal power balance between two competing groups of labour unions (Inter-
view with a Senior Director of Policy Division in the KCTU, Seoul, April 2015). 
The new thinkers were not strong enough to override the others but were strong 
enough to provide new impetus for the directions of labour movements and expan-
sion of the workers’ concerns beyond workplaces (Interview with a former Vice 
Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015; Interview with a Senior Director of 
Policy Division in the KCTU, Seoul, April 2015). In this regard, the partial shift of 
the labour movement opened the opportunity to form the coalition between workers, 
farmers, and civic activists for the health insurance reform.  
As shown in Table 6.4, in June 1993, the “democratic labour movement” put 
together various democratic trade unions into one body, the “Korean Council of 
Trade Union Representatives” (KCTUR, Chŏnnotae), at the national level. While it 
was a loose consultative body, it included all democratic unions and thus promoted 
the unity of the democratic labour movement (Rowley and Yoo, 2008, 48). In No-
vember 1994, democratic unions established the Preparatory Committee for the Ko-
rean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU).38 In November 1995, they founded the 
KCTU (Minjunoch'ong) and applied to the Ministry of Labour for acquisition of le-
gality with 862 enterprise unions. At that moment, the moderate groups took control 
                                                          
38 The Committee's main task was to prepare and facilitate the reorganization of individual unions into 
various industrial federations and the formation of the Confederation. 
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of several important workplaces such as the Hyundai Automobile, a symbolic work-
place in the Korean labour movement. At the national level, Kwon Young-Gil, the 
first leader of the KCTU, was also significantly influenced by social unionism and 
coined the slogan, “labour movement with citizen” (Kim, 1998).39 
 
Time Event 
Fall of 1987 Great Workers Struggle 
January 1990 
Foundation of National Confederation of Trade Unions  
(NCTU, Chŏnnohyŏp) 
October 1991 
Foundation of “Joint Emergency Committee for ILO Treaty Ratification and Revi-
sion of Labour Law” 
June 1993 
Foundation of “Korean Council of Trade Union Representatives” (KCTUR, 
Chŏnnotae) 
November 1994 Preparatory Committee for Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
Spring of 1995 Social reform fight led by Preparatory Committee for KCTU 
November 1995 
Foundation of “Korean Confederation of Trade Unions”  
(KCTU, Minchunoch'ong) 
 
Table 6.4 Timeline of major events in Korean labour movement 
Source: Gray, 2007, 152  
 
6.2.2 The cross-class coalition for health insurance reform  
 
In 1993, the “democratic labour movement” began to support the integration of 
the health insurance system. The leaders in the democratic labour movement thought 
that the formation of a policy coalition for health insurance integration would open 
up new opportunities for increasing the influences of the labour movement even 
though their core members bore more burdens from the consolidated health insur-
ance system.  
 
Rules and practices in the health insurance system and their effects 
 
                                                          
39 Kim Yu-sun (1998), a former head of Policy Division of the KCTU, has claimed that the first 
stage of the KCTU leadership leaned towards social unionism.  
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As Korean labour movements moved towards the socially oriented stance, la-
bour unions re-interpreted the meaning of the prevailing health insurance system and, 
in turn, reconstructed their interests in the health insurance policy. Trade unions rein-
terpreted the institutional arrangements in the health insurance system and this made 
self-undermining feedback mechanisms by diminishing the bases of political support 
for the prevailing institutional arrangement and expanding reformers’ political power.  
Firstly, the specific problem-solving practices for fiscal crisis fostered an inter-
pretive effect that the government should be more responsible for less fortunate citi-
zens’ welfare. The Korean health insurance system showed substantially low politi-
cal responsibility and weak commitments on financial support for the municipal 
health insurance programme, as mentioned in Chapter 4. The municipal health socie-
ties sharply increased insurance premiums with governmental approval in response 
to their fiscal problems (Han’gyŏre, 1996). The financial condition of municipal 
health insurance schemes seriously deteriorated in 1995, when the maximum day for 
covered treatment was significantly extended (Federation of Korean Medical Insur-
ance Societies, 1997, 572). As shown in Table 6.5, around half of municipal health 
insurance funds recorded deficits in 1995. The amount of reimbursement for medical 
institutes was increased by 29 percent while the governmental subsidy was increased 
by only 8 percent. The imbalance of accounts resulted in the steep rise in contribu-
tions of municipal health insurance schemes. As shown in Table 6.6, the contribution 
was increased by 15 percent in 1996 and 26 percent in 1997.40 The hike in premiums 
was widely reported in the press. As the government depended on the repeated in-
creases in the contribution rates of municipal health insurance schemes, the reform-
ers thought that it presented the structural vulnerability of the fragmented health in-
surance system in Korea.  
In addition to rise in contributions, the Korean government constrained the ex-
pansion of the scope of medical services in face of chronic fiscal problems in munic-
ipal health insurance schemes (Han’gyŏre, 1994). For instance, the introduction of 
some high-tech facilities such as CT and MRI into health insurance coverage sug-
gested by the “First Health Care Reform Committee” ended up with failure at the 
end of 1994. In Korea, the scope of covered medical service was almost uniform 
                                                          
40  The rise in premiums varied depending on the condition of health insurance schemes. 
Increasing premiums by more than 20 percent was not uncommon in 1996 (Han’gyŏre, 1996). 
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across all different health insurance schemes. Although some financially strong in-
surance schemes afforded to increase the scope of covered benefits, it was barred 
from the governmental intervention (Hoffmeyer et al, 1994, 30-2). This was because 
the expansion of covered medical services would aggravate the financial problems of 
municipal health insurance societies. In this regard, the government was reluctant to 
vastly and promptly enlarge insurance coverage and, in turn, the coverage of medical 
services in Korea remained quite narrow.  
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Revenue 215 531 994 1,495 1,667 1,862 2,068 2,377 2,831 3,472 
Expenditure 173 434 1,008 1,130 1,314 1,542 1,760 2,238 2,866 3,349 
Proportion of local 
health societies  
in red (%) 
13 46 90 0 3 6 12 50 65 81 
 
Table 6.5. The financial trend of the municipal health societies  
Source: Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 574 
Unit: billion won, % 
 
                                        Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Health insurance fee* (billion won) 1182 1324 1576 2023 
Number of Household 6766 7088 7320 7508 
Average fee per household  146 156 179 225 
Increasing rate (%) **  5.0 6.8 14.7 25.7 
 
Table 6.6. The premiums in the municipal health insurance schemes 
Source: Kim, 2000,114 
Note1: Health insurance fee means the amount of premiums imposed by the municipal health 
insurance schemes not actual fee revenue.  
Note2: Increasing rate is calculated based on the number of household not total subscriber. 
 
The advocates for the integration reform claimed that the failure of introduction 
of high tech facilities in 1994 showed the weakness of the fragmented health insur-
ance system. The reformers linked this episode into the institutional defects in the 
fragmented health insurance system. According to them, it was almost impossible to 
achieve generous health care benefits under the fragmented health insurance system 
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(Han’gyŏre, 1994). In this sense, it was widely believed, particularly in pro-welfare 
groups, the unification of health insurance societies would inevitably bring about a 
more expansionary and generous welfare program (Interview with a Deputy Director 
of Human Resources Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, 
May 2015). 
Secondly, the employees in Korea could not join the decision making and ad-
ministration of their health insurance societies, as mentioned in Chapter 4. This prac-
tice in the Korean health insurance governance had significantly undermined the le-
gitimacy of its fragmented health insurance system, reducing the meaning of health 
insurance society to just an “administrative unit” rather than a “substantial unit”. A 
company-based health insurance society did not play meaningful roles in health care 
policy. Its main roles were to collect premiums and control its membership on behalf 
of the government. In these regards, whether the government or individual health 
schemes would manage the public health insurance did not make difference (Lee, 
2002). There was no special reason that individual corporations should build their 
own health schemes.  
A Senior Director of Policy Division of the KCTU mentioned that most work-
ers regarded a company-based health insurance society just as an automatic mecha-
nism to deduct money from their salaries in exchange for healthcare benefits (Inter-
view with a Senior Director of Policy Division in the KCTU, Seoul, April 2015). A 
former leader of civil activists, mentioned that most of the activists thought that the 
multiple health insurance system would be able to be merged into a single insurance 
scheme since an individual insuerer was a just instrument for the health insurance 
system (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in Na-
tional Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). Furthermore, union leaders 
realised the unilateral management of company-based health societies by business 
was against the law. The company-base health scheme began in the 1970s, the era of 
authoritarian labour control, and such administration of the schemes was incompati-
ble with democratic principle. The socially oriented labour movement became more 
sensitive to the democratic process of administrations in their health schemes (Inter-
view with a former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015).  
 
Interactions among actors and their deliberations 
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The democratic labour movements began to embrace the health care reform 
based on their ideational changes. The labour movement adopted a more socially 
conscious orientation, promoting the pursuit of the wider public interest and propos-
ing a closer partnership between labour and civil movement. This shift was identified 
at various levels. At the first level, the new national centre of trade unions itself at-
tempted to pay more attention to social policy reforms through the reflection on its 
orientation. There were strong opinions inside the democratic labour movements that 
the national centre had to put more emphasis on social policies (Interview with a 
Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in National Health Insurance Cor-
poration, Seoul, May 2015). The democratic labour movements began to embrace 
social reforms such as tax, pension, education, and healthcare as one of their goals.  
At the second level, there were significant interactions between labour and 
health reform groups in this period (Interview with a former Vice Chairperson of the 
KCTU, Seoul, May 2015; Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources 
Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). The Kore-
an health reformers were seeking their policy partners after previous attempts to in-
tegrate all health insurance plans ended up with failure by presidential veto. They 
contacted union leaders based on the perception that the previous reform attempt in 
the late 1980s failed due to the absence of workers’ consents (Interview with a Depu-
ty Director of Human Resources Department in National Health Insurance Corpora-
tion, Seoul, May 2015). The conservative media repeatedly asserted that the integra-
tion of all health funds would increase the burden of employees and it undermined 
the political base of reformers. Some key activists for the health insurance reform 
visited major workplaces and persuaded workers to join forces with the reform. Pro-
fessor Kim Yong-ik at Seoul National University contacted several crucial labour 
leaders such as the association of Hyundai labour unions (Hyŏnch'onglyŏn), the 
council of Daewoo labour unions (Taenohyŏp), the general association of white-
collar employees (Ŏpchonghoeŭi), and white-collar employees (Chŏnnotae). It was 
possible because the health reform groups had strong connections with labour 
movements (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in 
National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015).  
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The reformers asserted the health insurance reform was beneficial for workers 
as well as farmers. First, the integration reform could enhance healthcare benefits for 
employees. It was quite difficult to achieve generous health insurance system under 
the fragmented system because the national benefits level was determined by the fis-
cal balance of municipal health insurance societies. Second, they underlined the life 
span perspective in healthcare policy (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human 
Resources Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). 
In Korea, a retired worker was supposed to move from a company-based into a resi-
dence-based health insurance scheme. In this sense, the crisis of the municipal health 
insurance schemes was closely linked to salaried workers. Third, the reformers em-
phasised redistribution across various income groups through the integrated health 
insurance system (Kwon, 2007, 156). The reformers framed the health insurance re-
form as a form of ‘solidarity’, claiming that social welfare had to include the func-
tion of redistribution (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources De-
partment in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015).  
At the third level, some parts of the trade unions such as workers in charge of 
municipal health insurance schemes directly called new national centre to embrace 
health insurance reform as its main goal (Interview with a former Vice Chairperson 
of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015; Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Re-
sources Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). 
When the KCTU, new national centre of labour unions, was being constructed, la-
bour unions from various industrial sectors put forward their own agendas. The trade 
unions of employees in municipal health insurance schemes had called for integra-
tion reform since 1988. Their demands for the health insurance reform were convey-
ing into top-leaders at the national centre through leaders in the white-collar work-
ers’ association (Interview with a former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, 
May 2015).  
 
Coalition for the Integration of the NHI 
 
Several studies in welfare state stress the importance of coalition building since 
the success of a welfare reform highly depends on the formation of a large coalition 
for policy changes (Häusermann, 2010; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The 
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farmers, democratic labour movement, civil groups, and progressive academia in 
social policy organised the crucial organisation for the health policy coalition, the 
“Solidarity for the Integration of the Health Insurance” (Ŭipoyŏntaehoeŭi) in 1994. 
Putting failure of integration reform in 1989 behind it, the establishment of the coa-
lition re-sparked a heated debate on the consolidation of all health insurance entities.  
Compared to the first reform attempt, the boundary of coalition for policy 
change was expanded. Whereas the reformers at the previous stage only included 
some progressive NGOs and farmers, it newly recruited labour movements and oth-
er NGOs in economic and social policy areas (Interview with a Deputy Director of 
Human Resources Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, 
May 2015). While the consolidation reform itself was definitely disadvantaged for 
regular workers in large enterprises, their organisational goal made them transform 
their strategies and preferences. In return, workers could get broader support from 
farmers, liberal parties, and civil activists as a sort of political exchange (Wong, 
2001). The reformers also obtained the support of prestigious civic organisations 
such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD or Ch'amyŏyŏn-
tae) and the Citizens  ´ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ or Kyŏngsillyŏn). 
These two civil associations were regarded as reformative and rational ones rather 
than radical and ideological ones and their images were helpful to enlarge the sup-
porters for the reform (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources De-
partment in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015).  
The formation of the large coalition strengthened the political power of reform-
ers. Firstly, the coalition attempted to gain access to political arena. They had 
strong connections with a liberal opposition party, which was a strong supporter of 
the integration reform. In November 1994, the “Solidarity for the Integration of the 
Health Insurance” filed a petition calling for health insurance merger to the Nation-
al Assembly through an opposition lawmaker. Secondly, the coalition opened dis-
cussion tables in big corporations several times to persuade workers to support the 
health insurance reform. Two key civil activists in health care policy such as Pro-
fessor Kim Yong-ik and Professor Jo Hong-jun and Heo Young-gu, Vice Chairper-
son of the KTCU, visited several workplaces to persuade leaders in enterprise un-
ions to take part in the merger reform. They stressed the common interests between 
labour and farmers in terms of social welfare as well as progressive blueprints. 
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Thirdly, the KCTU made a strategy to link the health insurance reform into collec-
tive wage bargaining at company level under the banner of “fight for social re-
form”.41 This strategy was successful in re-sparking political campaigns for the 
merger reform and raising the agenda in civil society (Interview with a former Vice 
Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015). Heo commented on the “fight for so-
cial reform” led by the KCTU that, 
 
 “The KCTU was a just loose alliance mainly based on enterprise un-
ions. It tended to evade complicated problems on which various members 
had diverse and competing preferences. This was because they were wor-
ried about deep division of the new organisation. Most of the KCTU mem-
bers in large corporations would pay more contributions if all health insur-
ance societies would be merged. Professor Kim Yong-ik, Professor Jo 
Hong-June, and I visited several large workplaces to make speeches on this 
issue. The union leaders at factories were fairly sympathetic to farmers and 
low-income self-employed. They roughly recognised that redistribution 
through a social insurance system would be required. I thought it was a 
miracle to lead workers in large firms to overcome their self-interests in 
this issue. (Park and Heo, 2001, 69)”  
 
It should be noteworthy that the KCTU was not committed to implement other 
social reform such as tax and education although the organisation officially an-
nounced that it would challenge the existing polices in these policy domains. Unions 
tend to be involved in an issue which has high political salience among population 
(Capoccia, 2016, 1112). This was because the organisation would had difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient supports for policy change in these issues due to the low level of 
political attention and mobilisation (Interview with a former Vice Chairperson of the 
KCTU, Seoul, May 2015). There are a lot of studies to demonstrate the relationship 
between the broad coalition formation and success of the health insurance reform in 
South Korea (Baek, 2010; Kwon, 2007; Lim, 2010; Wong, 2004). However, most of 
them assumed that labour and progress civil movement were supposed to support the 
                                                          
41 There were five categories in the KCTU’s social reforms; tax, pension, education, healthcare 
and corporate governance reform.  
125 
 
integrated health insurance system. As mentioned earlier, however, labour’s support 
for solidaristic welfare programme was contingent on political contexts and their ori-
entations.  
 
6.2.3 Debate on merger and institutional framing effects  
 
Launching the coalition in 1994 and the fights for social reform raised by the 
KCTU in 1995 sparked the debates on the effective and equal health insurance sys-
tem again. The outline of debates between the single-payer system and multi-payer 
system was already mentioned in Chapter 3. This part focuses on the peculiar per-
spectives of the debates on the health insurance reform in Korea.  
 
Accountability  
 
Those who supported the integration reform understood accountability of the 
health insurance system in terms of governmental responsibility. They claimed that 
the government should take more responsibility for the municipal public health in-
surance schemes. People held their government responsible for the social welfare of 
their citizens. They assumed that governments would be supposed to take significant 
responsibility for the public health insurance schemes since it was part of the public 
welfare system (Interview with a Senior Director of Strategy and Planning in Korea 
Health and Medical Workers’ Union, May 2015). They thought that all citizens had a 
right to obtain equal and effective health care services. The public health insurance 
system was a tool to achieve this goal and thus the government should provide equal 
and well-managed health insurance programmes for its citizens. In addition, they 
claimed that the financial vulnerability of municipal health insurance schemes large-
ly stemmed from the structural problems rather than their own faults. The municipal 
schemes relied on relatively weaker financial foundation and in turn it led to the fi-
nancial problems and inequality. In this regard, people who were dissatisfied with 
the health insurance system called for the merger of health insurance schemes, which 
was regarded as a firm commitment to rectify these problems (Interview with a Sen-
ior Director of Strategy and Planning in Korea Health and Medical Workers’ Union, 
May 2015).  
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Those who opposed the integration reform understood accountability of the 
health insurance system as the principle of “self-governance”. The self-governance 
was a strong rule in the social insurance system. A subscriber of insurance could 
have a sense of belonging in a multi-payer system since health insurance schemes 
were organised based on their identity, workplace, and residence. If a subscriber 
over-uses insurance claims, it would return the increase in insurance contributions. 
In this regard, the member of a health insurance society should take responsibility for 
management and financial outcome of one’s insurance scheme. They claimed the 
proposal for the integration was inappropriate since the reformers completely misun-
derstood the health insurance system. The reformers wrongly regarded it a mere tool 
to dispense welfare benefits instead of insurance (Federation of Korean Medical In-
surance Societies, 1997, 572).  
Comparing two arguments, the Korean context diminished the legitimacy of a 
fragmented health insurance system. Firstly, self-governance could not be strong 
grounds to defend the fragmented system in the Korean context, where representa-
tives of labour were not able to join managerial meeting of health insurance schemes. 
Secondly, the government did not pay much attention to the structural weakness of 
municipal health insurance schemes, which consisted of lower income and higher 
risk groups. It looked impossible that fragmented health insurance system in South 
Korea would be able to provide the universal and decent health insurance system for 
all the population. 
Neither central nor local governments had direct responsibility for finance and 
management of municipal health societies because they were autonomous legal bod-
ies in official logic. Low political accountability of health insurance societies also 
contributed to poor management performance of them. The central government held 
most of the authorities in handling health care policy due to a highly centralised po-
litical system. The ministry provided the guidelines on administration for individual 
health society. The politicians who supported the consolidation of health insurance 
schemes believed that full-scale unification would bring the advantages such as wide 
risk pooling, more equal contribution rate between rural and urban area, and lower 
administrative costs. It also affected the strategies of social actors who supported 
welfare expansion. They thought that unification of health care insurance, which 
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meant more direct responsibility of government for health insurance funds, would 
bring a more generous welfare program. 
 
Fairness of health insurance 
 
Those who were in favour of the integration reform in Korea understood the 
fairness of health insurance as the moral sense of “indiscrimination and solidarity”. 
Their first basic idea was that people should not be discriminated against in 
healthcare policy on the ground of their occupations. The level of benefits and con-
tributions was largely determined by the types of health insurance schemes one 
joined. Those insured by municipal health insurance plans were treated less favoura-
bly just because they were non-employees. Those who were in favour of integration 
reform contended that the discrimination between different occupational groups 
should be removed and that integration could ensure equality in the health insurance 
system.  
The second axiom was that public insurance system was supposed to pursue re-
distribution within different income groups. The principle of solidarity led to a sig-
nificant level of redistribution between the healthier and the less healthy, the affluent 
and the impoverished, and the younger and the older (Maarse, 2003). Most of the 
municipal health societies consisted of relatively low-income, older, and high risk 
members while most of the health insurance societies in big corporations consisted 
of affluent, younger, and healthier subscribers. The defenders of the single-payer re-
form called for the fundamental redistribution between two different groups through 
the integration of all health funds (Interview with a Senior Director of Strategy and 
Planning in Korea Health and Medical Workers’ Union, May 2015). The single-
payer system was able to maximise the re-distributional effect through comprising 
the whole population. The multi-payer system, by contrast, shared the risk and reve-
nue only within specific groups because it was divided by workplaces or local com-
munity.  
In contrast, those who supported the multi-payer system in Korea understood 
the fairness of health insurance as procedural justice and entitlement to claim. They 
claimed that the existing three different types of health insurance programmes were 
reflecting differences in income structures and occupational features among different 
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groups. They also claimed that the reformers should respect this historical configura-
tions and different ordering principles of corporate health insurance schemes. The 
third argument was that financial resources should be distributed by ‘entitlement’ 
rather than ‘need’. Individual health insurance schemes were supposed to manage 
their own finance in the social health insurance system. If one health scheme accu-
mulates the reserves, the members in this scheme have the strongest right to claim 
the benefits from the surplus rather than subscribers in other health schemes.  
Related with these claims, there were two practical and controversial issues. 
The most crucial issue of equity in the argument was “fair taxation” under the differ-
ent income structures among several occupational groups. Countries with well-
functioning taxation infrastructure are able to fairly and effectively collect health in-
surance premium (Hussey and Anderson, 2003, 216). If there was widespread tax 
evasion in some part of business, usually small business and unofficial economy, 
however, other groups such as wage workers should pay more. There were only lim-
ited capabilities to collect tax and premium in South Korea at that moment. The gov-
ernment obtained only around a quarter of taxation source data on the self-employed 
in the mid-1990s (Wong, 2001). The opponents argued that a single-payer insurance 
system would shift its financial responsibility onto salaried workers since their actual 
income levels were completely exposed. It is also related with different concepts of 
vertical equity between supporters of integration reform and defenders of a multi 
payer system (Kwon, 2007). The next overriding issue on equity for them was the 
reserve funds in corporate health insurance societies. The corporate health insurance 
societies accumulated massive reserves. The opponents claimed these funds had 
been contributed solely by the members of corporate health insurance societies 
(Han’gyŏre, 1994). They argued the massive reserves accumulated in company-
based health societies were attributed in frugality embedded in a fragmented system. 
Under the system, members attempted to save their financial resources since other-
wise their premiums would increase directly. In this account, non-member who had 
not contributed to the reserve funds at all was not entitled to claim sharing of the 
funds.  
 Judging from these competing arguments in the Korean context, we can under-
stand the farmers’ moral appeal for equal treatment was fairly strong. This was be-
cause health insurance schemes were regarded as just ‘managerial units’ rather than 
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‘substantial units’. In Korea, labour did not equally take part in the decision-making 
process of company-based health insurance schemes and the government significant-
ly restricted the autonomy of individual health insurance schemes. The MOHSA de-
cided most fundamental factors in the governance of health insurance schemes such 
as reimbursement and benefits level (Hoffmeyer et al, 1994). These practices under-
mined the legitimacy of the fragmented health insurance system and insurance 
schemes remained plain managerial units in charge of the collection and payment of 
insurance finance. Even several scholars who opposed the integration reform men-
tioned that there would be little differences in the health insurance system after the 
consolidation reform because prevailing health insurance societies did not play 
meaningful roles (Choi, 2014; Lee, 2002). If a company-based health insurance 
scheme was just an administrative unit, it was difficult to justify the huge gap of fee 
levels across different insurance schemes. In this context, the Korean Constitutional 
Court also dismissed the challenge that the reserved funds should not be shared with 
other members in June 2000, claiming it should belong to the whole social insurance 
system rather than private insurance funds.  
 
Efficiency  
 
The health reformers stressed the ‘economies of scale’ as mentioned in Chapter 
3 while opposition groups highlighted the ‘diseconomies of scale’. There would be 
the economies of scale in integration reform to reduce the management costs of 
health insurance schemes and the instability in small health insurance schemes by 
enlarging risk pools. By contrast, the diseconomies of scale such as moral hazard of 
insurance members and red tape in bureaucracy would emerge.  
The reformers for integration in South Korea underlined the efficiency of an in-
tegrated system at macro-level. Those who supported the idea of integration con-
tended that full-scale unification would bring advantages such as wider risk pooling 
and the lower administrative costs. They made a strong argument that the integration 
would increase the efficiency of the Korean health insurance system on the basis of 
transfers among different risk and income groups. The idea of integration was attrac-
tive since it would enable the health insurance system to self-sustain with no addi-
tional funding (Baldwin, 1990). The National Conference for New Politics (NCNP), 
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a major liberal opposition party, claimed financial resources saved by the integration 
reform would be used to stimulate research and development (R&D) and industrial 
restructuring. In addition, there were huge reserves in corporate health insurance 
schemes. In 1995, the amount of reserves in corporate health insurance societies 
reached around 2.5 trillion won, the equivalent of 14 months’ payments for insurance 
claims from their members (Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 
605). Using the reserves, they could solve the fiscal problem in the Korean health 
insurance funds (Interview with a Senior Director of Strategy and Planning in Korea 
Health and Medical Workers’ Union, May 2015).  
Those who were against the integration reform understood the term of efficien-
cy at micro-level, emphasising moral hazard problems stemming from the integra-
tion. There would be a stronger financial incentive for subscribers in a multi-payer 
system to refrain from overusing medical insurance benefits than a single-payer sys-
tem. This was because high medical expenditures would directly affect the fiscal 
condition of their health insurance schemes and, in turn, may lead to rise in contribu-
tions under a multi-payer system. They claimed, if all health insurance schemes were 
merged, the reserves in corporate health insurance societies would be depleted quick-
ly because patients would overuse medical services due to little incentive to save fi-
nancial resources. In this regard, self-governance in a health insurance society could 
enhance the efficiency of the whole public health insurance system. 
Comparing two claims in the Korean context, the reform group put forward 
more tangible benefits such as sharing reserves and decreasing personnel in the 
health insurance schemes through the integration reform. In contrast, the benefit of a 
fragmented system was quite uncertain. This was linked to the peculiar practices in 
the Korean health insurance system. The corporate health insurance societies in Ko-
rea had only limited functions as insurers while their counterparts in Germany and 
Japan, to some extent, had wider functions such as setting up the rules on benefits 
and health promotion since the government took strong control of these regulations 
(Choi, 2014; Lee, 2002). The corporate health insurance societies in Korea played a 
limited role in improving members’ physical condition while it was quite common in 
Japanese counterparts. Those who supported the fragmented system in Japan suc-
cessfully demonstrated how a company-based health insurance society could en-
hance the efficiency of health insurance system thorough the discourse of strengthen-
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ing ‘insurer functions’. In contrast, the health insurance societies in Korea failed to 
demonstrate how they could contribute to the improvement of the efficiency of 
health insurance system and healthcare service.  
 
6.2.4 Partial reform bill under the conservative government 
 
After the healthcare reformers in Korea formed a broader coalition, not only a 
liberal opposition party but also the conservative ruling party paid more attention to 
the health care policy. The 1997 presidential election reshaped the political environ-
ment in favour of the health insurance merger. Some of the lawmakers in the ruling 
party were supportive of the merger reform. The National Assembly, in these cir-
cumstances, passed the partial reform bill in November 1997, which stipulated that 
227 municipal health insurance societies for the self-employed would be merged into 
an insurance body.  
 
Policy recommendations from governmental committees 
 
The government set up the “Development Committee for Farming and Fishing 
Villages” to investigate how to improve the overall welfare system for rural residents 
after closing the Uruguay Round, one of the GATT Rounds which agreed to open 
world agricultural market. The committee released the report in May 1994, propos-
ing the consolidation of all health insurance schemes and the shift of contribution 
charging method in municipal health societies. Nonetheless, government officials in 
healthcare policy dismissed the suggestions, claiming that the report solely reflected 
farmers’ voices and most of the committee members were not experts in the 
healthcare field.  
Instead, the government set up a specialised committee for healthcare and 
health insurance reform. The government also set up the “First Healthcare Reform 
Committee” in January 1994 and “Second Healthcare Reform Committee” in 1996, 
(Sin, 2004, 152). These committees released the policy reports, both recommending 
the consolidation of the 227 community-based health societies into 16 societies at 
the great local government level. They claimed this measure would improve the or-
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ganisational efficiency and enlarge the scope of risk pooling. The government put 
forward it as the counter-proposal against the full-scale integration plan.  
 
Gradual integration bill  
 
There was a stand-off between reform groups and opposition groups until 1997, 
when the presidential election took place. Although opposition party submitted a re-
form bill for the integration of the whole health insurance schemes in 1996, it was 
not reviewed in the National Assembly without the consent of majority ruling party. 
However, there was a significant shift in the stance of the ruling party on the health 
insurance reform in 1997. A lawmaker in the conservative ruling party Hwang 
Seong-kyun proposed the three staged-reform plan in August 1997 (Sin, 2004, 157). 
In the first step, the municipal health programme and public officers’ health pro-
gramme would be merged into a single body. In the next step, various corporate 
health societies would be absorbed into the single-payer in terms of organisation but 
their fiscal accounts would be still kept separated from the others’ accounts. In the 
final stage, the fiscal structures of all health funds would be also integrated. He pro-
posed the bill stipulated that the health insurance programme for the self-employed 
and public officers would be merged into a single insurance carrier, which was the 
first stage of his three-step merger plan.  
The shift in party position could be understood in terms of the upcoming presi-
dential election held in December 1997 and weak party discipline. Most of the law-
makers in the ruling party from rural constituencies were supportive of Hwang’s idea 
since they could obtain political gain by supporting the health reform bill. In re-
sponse to the pressures from rural areas for improved health insurance governance, 
ruling party lawmakers pushed their party leaders to pledge to reform the health in-
surance system in the presidential campaigns. Lee Hoe-chang, the presidential can-
didate of the ruling Grand National Party (GNP), pledged to carry out the gradual 
integration of health insurance schemes in September 1997 (Kim, 1997). Just before 
the next presidential election, an incumbent president’s influence on the ruling party 
was marginalised due to a serious economic downturn and political scandals. The 
presidential secretary and party leaders usually took control of lawmakers under 
strong party discipline. However, at that moment, presidential secretary could not 
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play an important role in mediating between the ruling party and the government. 
While the government attempted to keep the fragmented system, it could not have a 
significant influence on ruling party lawmakers.  
Against this background, major political parties reached a compromise on the 
partial integration bill and it was passed in November 1997. President Kim Young-
sam did not exert veto power. The Korean government had already applied for the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout package and was not willing to fight 
against major political parties on health insurance reform amid an escalating finan-
cial crisis. Moreover, since the partial reform bill did make no change in the enter-
prise-based health insurance societies, business was not opposed to the Act. On the 
grounds of the 1997 National Health Insurance Act, the first step of full integration 
of all health funds took place in October 1998 under the next government.      
 
6.3. Large-scale health insurance reform between 1997 and 2003 
 
A new political resolve to implement the health care reform came up after the 
regime change at the end of 1997. President Kim Dae-jung embarked in a new direc-
tion with expansion of the welfare state driven by serious economic crisis and regime 
change. The health care reform might inflict the pain of adjustment on the corporate 
actors. Although the conservatives and some waged workers attempted to thwart the 
government’s intention and then restore fragmented health insurance system, the co-
alition between farmers, labour, civic activists, and the new ruling party led the legis-
lature to integrate all health insurances. 
 
6.3.1 Regime change in 1997 and the Tripartite Commission 
 
Asian Financial Crisis and regime change 
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis opened new political arena and opportunity. 
The financial crisis hit Southeast Asia in the summer of 1997 and soon spread into 
South Korea. On November 21, the government announced the formal request for 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervention to restore investors’ confidence 
and stabilise the national economy. The agreement between the Korean government 
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and the IMF, including a $57 billion bailout, was signed on December 3. It was ob-
vious that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis during the last months of Kim Young-
sam's tenure played an important role in the regime shift in South Korea. The crisis 
was the most intense economic panic that Korea had faced since the onset of its rapid 
economic development in the 1960s.42 The Asian Financial Crisis discredited the 
prevailing government because not only policy failure but also corruption in the rul-
ing elite had contributed to the economic catastrophe. Furthermore, the signing of the 
IMF bailout agreement was regarded as “semi-colonisation”. Just one month after 
the onset of the financial crisis a new presidential election occurred. The presidential 
election in December 1997 had brought the Kim Dae-jung government to office, 
which was the first regime change by election in South Korea.  
There is a lot of literature that emphasises external shocks such as war and eco-
nomic crisis to explain institutional changes (Ikenberry, 2001; Krasner, 1984). How-
ever, the crisis had brought only limited effects on actors’ positions on the health in-
surance reform. One of the crucial actors, labour, changed its preferences and goals 
on health insurance policy in the mid-1990s even in absence of exogenous shocks. 
Although the Asian Financial Crisis helped implement the health insurance reform 
by weakening the opponent groups, it could not account for the dynamic process of 
reshaping actors’ attitudes on the health insurance reform.  
 
Political and partisan effects of the new government 
 
President Kim Dae-jung was inaugurated on 25 February 1998. The regime 
change contributed to the integration reform in several ways. First of all, it helped 
the integration reform move on the policy agenda. To enter the official policy agenda, 
policy makers should perceive a policy issue as a serious problem. Key actors in pol-
icy-making process attempted to construct the problems and put them on the table of 
policy agenda (Kingdon, 1995). In this regard, the regime change helped to construct 
the health reform agenda. The integration reform was one of his pledges during the 
presidential campaign. Soon after he won the presidential election, he put the reform 
on the top of social security reform.  
                                                          
42 The unemployment rate in Korea had risen from 2.1 percent in October 1997 to 8.7 percent in 
February 1999 (Haggard, 2000, 197). 
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Secondly, the regime change empowered the advocacy coalition for the health 
insurance reform since the reformers held strong control over the government and 
cabinet (Kwon, 2007, 158). The President Kim himself had supported the integration 
reform and was willing to push the health insurance reform. President Kim appointed 
Cha Heung-bong as Minister of Health and Welfare. He was also a staunch supporter 
of integration, who was a former high-level officer in the Ministry of Health and So-
ciety Affairs and yet fired by authoritarian government because of taking side with 
the consolidation reform. In this regard, appointing Cha Heung-bong as Minister was 
itself remarkably symbolic (Kwon, 2011, 662). In addition, the progressive NGO 
activists and academics such as Lee Sang-Yi joined the governmental bodies and rul-
ing party in social policy division in order to map out the reform proposal. Instead, 
Kim Jong-dae, one of the main staunch opponents among high-level officers, was 
sacked. Most of the members in the governmental committee of health insurance re-
form, which was leading the reform, were in favour of the health insurance reform.  
Thirdly, the regime change made strong partisan effects on welfare policy since 
the progressive government brought new ideas into the governmental bodies. Presi-
dent Kim was much more interested in welfare expansion than the Conservative can-
didate (Kwon and Reich, 2005, 1004). While conservative elites in Korea had solely 
stressed economic development over social security and thus welfare system was 
highly under-developed, the new president took a more positive posture on solidar-
istic welfare policy. The Kim Dae-jung government sought to reform or expand the 
major social-insurance programs such as health insurance, pensions, and unemploy-
ment insurance. In addition, the government established the Minimum Living Stand-
ard Guarantee for the poor. These initiatives reflected a new direction in the devel-
opment of social welfare under the Kim Dae-jung administration (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 2008, 250).  
 
Tripartite Commission and partial integration 
 
To overcome the economic crisis, president-elect Kim Dae-jung brokered the 
social pact among the government, business, and labour. The Korean Tripartite 
Commission made up of government, business, and labour representatives in January 
1998, negotiated crucial economic and labour reforms. The establishment of the Tri-
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partite Commission was a historic event in Korea because there was no meaningful 
social dialogue institution beyond the firm level (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; 
Kwon, 2011). In addition to regime change, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis also 
made a totally different policy environment. When a country was stuck in a deep cri-
sis that led to high unemployment and painful adjustment, there were powerful in-
centives for bargaining and cooperation to recover international competitiveness 
(Avdagic, 2010; Hassel, 2003). In the Tripartite Commission, the government per-
suaded trade unions to accept labour market flexibility, in return for the expansion of 
welfare programmes for the unemployed (Shin, 2003, 191).  
The talk bore fruit with so-called the “Great Compromise” in February 1998. 
They reached the “Tripartite Accord for Overcoming the Economic Crisis”, which 
was a political exchange between labour and business. Labour accepted the legalisa-
tion of layoffs in return for the expansion of labour rights and welfare programmes 
(Haggard, 2000, 211). The firms with an urgent managerial difficulty could use re-
dundancy lay-offs. Labour instead secured the package including the expansion of 
basic rights for labour,43 recognition of a teachers’ union, the medical insurance re-
form, and the rights of laid off workers to join enterprise-level unions (Ha and Lee, 
2007).  
The agreement among three parties also led to a series of reforms in social poli-
cy area such as health care, pension, and unemployment benefits (Gray, 2014, 490). 
The Korean Tripartite Commission agreed the legislation for the full-scale merger of 
health insurance schemes by the end of 1998, adding it to the “100 national policies 
list for the new government” to be pursued by the Kim Dae-jung administration. It 
made the integration of all health insurance schemes much easier than the previous 
attempts which faced strong veto groups such as business (Kwon, 2011, 661). At that 
moment, the priority of big businesses was protecting their Chaebol44 corporate gov-
ernances given their weak financial condition. As the government attempted to over-
haul the Chaebol governance by enhancing internal transparency, business was will-
ing to negotiate with other actors on the health insurance reform (Kwon, 2011, 660).  
                                                          
43 Public officers could create their consultative organisation and trade union could be involved 
in various political activities. 
44 The Chaebol is large conglomerates and the group of affiliated companies based on cross-
ownership linkages of business family in Korea. 
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6.3.2 Advocacy groups’ positions 
 
Reformer groups 
 
In this period, there were four major ways in which the reformers reinforced 
their ideas for the integration reform. Firstly, reformers including the KCTU had 
framed the fragmented health insurance system as a by-product of the Chaebol gov-
ernance, which was blamed as one of the main culprits in the current economic crisis 
(Interview with a former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU, Seoul, May 2015). The 
corporate governance was closely linked to the health insurance governance and the 
latter was a reproduction of the former. The corporations in Chaebol governance 
formed their joint health insurance schemes on the basis of their enterprise conglom-
erates. For instance, the corporations in Samsung conglomerate established the Sam-
sung Joint Health Insurance Scheme. They accumulated 96 billion Korean Won as 
reserves and the LG Joint Health Insurance Scheme had around 41 billion Won as 
reserves at the end of 1995 (Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 
1997). Just as the Chaebol governance monopolised national economic power, the 
reserves in company-based health schemes were used for business without labour’s 
monitoring. These health schemes had accumulated massive reserves but they did 
not allow labour to join their decision-making process. Based on these circumstances, 
the reformers claimed that labour and citizen had to obtain more control on health 
care policy through the consolidated health insurance system.  
Secondly, the rivalry between the KCTU and the FKTU was generating their 
identity-building (Choi, 2006, 64). The former sought to taint the latter’s image as 
exclusive economic bigots. The FKTU joined forces to fight against the full-scale 
merger of the health insurance system, claiming the integration would lead to in-
crease workers’ contributions. The FKTU sought to identify the KCTU as a radical 
and militant group, framing themselves as a gradual reform group (Interview with a 
Senior Director of Strategy and Planning in Korea Health and Medical Workers’ Un-
ion, Seoul, May 2015). The two national centres clashed with each other in the street, 
the National Assembly, and televised debates on the consolidation reform. The 
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KCTU framed its rival as a narrow interest-driven organisation while framing itself 
as an encompassing progressive group.  
Third, new problem-solving practices on fiscal crisis in the new health insur-
ance scheme arising from the partial integration between the health insurance pro-
gramme for the self-employed and public officers generated a positive feedback to 
strengthen the idea for the integration reform. The balance of the health insurance 
system recoded a historical deficit in 1999, just after the partial integration of health 
insurance plans. The government took immediate action to redress it by increasing 
the governmental subsidies for the health fund. The government introduced tobacco 
tax in order to offset the deficits in the health fund. The new problem-solving prac-
tice strengthened the reformers’ idea that the integration reform would increase the 
responsibility of the government for the Korean health insurance system. 
Lastly, labour reforms between 1996 and 1999 gave insight into the importance 
of a broad political coalition. At the end of 1996, the ruling party passed a bill on the 
labour market to ease the strain of layoffs. Labour organised large-scale strikes be-
tween December 1996 and March 1997 against more flexible labour market policy. 
At that moment, the progressive civic groups were willing to embrace labour issues 
and uphold solidarity with labour. Faced with the strong opposition, President Kim 
Young-Sam had to cancel the revision of the Trade Union Act and thus the strike 
was often said to be the most successful one in the 1990s. In addition, the Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis posed a serious threat to trade unions and the KCTU had to rely on a 
coalition with other civic groups in pursuit of employment protection and its legal 
recognition (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in 
National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015).45  
 
Opposition groups 
 
The health insurance policy in Korea was highly politicised after the govern-
ment pushed he merger of health insurance societies. In response to the plan, there 
was a massive counter-mobilisation. There were three major concerns regarding the 
implementation of full merger among different occupational health insurance pro-
                                                          
45 The KCTU did not gain legal recognition until 1999. This was because labour related law did 
not allow multiple trade unions. 
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grammes. First, while wage earners’ incomes were completely exposed to tax au-
thorities, the self-employed in South Korea usually underreported their income 
(Kwon, 2011, 661). The opponent groups resented the fact that they would bear more 
contributions for the self-employed who insufficiently contributed to the public 
health insurance after the integration reform. Second, the government failed to con-
struct the fair contribution system to impose contributions among different occupa-
tional groups (Kwon, 2007, 158). Third, there was a constitutional controversy over 
the integration of all health insurance schemes (The Korea Times, 1999). Some 
scholars and lawmakers argued the bill was against the constitution because it would 
forfeit the reserves in corporate health insurance schemes. Since the reserves in cor-
porate health insurance schemes were only contributed by their members rather than 
whole citizens, the funds should be regarded as exclusive assets for the subscribers in 
these schemes. 
There were three main opposition groups including workers in corporate health 
insurance schemes, Grand National Party (GNP), and some wage earners. The 
strongest opposition group against the health insurance integration was the employ-
ees in corporate insurance schemes. They were concerned about job losses, which 
may happen if employment-based health insurance societies were dissolved. In re-
sponse to the threat of massive layoffs and job displacement, they set up their labour 
unions at the national level in July 1998. They also provided theoretical rationale to 
oppose integration plan based on empirical data. In addition to theoretical opposition, 
the association of corporate health insurances sabotaged the integration by refusing 
to provide practical materials to implement the integration of all health insurance 
schemes (The Korea Times, 2000).  
The GNP, a major opposition party, joined forces to resist the full-scale merger 
of the health insurance system by shifting its position on the reform. During last 
presidential campaigns, the GNP supported the integration of health insurance sys-
tem, considering the voter from rural areas and some lawmakers from rural constitu-
ency had supported integration. However, the party changed its position, which was 
undoubtedly influenced by mobilisation of opposition groups (Won, 2006, 172-3). In 
addition to the lobby, faced with the financial crisis of the partially integrated medi-
cal insurance system, the GNP sought to criticise the incumbent government for in-
competence. They expected it would lead to widespread discontent with the ruling 
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party (Wong, 2004, 109). In this regard, the opposition party blamed the government 
and ruling party for giving “blind support” of the full-scale merger, calling the Presi-
dent an idealist.  
The third main actor in the opposition groups was the Federation of Korea 
Trade Unions (FKTU). The FKTU joined forces to fight against full-scale merger of 
health insurance, claiming the integration would increase workers’ contributions. 
They also felt concerned about the unfair distribution of additional burdens because 
of the wide tax-evasion of the self-employed (The Korea Times, 1999). In addition, 
as the association of corporate health insurances joined the FKTU in 1998, the latter 
had a strong incentive to protect their new members (Choi, 2006, 65). The FKTU 
threatened the government that they would refuse to pay health insurance and pen-
sion contributions unless the government deferred the integration of the health insur-
ance scheme for more than two years.  
However, it is noteworthy that the debate in this period focused on the pacing 
and sequencing of integration process and opposition groups hardly disagreed with 
the integration reform itself (Wong, 2004, 109). The opposition groups called for 
deferring the full-scale integration of all health funds, pointing out its practical prob-
lems. In response to the criticism, the government and reformers accommodated 
their concerns by taking some measures enhancing transparency and stability of the 
health insurance system.  
 
6.3.3 Political process of the health insurance reform  
 
Integration of health insurance programmes 
 
The government took a first step on merger, integrating the health societies for 
public officers and local residents based on the partial integration bill. In October 
1998, 227 local health insurance societies and a health fund for public workers were 
subsumed into a single “National Health Insurance Corporation” (NHIC). Mean-
while, for the full-scale integration of all health insurance programmes, President 
Kim Dae-jung ordered the establishment of the “Special Committee for Social Re-
form” and the Ministry of Health and Welfare build up the task force for the health 
insurance integration in March 1998. A significant proportion of scholars who de-
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fended the integration plan joined the committee. After they undertook research on 
the effective structure of the integrated health insurance system, they released the 
guidelines on the health insurance integration in July 1998. The government pro-
posed the bill to unite the organisation of all health insurance schemes in December 
1998. It stipulated that all organisations of medical insurance plans would be merged 
in January 2000 while the financial resources would keep being separated for two 
more years. It also mentioned that insurance contributions for all subscribers would 
be imposed based on a single method. The standing committee on Health and Wel-
fare endorsed the bill in December 1998. The plenary session formally endorsed the 
National Health Insurance Act in January 1999 amid a walkout by opposition law-
makers (Sin, 2004).  
 
Reform outcome  
 
However, the full-scale integration was disrupted by the major opposition party 
(Korea Times, 1999a). The GNP resisted the planned financial consolidation of the 
health insurance system by proposing an alternative bill which would keep disinte-
grating the health insurance funds for wage workers and the others. The ruling party 
and major opposition party reached the agreement to hold off the financial integra-
tion for one year and a half (The Korea Herald, 2001). As shown in Table 6.7, the 
revised bill on delaying financial merger until July 2003 was passed in January 2002 
with consent of both parties. As the consolidation of the health insurance system 
would take place in the next government, the GNP gained an opportunity to scrap the 
integration reform. Since the next presidential election was scheduled to be held in 
December 2002, it could be a crucial political momentum to push or thwart the fi-
nancial consolidation of health insurance funds.  
In December 2002, the ruling party candidate Roh Moo-hyun won the presiden-
tial race by a narrow margin. Although it seemed that the ruling party had the man-
date on the health insurance reform, the GNP still took the majority in the National 
Assembly. In April 2003, the GNP submitted the bill on the separation of fiscal ac-
counts in the health insurance schemes between salaried workers and the self-
employed. The opposition party called for a two-year delay of the financial merger 
and the establishment of special committee to discuss further health insurance reform.  
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Time Contents 
November 1997 
Partial integration bill between health insurance for public officers and self-employed 
was passed  
December 1997 Kim Dae-jung won the presidential election (Regime change) 
February 1998 Social pact in the Tripartite Commission 
October 1998 Partial integration bill between health insurance was implemented (1st step of reform) 
December 1999 The bill on deferment of financial merger by the ruling party lawmakers was passed 
July 2000 Organisation integration was implemented (2nd step of reform) 
January 2002 A bill on deferment of financial merger proposed by the opposition party was passed 
December 2002 The ruling party candidate, Roh Moo-Hyun, won the presidential election 
June 2003 A bill on deferment of financial merger by the opposition party lawmakers was rejected 
July 2003 Financial integration was implemented (3rd and final step of reform) 
 
Table 6.7 Timeline of major events on the health insurance reform between 1997 
and 2003 
Source: Kim, 2012, 55 
 
However, the opposition groups were isolated from mass public. Through two 
consecutive presidential elections, the reformers gained the approval of the popula-
tion on this issue. In addition to shift in mass opinion, the opposition party’s final 
trial to obstruct the complete integration plan was frustrated by two lawmakers’ de-
fection. In the GNP, two lawmakers in the Committee for Health and Welfare defied 
the party line on the vote, criticising the party leadership for being in a bigoted posi-
tion on the health insurance reform.46 The party’s discipline on the reform was not 
strong at that moment because the supportive opinion on the integration was overrid-
ing the opposition one. Even quite many opposition lawmakers also backed up the 
integration bill, claiming the ruling party obtained the mandate on the health insur-
                                                          
46 Among 15 members in the welfare committee of the National Assembly, the GNP had 9 
lawmakers and had a majority. However, two rebels in the party voted against their party’s 
plan. 
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ance reform by the presidential election (Interview with a Deputy Director of Human 
Resources Department in National Health Insurance Corporation, Seoul, May 2015). 
In this regard, as shown in Table 6.8, the whole process of the health insurance inte-
gration was completed in July 2003 when the merger of financial structures was fi-
nally fulfilled. 
 
Level 
Types of the 
health insur-
ance schemes 
As of Septem-
ber 1998 
As of October 
1998 
As of July 
2000 
As of July 
2003 
Organisational 
structure 
Municipal 227 
1  
1  1  Public officer 1 
Corporate 142 142 
Financial 
structure 
Municipal 227 1  1  
1  Public officer 1 1 
1  
Corporate 142 142 
 
Table 6.8 The process of the integration of the health insurance schemes 
Unit: number of insurance schemes 
Source: Kim, 2012, 85 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the political dynamics underlying the health insur-
ance reform in South Korea. It has presented how the institutional features in the Ko-
rean health insurance system such as decision-making and problem-solving practices 
had influences on the path of the health insurance reform by shaping main actors’ 
attitudes and strategies. In the Korean health insurance system, there were two re-
markably distinct features which resulted in the different institutional effects on the 
health insurance reform. The first characteristic of unique aspects was the absence of 
self-governance. Labour was usually unable to take part in the administration of 
health insurance schemes. This practice in the Korean health insurance governance 
significantly undermined the legitimacy of the fragmented health insurance system, 
reducing an individual health insurance society to just an “administrational unit”. 
The second characteristic of unique aspects was the substantially low political re-
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sponsibility for the health insurance system, particularly municipal health insurance 
schemes, which were financially weaker than corporate health insurance schemes. 
The central and local government also conferred weak commitments to aid financial-
ly weak municipal health societies. It also fostered the interpretive effects that the 
fragmented health insurance system itself lacked public responsibility for rural resi-
dents. The reformers claimed that a single-payer system could enhance the govern-
mental responsibility on health care policy.  
The ideational shift of the KCTU towards social movement unionism and dense 
network between labour and health reformers in Korea was also crucial for the re-
form outcome by reshaping trade unions’ interests on health insurance policies and 
reinterpreting the meaning of a prevailing health insurance system. The democratic 
union movements shifted their stances on the integration reform in the mid-1990s 
while they were not fully supportive of the reform in the 1980s. The social move-
ment unionism contributed to redirecting labour towards embracing social issues. 
The reshaping of labour’s position in the mid-1990s had brought about the broad co-
alition between farmers, labour, and civic associations.  
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Chapter 7 The political dynamics of health insurance reform  
in Japan 
 
This chapter explores the political dynamics behind the health insurance reform 
in Japan between the late 1990s and the early 2010s. The first section will explain 
the launch of the health insurance reform between 1997 and 2001. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the municipal health insurance programme was financially more dis-
tressed than other health programmes. It resulted from the disproportionate share of 
the elderly in this programme. The idea that all health insurance schemes would be 
integrated into one came from the municipal health insurance schemes and municipal 
governments. They claimed that the integration plan could solve increasing disparity 
among subscribers in different health insurance programmes. However, actors who 
were involved in the corporate health insurance schemes favoured the fragmented 
health insurance system and business and labour formed the policy alliance for the 
fragmented health insurance system. Moreover, the government were not able to ad-
just the contending interests among major actors in health care policy because of the 
lack of political leadership.  
The second section will explain the decision to maintain the fragmented health 
insurance system under the Koizumi administration. While Health Minister Sakagu-
chi was in favour of a more solidaristic reform proposal than the current system, the 
opponents were opposed to it. Those in favour of the fragmented health insurance 
system created a new policy discourse centred on strengthening the roles of individ-
ual health insurance societies. It successfully showed how autonomous and decen-
tralised health insurance bodies could increase the efficiency of the whole health in-
surance system. To protect the fragmented system favoured by corporate actors, the 
government introduced the independent health insurance schemes for the late elderly 
on the basis of the cabinet-oriented policy making process. 
The third section will explain the unsuccessful reform trial under the govern-
ment of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) between 2009 and 2012. The DPJ 
made the pledge to integrate all health insurance plans and reverse the unpopular 
health insurance schemes designed by the Koizumi government in its manifesto. 
However, Rengō were still opposed to the integration reform, being worried about 
146 
 
rise in high-income workers’ burdens. Moreover, the DPJ was divided on the tax 
hike issue after the Kan administration. In the end, the party leaders gave up the 
health insurance reform. 
 
7.1 Health insurance reform trial in the 1990s 
 
Medical expenses for the elderly in Japan has accounted for the lion’s share of 
the total health expenditure in response to their ageing society. The nation’s medical 
expenditures for the fiscal year47 1995 reached 27 trillion yen, representing an in-
crease of 5.3 percent from the previous year (The Daily Yomiuri, 1996). Japan had 
suffered the increase in health spending for the elderly, which accounted for half of 
the national health spending (The Daily Yomiuri, 1996). In addition, political con-
cern on increasing health care costs was burgeoning in the mid-1990s as the Japa-
nese economy entered into a long recession. In response to these problems, the gov-
ernment began to investigate how to restructure its health insurance system. 
 
7.1.1 An emerging idea for the integration reform 
 
At that moment, new policy idea for the integration of all health funds, so called 
“ipponka”, emerged from municipal health insurance societies, local governments, 
and scholars in response to the serious fiscal problem in the municipal health 
schemes (Shimazaki, 2009, 13). The idea of a full-scale integration of health insur-
ance schemes can be traced back to 1947 (Jeong and Niki, 2012, 59). The General 
Headquarter proposed the “Measure for the Reconstruction of the Municipal Health 
Insurance”. It considered merging multiple health insurance schemes at the munici-
pal government level. The Ikeda government also considered a merger between the 
employment-based and residence-based schemes just after achieving the universal 
health care in 1961 (Yoshihara and Wada, 2008, 188). In response to the retrench-
ment of the health care benefits in the 1980s, the medical professionals called for the 
integration of the health insurance system. In August 1984, the Japanese Medical 
Association (JMA) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) signed a memorandum on 
                                                          
47 Fiscal year begins April 1 and end March 31 next year. 
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the integration of the health insurance system, stipulating a full scale merger of 
health schemes (JMA, 1997, 181; Yoshihara and Wada, 2008, 608). However, nei-
ther the LDP nor the Ministry of Health and Welfare were fully supportive of the 
integration reform. In 1989, the committee of social security concluded that “While it 
was ideal to integrate health insurance schemes, such a goal would be pursued 
through the health care programme for the elderly for the time being” (JMA, 1997, 
199). 
As the problems in the Japanese health care system became pronounced, this 
idea of the integration came up again in the 1990s. The municipal health societies 
were grappling with their serious fiscal crisis (Shimazaki, 2009, 13). In June 1996, 
the subcommittee of the Council on Health Insurance released a report on various 
health care reforms such as healthcare delivery, health insurance, and reimbursement. 
In 1996, the LDP and other two ruling parties - the Social Democratic Party (SDP, 
Shamintō) and Sakigake (Harbinger) Party - started to build up the health insurance 
reform council to review the healthcare and insurance system. The Council on Elder-
ly Health and Welfare (Rōjin Hoken Fukushi Shingikai) also released a policy report 
on the reforms for elderly care in December 1996, putting forward four different ide-
as48, which had provided the base for future health insurance reform for over a dec-
ade. The integration of all health schemes was included in this report.  
 
Demand for integration 
 
The municipal health insurance programme had been financially more dis-
tressed than the corporate health insurance programme because the former covered a 
large number of low-income elderly. In 1996, around 65 percent of the municipal 
health societies went into deficit (MHLW, 2003). They claimed the problems in 
these societies mainly came from a disparity of the elderly members and shift of in-
dustrial patterns rather than their managerial problems. The government, in turn, had 
to find the solution through structural reforms. The “National Association of Towns 
and Villages”, “Japan Association of City Mayors”, and the “All Japan Federation of 
                                                          
48 This report parallelised four competing reform options: integrating all health societies, widen-
ing risk adjustment, creating new independent health plans for the elderly, and introducing a two-
track option. These ideas had provided the base for future health insurance reform for over a dec-
ade. 
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National Health Insurance Organisations”49 issued a policy report on health care re-
forms in December 1999. What it proposed was the merger of all health insurance 
schemes. They suggested taking immediate action leading to the integration of finan-
cial structures before the full-scale integration. They thought that the unification of 
the employment and residence-based health plans could also fundamentally solve the 
fiscal crisis plaguing municipal health insurance schemes by merging all health in-
surance funds between fiscally healthy and unhealthy funds (Kokumin Kenkōhoken 
Chūōkai, 1998). Moreover, it could lead to the equalisation of benefits and burdens 
to all insured persons, as the subscribers of the municipal health insurance pro-
gramme had to bear higher contributions than those in other programmes. The inte-
gration reform would rectify inequality in the health insurance system (Reich et al, 
2011, 1120). 
The municipal governments also became strong supporters of the integration re-
form. This was because they were responsible for not only managing but also financ-
ing their municipal health insurance societies on the basis of the 1948 Citizen Health 
Insurance Act. As such, they had to put their financial resources into their health in-
surance societies. It was not easy for municipal governments to increase contribution 
rates for municipal health insurance schemes since it was unpopular policy for elect-
ed local governors and civil council members (Interview with a public officer in 
Municipal Health Insurance Division of Kunitachi City, Tokyo, January 2015). 
Moreover, it was politically difficult to substantially increase the level of cross-
subsidisation because the employee health insurance schemes were strongly opposed 
to the measure.  
In addition, there were some serious concerns about the consolidation reform. 
Firstly, it was difficult to find an accurate method which would ensure to charge 
equal contributions between salaried workers and the self-employed (Asahi Shimbun, 
1998; Kenporen, 2008, 5; Shimazaki, 2009, 25; Tsuchida, 2011, 241; Yoshioka, 
2009, 91). The income transparency of the self-employer in Japan was still signifi-
cantly low. It would be almost impossible to create common criteria for levying in-
surance premiums between the two groups (Reich et al, 2011, 1113).  
                                                          
49 As mentioned above, the ‘All-Japan Federation of National Health Insurance Organizations’ 
(Kokumin Kenkōhoken Chūōkai) was a national association for Citizen Health Insurance 
societies. 
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The other problem was found from a political perspective (Reich et al, 2011, 
1331; Jeong and Niki, 2012, 61-2). Business and labour were strongly opposed to the 
integration reform for two reasons. The integration reform would merge between 
employment-based and residence-based health funds and thus health scheme at the 
individual company would vanish. In addition, the winners and losers of this reform 
were too obvious. This reform would lead salaried workers to pay more contribu-
tions for others compared to the current system.  
Moreover, the integrated health insurance system may introduce a moral hazard 
in the health care system (Asahi Shimbun, 1998; Rengō, 1997). Notably, it could 
blur the responsibility of the health insurance schemes. Each health society was re-
sponsible for its own financial outcomes including collecting revenues and the in-
sured persons would have incentives to reduce their health care utilization under the 
fragmented health insurance system. If the insured persons in a separate insurance 
pool reduce the cost of their insurance claims, their health insurance carrier could 
provide more benefits with lower contributions. However, after the merger of seg-
mented health insurance funds, people may care less about minimising their health 
expenditures.  
 
Merit and demerit of risk structure adjustment plan 
 
A less radical reform proposal existed that focused on improving solidarity 
within a fragmented system (Asahi Shimbun, 1998; Nishimura, 1999). It was to 
strengthen the risk structure adjustment programme while maintaining the basic 
framework of the current health insurance system. The health insurance schemes un-
der a fragmented system contained a number of diverse enrolees. The members’ dif-
ferences in income and health status would have a strong impact on the financial sit-
uation of the health insurance schemes (Buchner and Wasem, 2003). In the public 
health insurance system, a health insurance scheme which covers higher proportion 
of those considered high risk or poor usually has difficulty in balancing its budget. 
The risk-adjusted programme seeks to equalise the disparity of risk factors such as 
age, gender, and disability among subscribers in different health plans by cross-
subsidising (Izumi, 2010; Van de Ven, 2007).  
 
150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The structure of risk structure adjustment 
Source: Nishimura, 1999, 9  
 
Japan already introduced the basic risk-adjustment mechanism in 1982. The 
‘health care services for the elderly’ was generated in 1982 as an effort to rectify im-
balance in elderly enrolment, particularly between health insurance for the employ-
ees and self-employed (Tatara and Okamoto, 2009, 135; Tsuchida, 2011, 238). It ad-
justed the imbalance of risk levels among different schemes by the proportion of el-
derly people over the age of 70. The new proposal would strengthen the cross-
subsidisation by introducing other factors to measure inequality between various 
health funds, as shown in Figure 7.1. While the existing programme had only two 
age groups, those over the aged 70 and those who were not, new proposal for risk-
adjustment would proceed to divide the age group more specifically. For each age 
group, there was the standard level of medical expenditures. The risk-adjustment 
programme would adjust the imbalance of risk between schemes based on differ-
ences in the age structure of each insurer (Shimazaki, 2009, 27).  
It was fascinating that there would be an achievement of equality without the 
need to abolish the self-governed health insurance schemes. However, corporate 
health insurance schemes and their political allies were also hostile to the enlarge-
ment of the risk adjustment schemes because of the rise in their contributions (Ken-
poren 1999, 33; Shimazaki, 2009, 27).  
 
7.1.2 Coalition for the fragmented system 
 
The fragmented health insurance system was sustained and supported by advo-
cacy groups such as employers and employees in big business. Their responses to the 
consolidation proposal was decidedly negative (Asahi Shimbun, 1998; Rengō, 1997). 
Municipal 
health 
insurance 
Employment-
based health 
insurance  
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This was because the young and high income enrolees in company-based health in-
surance schemes were more likely to bear more contributions after the integration 
reform.  
 
Institutional arrangements 
 
There were some institutional mechanisms to sustain the fragmented health in-
surance system in Japan. First, this system provided economic advantages for the 
insured persons in the employment-based health schemes. Most of the large corpora-
tions paid more than half of employees’ contributions, around 60 percent on average 
as shown in Table 7.1. Moreover, they tended to provide a variety of extra benefits 
(Interview with an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of Rengō, Tokyo, 
December 2014). For example, a company health insurance scheme had three luxury 
resorts found in areas popular for tourists. Although these facilities were officially 
for those recuperating, in reality, it was for all enrolees in the scheme (Interview with 
an Executive of a Company Health Insurance Society, Tokyo, December 2014). If all 
health insurance schemes were integrated into a single national health insurance 
scheme, the contributions of high income workers would significantly increase and 
health insurance benefits would be reduced.  
 
 employee employer total 
Panasonic Health Insurance society 39% 61% 100% 
Nissan Health Insurance society 42% 58% 100% 
Hitachi Health Insurance society 43% 57% 100% 
 
Table 7.1. The rate of premiums shared between employer and employee in 2014 
Source: Each health insurance society webpage  
 
It was expected that the enlargement of the risk-adjustment programmes put a 
huge burden on the Society-Managed Health Insurance programme, as an enrolee in 
this programme would pay additional 110,000 yen per annum for one’s contribution 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2002a). Although it was quite difficult to exactly anticipate the 
amount of hike in contributions paid by employees due to the integration reform, the 
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additional burdens borne by an enrolee in this programme would be higher than the 
cost from the enlargement of the risk-adjustment programmes.  
Secondly, the fragmented health insurance system strengthened the influence of 
trade unions on health care policy through co-management of the company-level 
health insurance societies. It is often said that workers in corporatism occupy an 
important governance role on the social insurance system, which is commonly the 
case in Continental Europe (Giaimo, 2002). For example, sickness funds managed 
by both unions and employers allow organised labour and capital a voice in the 
health care administration in Germany (Manow, 1997). Under this system, organ-
ised labour and capital could play two roles as payers and insurers simultaneously. 
As major financial contributors, employees and employers would pay a substantial 
proportion of the contributions for the public health insurance system. At the same 
time, they occupied a role as insurers, which meant that they were directly involved 
in the administration of health insurance schemes at the company level. Combining 
these two roles gave them greater leverage in the health care policy. In addition, 
most of the important issues in the Japanese health care policies were addressed in 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) advisory councils, “shingikai”. Trade 
unions could have an influence in this arena to some extent since they were mem-
bers of the shingikai and were involved in policy deliberation on company-based 
health insurance societies (Interview with an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy 
Division of Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014).     
 
Building a coalition in health care policy 
 
In addition to economic and institutional incentives, the cooperative labour-
management relationship in Japan helped employers and employees to form a policy 
alliance in the health care field. The cooperative labour-management relationship 
had become dominant since the mid-1970s, which was mainly cultivated in the pri-
vate sector (Hirokuni, 1997; Kume, 1998; Suzuki, 2007). Japanese labour relations 
were largely established from the enterprise union system. From 1945 to the 1960s, 
the labour movement had been quite militant in its tactics and goals. A series of bru-
tal defeats such as coal miners’ strike at the Miike mine in 1959-60 and increasing 
exposure to the international market pushed the Japanese trade unions towards a 
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more co-operative strategy. Large enterprise unions in the private sector led by the 
International Metalworkers Federation- Japan Council (IMF-JC) fostered this trend 
during the oil crises in the 1970s. Faced with the economic crisis, union leaders de-
cided to cooperate to restrain wages, hold inflation, and maintain full employment 
(Kume, 1988). Instead, the management and government allowed unions to join pol-
icy consultations at the firm and national level.  
Labour and business shared policy goals in the healthcare arena. Firstly, faced 
with discussion on the health insurance reform in the 1990s, they had been quite vo-
cal in opposing the consolidation of all health insurance programmes. They claimed 
that a rise in insurance premiums would not only increase the burden on salaried 
workers but also reduce their international competitiveness in the global market 
(Keidanren, 2001). They also attempted to protect their company-based health insur-
ance schemes because it could preserve their political influences on the health care 
policy. Since unions were keen to pursue an insider-oriented economic policy, the 
burdens on workers in large corporations were critical issues for the Japanese trade 
unions (Song, 2012, 416; Yun, 2008, 147). 
Secondly, labour and business attempted to protect their interests as payers 
against medical providers (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998, 22; Mano, 2012, 188). In 
health care policy area, they had long cultivated a cooperative relationship against 
medical providers. As the “profession dominance theory” implies, there were power 
imbalances in health care policy between providers and consumers. The providers’ 
political sway in Japan was enhanced by their connections to the ruling party and 
strong organisational power (Leduc, 2002, 46). Undeterred by strong medical pro-
fessionals, labour and business attempted to protect their interests in the employ-
ment-based health insurance schemes. The trade unions, business groups, and the 
corporate health insurance associations built a strong coalition against medical pro-
viders in the healthcare related governmental committees.  
Thirdly, they also protected the interests of corporate actors against the farmers 
and self-employed in health policy. The government and LDP had provided large-
scale government aids and protections of farming imports for the farmers. Small 
business had gained several benefits such as budget subsidies, tax forbearance, and 
regulatory protection, too (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, 54). In the health care field, 
the health insurance funds for the self-employed obtained the significant governmen-
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tal subsidies and the transfer of financial resources from the company-based health 
funds. In this regard, the corporate actors called for the reduction of cross-funds sub-
sidy from employment-based to residence-based health funds.  
Lastly, they protected the interests of the working generation against the elderly 
(Kenporen, 1999, 2002). The elderly had obtained quite generous healthcare services 
since the 1970s. Although the ageing society and burgeoning healthcare expenditure 
put heavy burdens on the working generation, politicians who were concerned about 
old voters were reluctant to reduce the benefits. The corporate actors called for a bal-
ance of the burdens between different age groups. In sum, labour and business 
shared these goals in health care policy and developed a policy coalition for their 
common interests.  
 
Penetration formula (Two-track formula) 
 
The corporate actors’ ideas on the health insurance reform were embedded in 
two policy proposals - penetration formula (also known as two-track formula or 
“Tsukinuke hōshiki” in Japanese) and independent health insurance for the elderly. 
Some organisations involved in the corporate health insurance programme made a 
proposal that would strengthen the occupational distinction. The National Federation 
of Health Insurance Societies (Kenporen), the Japan Federation of Employers' Asso-
ciations (Nikkeiren), and the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengō) argued 
that individual health insurance associations would introduce the penetration formula 
and keep maintaining membership for the coverage for those who retired from the 
company. At that time, as workers retired, they were to automatically move from 
corporate health societies to municipal health societies. In contrast to the prevailing 
system, the penetration formula would make it possible for an enrolee to stay in the 
company-based health insurance programme for life. As shown in Figure 7.2, the 
employment-based health societies would continue to provide a medical insurance 
coverage for the retied who were enrolled in employment-based health societies for 
more than 25 years. This proposal would be beneficial for company-based health 
funds because it would scrap or reduce cross-subsidies from employee-based to resi-
dence-based health insurance schemes. This proposal could also reduce the conflict 
between generations because the working generation who were involved in compa-
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ny-based health funds would support those who were enrolled in company-based 
health funds for a long time, not all elderly people in the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. The penetration formula structure (left) and Independent health insur-
ance scheme for the elderly (right) 
Note: The arrows refer to the flow of financial supports.  
Source: Shimazaki, 2009, 15 
 
However, there were some concerns that this proposed programme could make 
a strong demarcation between employee-based and residence-based health insurance 
schemes and, in turn, it would prompt inequality among various types of the health 
insurance programmes (Shimazaki, 2009, 26). Since the eligibility of the penetration 
formula was strongly connected to the labour market status and long-term contribu-
tions, it would be an exclusive benefit for those who worked in large corporations as 
regular workers. In this regard, some people criticised the two-track system for con-
tradicting the principle of social solidarity embedded in the universal health insur-
ance system.  
In addition, the two-track system would aggravate financial distress of the mu-
nicipal health insurance schemes. This plan would increase the burdens of the Citi-
zen Health Insurance programme because it assumed the removal of the cross-funds 
subsidy between employee-based and residence-based health societies (Asahi 
Shimbun, 1998). If the two-track reform was put in place, it was expected that the 
contribution of those enrolled in Citizen Health Insurance schemes would increase 
by about 19,000 yen per person (MHLW, 2001).  
Lastly, it was claimed that this proposal would conflict with the flexibility of 
employment practice. The pattern of employment became more dynamic and flexible 
(Hori, 2009, 185). It seemed that more people would cross the line between employ-
Employment-
based health 
insurance  
Municipal 
health 
insurance 
Retired health 
insurance  
Health insurance for the elderly 
Municipal 
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ee-based and residence-based health insurance schemes than before. In this regard, 
this proposal could not reflect the change in employment structures.  
 
Independent health insurance scheme for the elderly 
 
Other proponents of the fragmented health insurance system suggested intro-
ducing a separated health insurance programme for the elderly. As shown in Figure 
7.2, this proposal suggested separating the elderly from younger generations. Some 
argued that there was a need for the separate health insurance programme for the el-
derly considering some features of this age group. Seniors were generally more sus-
ceptible to the disease and thus tended to use medical institutions more frequently 
compared to other age groups (Reich et al, 2011, 1111). Moreover, this age group 
was more likely to be part of low income groups.  
In addition, this proposal was based on the existing medical programme for the 
elderly. The previous health insurance system already had the division between old 
and young generations. The 1972 Elderly’s Welfare Act provided free access to 
medical care for the elderly and then it was replaced by the ‘health care system for 
the elderly’ in 1982 (Rōjin Hoken Seido or Rōken). The elderly who joined this pro-
gramme paid 10 percent of co-payments and the health insurance programmes which 
covered the small proportion of the elderly directly provided the subsidies for the 
elderly care. These practices of age division in the current health insurance system 
led to the discussion on the independent health insurance scheme for the elderly. 
As shown in Table 7.2, the Japan Medical Association (JMA) and the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) supported this proposal to create 
the independent health insurance programme for the elderly (Asahi Shimbun, 2001a; 
Konuma, 2003, 24). These two organisations regarded the proposed system as the 
transition into the tax-based health care system for the elderly care. They called for 
huge subsidies for the elderly health care, which could cover 90 percent of medical 
expenditure for the elderly. According to them, this subsidy would be funded by 
general tax since the elderly were not suitable to be handled by the contribution-
based social insurance system (Izumi, 2010, 59). 
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Proposal Main framework Supporting bodies 
Integration  
Integrating all health insurance schemes 
into one insurer 
Citizen Health Insur-
ance Association and 
municipal governments 
Risk adjustment 
Strengthening risk adjustment based on 
age, sex and other risk factors 
- 
Two-track system 
Keeping maintaining membership after 
retirement 
Kenporen, Nikkeiren, 
and Rengō 
Independent health 
insurance schemes 
for elderly 
Separating independent scheme for the 
elderly from other schemes 
Kaidanren and JMA 
 
Table 7.2 Various health insurance reform proposals  
Source: Konuma, 2003; Asahi Shimbun, 2001a 
 
There were some advantages for this proposal. Firstly, it clarified the rule of 
benefits and burdens among the different generations (Izumi, 2010, 62). Although 
the existing medical programme for the elderly (Rōken) was run by municipal gov-
ernments, there was no body which held the legal and fiscal responsibility for the 
programme. Secondly, it could restrain an increase in medical costs for the elderly. 
The new proposal could pose barriers to the access of the medical service by putting 
a heavier financial burden on the elderly than before. Thirdly, it could solve the une-
ven distribution of the elderly between employment-based and residence-based 
health insurance schemes. Regardless of employment status, those who were over 75 
should move to a special health insurance schemes, according to this proposal.  
Nonetheless, there was criticism of the new proposal. Firstly, there may not be 
enough risk pooling for the elderly (Yoshioka, 2009, 84). A social insurance system 
is supposed to enlarge a risk pool by aggregating enrolees with a different risk level. 
Considering insurance theory, it is not an effective insurance programme because the 
elderly health scheme seeks to separate high risk groups from low risk groups (Ko-
kuho Shimbun, 1997). Secondly, since the elderly as a group could pay only a lim-
ited portion of their health expenditures, it was inevitable that the elderly health in-
surance scheme would record massive deficits (Ikegami and Campbell, 1999, 68). 
The other insurance carriers and government may be obliged to bear the significant 
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burden of health care for the elderly otherwise and it was not much different from 
the status quo.  
Thirdly, another concern was that the health insurance programme targeting the 
elderly would trigger serious conflicts between generations (Asahi Shimbun, 1998). 
The reason was that a new health scheme would require financial support from the 
younger generation, which would be taken from tax or other such contributions 
(Nishimura, 1999, 12). Lastly, there was a concern for the possible deterioration of 
medical service quality for the elderly (Ikegami, 2005, 132-133). The government 
may decrease the quality of health care service for the elderly in order to constrain 
health expenditures. Since the proposed plan separated the elderly from others, it 
would be much easier for the government to give physicians economic incentives to 
provide poor service for the old.  
 
7.1.3. Political process and negotiations 
 
The proposal from the Ministry of Health and Welfare  
 
In the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), officials and policy experts 
sought to carry out health insurance reforms. The ministry released the reform head-
line, “the Health Insurance System of the 21st Century” (21 Seiki no Iryōhōken Sei-
do) in August 1997, which contained two options on the health insurance governance. 
The first option was the integration of all health insurances by merging employment-
based and residence-based health insurance schemes. The other option was to build 
up the independent insurance scheme(s) for the elderly with maintaining the frag-
mented health insurance system. These two proposals from the health ministry 
brought important debates in the health policy community. The ruling parties sup-
ported the independent health plan for the elderly (Konuma, 2003; The Daily 
Yomiuri, 1997). In August 1997, the LDP, the Social Democratic Party and New 
Party Sakigake50 agreed in principle to create a new health insurance system solely 
for people who were 70 or older. Facing an ageing society, the government sought to 
relieve the heavy burden on the working generation by imposing more burdens of 
                                                          
50 These two parties were non-Cabinet allies with the LDP. But they left the coalition in August 
1998. 
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social security on the elderly. They were also able to broadly agree that the drugs 
pricing system needed reforming (The Japan times, 1997; The Ruling Parties’ Medi-
cal Insurance Reform Council, 1998). 
 
Failure to reform the prescription pricing system and revolt of Kenporen  
 
The government and ruling parties faced a tough test of leadership when they 
pursued the pharmaceutical reform. Physicians and hospitals in Japan could directly 
dispense drugs, contrary to most Western European countries. For Japan, it was one 
of the main sources of profits for physicians and hospitals (Ikegami and Campbell, 
1999, 63; Leduc, 2002, 162). While the government set up an officially listed price 
for each drug, pharmaceuticals could sell drugs to the hospitals at comparatively 
lower prices. The gap between the wholesale price and fee-schedule price was called 
“R-zone” (Talcott, 1999, 16). Doctors and hospitals were able to make profits 
through this difference. Meanwhile, it had led to the higher consumption of drugs, so 
called “intoxicated Japan”. Japan had the highest per capita consumption of drugs in 
the world in 1996 and over-prescription led to inflate the medical spending in Japan 
(Ikegami and Campbell, 1999, 74).51  
An advisory panel to the Health and Welfare Minister proposed the introduction 
of a “reference price system52” in January 1999, aiming at reducing drug costs 
(Ikegami and Campbell, 1999, 69). However, the introduction of the reference pric-
ing system faced high hurdles from interest groups (Asahi Shimbun, 1999c). The Ja-
pan Medical Association was strongly opposed to the proposal, claiming that it 
would just put more burdens on patients while drug prices would not necessarily 
drop. Welfare-related zoku (policy tribe) politicians in the LDP were concerned that 
it could ruin the relationship between the party and doctors’ association. Due to 
stanch opposition from physicians and lawmakers, pharmaceutical reform ended up 
with failure in April 1999 (Leduc and Leduc, 2003, 570; The Daily Yomiuri, 1999).  
After the announcement of delaying for the pharmaceutical reform, the corpo-
rate insurance schemes complained the LDP continued to protect the doctors’ inter-
                                                          
51 The prescription cost was around 7.4 trillion yen a year, more than a quarter of the national 
health spending (The Daily Yomiuri, 1999).  
    52 It is a system that “establishes a common reimbursement level or reference price for a group 
of interchangeable medicine” (Dylst et al, 2012, 128). 
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ests and that the party was shifting the burden onto them. In July 1999, the National 
Federation of Health Insurance Societies (Kenporen) denied to pay its cross-subsidy 
for the elderly health care, blaming the government for imposing heavy burden for 
the elderly health care on company-based health insurance schemes (Asahi Shimbun, 
1999a, 1999b). Kenporen successfully mobilised its members to temporally freeze 
payments for the inter-fund transfers. 1,793 health insurance schemes, which 
amounted to 97 percent of the total company-based insurance schemes, joined this 
collective action. They delayed paying subsidy (152 billion Yen) for the elderly 
health care. Labour and business also joined the movement, calling for the abolish-
ment of the risk-sharing schemes. Ninomura, a vice president of Kenporen, said that 
it was successful in drawing public attention to the problem of cross-subsidy for el-
derly healthcare (Asahi Shimbun, 1999c).  
 
7.1.4. Reform outcomes 
 
The first reform trial in the late 1990s ended up in failure due to weak political 
leadership. At that time, the “shingikai”, an affiliated ministerial consultative council, 
played an important role in shaping the reform path (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998; 
Iwabuchi, 2013; Talcott, 2001; Yuki, 2004). When bureaucrats in Japan raised a ma-
jor reform issue, the ordinary procedure of introducing new policy or changing poli-
cy began by putting the reform agenda on the shingikai. It consisted of representa-
tives from core interest groups for a specific public policy area. The healthcare and 
health insurance related consultative councils were typically composed of the repre-
sentatives from the JMA, Kenporen, business groups, labour unions, and academics.  
In the healthcare policy council, there was a clash of the interest groups in 
health reforms and they failed to adopt one of proposals as the future reform plan 
(Asahi Shimbun, 1999f). The organisations related to Citizen Health Insurance pro-
gramme called for the integration of all health insurance schemes. Kenporen and 
Rengō claimed that each health insurance association should cover its members in 
their whole life. The Japan Medical Association insisted on separating the medical 
insurance program for the elderly from other health insurance programmes, provid-
ing huge subsidy for new programme. The policy council submitted the policy report 
to the Minister in August 1999, showing all four policy alternatives.  
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Politicians were unsuccessful in coordinating the various interests of related ac-
tors. In the aftermath of the failure of medicine reform and Kenporen’s revolt, the 
government leadership to push healthcare reform was seriously weakened (Asahi 
Shimbun, 1999d, 1999f). In addition, after Sakigake Party and Social Democratic 
Party left the coalition in August 1998, the discussion for healthcare reform was sub-
siding. In November 1999, in the Committee on Health and Welfare in the House of 
Representatives, Minister Niwa said that it was almost impossible to achieve the 
medical insurance system for the elderly before 2000 (Asahi Shimbun, 1999e). No 
final agreement emerged by the end of 2000 and the health insurance reform was 
postponed to the next government.  
 
7.2 Koizumi era reforms 
 
The healthcare system in Japan hinged on a fundamental review of medical 
spending for the elderly. Although medical insurance schemes were on the verge of 
collapse due to ballooning medical expenses, the health care and insurance reform 
attempt was not successful in the 1990s. It was largely explained by the lack of polit-
ical leadership in the previous government. Against this background, when Prime 
Minister Koizumi took office in April 2001, he announced that he would push for 
structural reforms in order to revitalise the moribund economy and health insurance 
reforms to enhance the efficiency of health care financing. 
 
7.2.1. Reshaping reform ideas in the Koizumi administration 
 
The Koizumi administration fostered the favourable environment for health in-
surance reforms in the early stage. Although Minister Sakaguchi made a solidaristic 
reform proposal, the coalition of the fragmented health insurance system resisted the 
idea. Instead, the coalition sought to support their ideas by a new policy idea which 
strengthened the insurers’ role under the fragmented health insurance system.  
 
Demand for integration of all health insurance societies  
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As the health care reforms in the 1990s ended up in a failure, the Koizumi cabi-
net needed to take the political initiatives to push the reforms. Prime Minister Koi-
zumi and Health and Welfare Minister Sakaguchi showed political will to lead the 
health insurance reform.53 The MHLW set up the Committee on Health Insurance 
Reform in September 2001, inviting the JMA, Kenporen, Keidanren, Rengō, repre-
sentative of local governments and municipal health insurance scheme, and related 
scholars as its members. Wepresentatives of municipal health insurance schemes and 
local governments called for the integration of all health insurance societies in order 
to solve their fiscal problem. Nishimura, a health economist at the University of 
Kyoto, supported their idea on the reform.  
Meanwhile, Minister Sakaguchi proposed the enlargement of the risk-sharing 
programme into all age groups in September 2001. He said that he preferred integrat-
ing the health insurance system and risk-sharing programme could be a stepping 
stone for the integration of all health societies (Kokuho Shimbun, 2001b). He pur-
sued the partial integration as a short-term goal. Firstly, municipal insurance socie-
ties would be merged into a single prefectural insurance society at the prefecture lev-
el and occupational insurance societies would be merged into an occupational insur-
ance at the prefecture level. In the next step, the government would seek to integrate 
the residence-based insurance and occupation-based insurance scheme at the prefec-
ture level. The local governments and the association of the municipal health insur-
ance programme hailed the Minister’s proposal amid the hope that the proposed risk 
adjustment scheme would ease their burdens for the elderly care. Moreover, it could 
be an intermediate step towards the consolidation of all health insurance societies 
(Kokuho Shimbun, 2001b; Asahi Shimbun, 2002a).  
 
Lesson drawing from Korean experience 
 
As Korea achieved the integration of health insurance system at that time, Japa-
nese policy actors in health care domain were interested in the experiment of the Ko-
rean health insurance system. A policy implemented in a place might provide lessons 
for governments and policy actors in other places, conceptualised as “lesson-
                                                          
53 They criticised the committee politics in shingikai in the 1990s of being inefficient to reach a 
decision and conciliate the conflicts of interests among main actors related to health policy. 
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drawing” in policy studies (Rose, 1991). However, opinions on the Korean case were 
divided in Japan. This was partly because the contexts in which policy was created 
and implanted were complex and thus the causal effect was often unclear. This was 
also partly because actors sought to interpret the outcome and evaluation of the cases 
according to their interests. Actors within municipal health insurance societies 
claimed that Korea achieved the more equal and efficient health insurance system 
due to the consolidation reform.  
However, actors within employment-based health scheme had opposite ideas. 
They drew ‘negative lesson’ from the Korean experience of the achievement of the 
integration reform. Especially, Kenporen took intensive research on the Korean ex-
perience and its lessons (Kenporen, 2002). They pointed out the demarcation be-
tween salaried workers and the self-employed still existed in the Korean health in-
surance system despite the integration of all health insurance schemes. These two 
groups in Korea paid their premiums in different ways and the self-employment in-
come report was still not transparent (Kenporen, 2002, 82-84). The integration also 
led to increase in governmental subsidies for the health insurance programme since 
the reform aggravated the fiscal condition of the health insurance system in Korea. 
Moreover, a single insurer was controlled by politicians and public officers and thus 
lost its autonomy. The research of Kenporen only mentioned that the integration re-
form led to the declining managerial cost arising from reducing the number of staffs 
and the progress of IT system for collecting and managing data (Kenporen, 2002, 96). 
In sum, two competing groups sought to drew different lessons from Korean experi-
ence based on their stances.  
 
New discourse on insurers’ roles 
 
Meanwhile, the political debates on the integration of the health insurance sys-
tem kept going. Those who were in favour of a fragmented system created a new 
policy discourse,54 “vitalisation of insurer functions” (Hoken-sha Kinō-ron) and they 
used it as the crucial weapon to attack the logic of integration reform (Abe, 2004; 
                                                          
54 The discourse of “vitalisation of insurer functions” refers to “both a set of policy ideas and values 
and an interactive process of policy construction and communication.” (Schmidt, 2002, 210). The 
discourse is more than one policy idea since it intertwines several ideas such as insurer autonomy, 
competition-based health care, and consumer sovereignty in health care policy.   
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Ogata, 2005, 245-7; Tajika and Kikuchi, 2003; Tsushima, 2003; Yamasaki and Oga-
ta, 2003). It was influenced by the concept of “managed competition” (Enthoven, 
1988) and experience of the health insurance reform in several Continent European 
countries. The managed competition is an idea that providers and insurers compete 
on the quality and price of medical care and the government set up the rules of com-
petition to guarantee certain public goals such as solidarity and universality (van 
Kleef, 2012, 171). In the Dutch and German health insurance reforms, it was shown 
that managed competition could provide the universal access to good-quality health 
care and the strong incentives for efficiency at the same time. In Japan, some aca-
demics modified the concept of managed competition to some extent, stressing the 
active roles of insurers (Tajika and Kikuchi, 2003; Yamasaki and Ogata, 2003).  
Traditionally, there was limited room for autonomy of the insurers in Japan 
compared to the German and other European social health insurance systems (Ogata, 
2005, 245-7). Most of the important decisions in health care policy were made by the 
government in Japan. Individual health insurance schemes were restricted by uni-
form rules set by the government. For example, the benefits for the insured were al-
most the same across different health insurance schemes. In this regard, the main 
roles of health insurance schemes in Japan were limited to the administration of the 
health insurance system such as management of their membership, collection of 
premiums, provision of the benefits, and reward for medical providers.  
However, the discourse of “vitalisation of insurer functions” put emphasis on 
self-governing capabilities of individual health insurance schemes. It was claimed 
that autonomous insurers could improve the efficiency of the social health insurance 
system and empower their consumers in several ways. Firstly, insurers would set up 
its own rules on the level and scope of their insurance benefits. Secondly, as con-
tracting parties, insurers would make contracts with medical providers. If a health 
insurance society could directly contract with providers, insurers could lower the 
price for medical services than before and be more responsible for their payments for 
insurance claims. Thirdly, an autonomous health insurance society could contribute 
to the improvement of its members’ health conditions. It could provide regular health 
check-up, medical consultations, and health promotion programmes such as anti-
smoking campaigns. Fourthly, insurers would provide information on the quality of 
health care services for patients. Patients in Japan usually had little information on 
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medical institutes and largely left major decisions on medical services to doctors. If 
health insurance schemes accumulate data on healthcare services, then the patients 
could use it as important sources of information on health care (Tatara and Okamoto, 
2009, 62). In addition, insurers could measure the quality of hospitals based on the 
guideline, common index, and consumers’ survey. 
The new discourse on insurers’ roles could spread widely based on the several 
features in the Japanese health insurance system. The market-friendly Koizumi re-
form fit well into this discourse, which stressed the competition among various in-
surance societies. In addition, there was a long tradition that employees and employ-
ers took decisions on individual health insurance schemes together. This practice 
made the perception that company-based health insurance schemes were a kind of 
self-governing bodies. The new discourse on insurers’ functions fundamentally 
changed the frame of debates on health insurance reforms by reinforcing the logic of 
a fragmented system (Mano, 2012, 206). The advocate for the multi-insurers system 
argued that the government had to allow insurers to play wider roles in health care 
and insurance policy by easing the complicated regulations. Based on the idea, the 
government also considered to grant more autonomy to each health insurance society.  
This new discourse was adopted by the supporter for the two-track system and 
independent elderly insurance system. First, Rengō, which backed up the two-track 
system in the health insurance reform, attempted to strengthen its proposal through 
the discourse on the “vitalisation of insurer roles”. The two-track system would pro-
vide strong incentives to seek to improve members’ health status for health insurance 
schemes. This was because a member of a company-based health plan could keep 
staying in the same type of health insurance programmes for life. Rengō stressed the 
importance of continuous health promotion from the young generation (Social Secu-
rity Advisory Council’s Subcommittee on Medical Insurance, 8th Meeting Minutes, 
2004).  
Second, the advocates for the independent health insurance programme claimed 
that health insurance schemes could be actively competing for better service and 
lower price if the elderly was separated from other age groups. As mentioned above, 
they pointed that the elderly was a special age group and thus they did not fit well 
into the social insurance system. The proportion of the elderly in individual health 
insurance schemes could distort their outcomes. In this regard, they claimed that the 
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elderly insurance programme would lead insurers to make more efforts to enhance 
the efficiency of their health schemes. In sum, the new discourse on insurers’ func-
tions backed up the legitimacy and efficiency of a fragmented insurance system. 
 
Unions’ efforts for revitalisation 
 
The Japanese labour unions suffered declining organisational power at that time. 
Firstly, the union density in Japan had decreased from 25.2 percent in 1990 to 21.5 
percent in 2000. While Rengō had around eight million members in 1989 at the time 
of its foundation, the number of its members decreased to seven million in 2001 
(Watanabe, 2015b, 516). As Korpi (1983) mentioned, union density is closely related 
to the unions’ organisational and financial strength and, in turn, decreasing members 
led to the retrenchment of workers’ political power. Secondly, labour’s institutional 
channels to take part in the policy making process were also weakened. The political 
influence of labour union was undermined by the Koizumi reforms. Rengō was de-
nied access to the policymaking process in cabinet committees on the labour market 
deregulation by the Koizumi government (Miura, 2007; Watanabe, 2012).  
Thirdly, the political reform in the 1990s undermined the connections between 
trade unions and political parties (Nakakita, 2009). When Rengō was established in 
1989, it attempted to use the connections with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, Nihon 
Shakaitō) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP, Minshatō) to have influences on 
institutional political arenas. However, as the party reform within the JSP was un-
successful, Rengō decided to loosen the connection with this party and joined the 
anti-LDP coalition in the early 1990s. Although Rengō got aligned with the Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (DPJ) later, the relation with the DPJ was not as strong as its 
previous relation with the JSP. Although Rengō and the DPJ attempted to coordinate 
labour and welfare policy in the elections, the DPJ leaders occasionally kept the dis-
tance from trade unions when organised workers were criticised for protecting their 
vested interests (Nakakita, 2009, 26-8). 
Faced with the deep crisis of the labour movement, Rengō attempted to organise 
non-regular workers in small and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs) to achieve its revital-
isation (Watanabe, 2015b). The new leadership declared the “New Rengō” in 2001 
and released the “Union Organising Action Plan 21” to organise them. In 2003, 
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Rengō adopted another action policy to reinvigorate it at its regular convention. Tra-
ditionally, Japanese labour unions were not active in organising part-time workers 
and employees in SMEs. Only 1.3 percent of workers in companies with less than 
100 employees joined trade unions in 2003 (Hanami, 2004, 12). As trade unions suf-
fered weakening political influence and declining union density, however, union 
leaders put more emphasis on organising non-regular workers. Moreover, increasing 
social inequality pushed trade unions to make counter-actions against such a trend. 
After the 2001 “Shuntō” (spring labour offensive), Rengō campaigned for higher 
wages of part-time workers, claiming the reduction of the gap between regular and 
non-regular workers. The organisation accused Prime Minister Koizumi of widening 
social divide stemming from his market-oriented reforms. Rengō mentioned that it 
would give priority to narrowing social disparity by supporting part-time workers 
and regular workers in SMEs (The Japan Times, 2005). In this regard, trade unions’ 
stances on health insurance policies were slowly moving towards embracing non-
regular and SMEs workers’ needs. 
 
Rengō’s partial shift on the health insurance reform 
 
According to two-track system proposed by Rengō’, labour market insiders 
could be involved in the favourable company-based health insurance programme for 
their whole life while labour market outsiders could not to join this programme. The 
eligibility for the benefits of this programme depend upon labour market participa-
tion and employment status, and most part-time workers could not join the company-
based health insurance programme at that moment. This was because only workers 
who worked more than 30 hours per week were eligible for the membership of the 
corporate health insurance schemes. In addition, entitlement to a full membership of 
the retirement health insurance programme for the retired required a contribution 
record of twenty-five years (Rengō, 2002, 46). The long-required contribution period 
became another obstacle for labour market outsiders to join this health insurance 
programme (Häusermann, 2010). Because of these features, the two-track system 
was criticised for promoting inequality in the health insurance system. 
In response to such criticism and increasing non-regular workers, Rengō began 
to call for the expansion of coverage of employees’ health insurance schemes to in-
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clude non-regular workers. Although they kept claiming the strong division between 
employment-based and residence-based health insurance schemes, its meaning was 
changed. While previously the two-track system was exclusively favourable for reg-
ular workers in large firms, new demand attempted to enhance the equity between 
labour market insiders and outsiders. 
However, Rengō still resisted the implementation of the integration of all health 
funds. Firstly, the organisation recognised the importance of company-based health 
scheme as a tool to influence health care policy since workers took part in its deci-
sion-making process (Interview with an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Divi-
sion of Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014). Secondly, the organisation was worried that 
the solidaristic health insurance reform could be a mere mechanism of cost shift onto 
high-income salaried workers (Interview with an Assistant Director in Welfare Poli-
cy Division of Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014). The organisation thought that since 
the highly-institutionalised transfer system from company-based health schemes to 
residence-based health schemes could support the municipal health schemes, it did 
not need to bring more solidaristic health insurance reform. Thirdly, union leaders 
and staff in Rengō were influenced by the discourse of insurers’ roles. They thought 
that the fragmented system would be more efficient than the unified system just as 
what the discourse of insurers’ roles claimed. An official in Rengō criticised the mu-
nicipal health schemes “for solely relying on the governmental subsidy and cross-
transfer system, rather than streamlining their fiscal management” (Interview with an 
Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014). 
Lastly, Rengō’s new stance towards social movement unionism should not be exag-
gerated. As Watanabe (2015b) points, the organisation was still more concerned 
about the vested interests of well-organised regular employees in big corporations. In 
addition, unions’ efforts to organise non-regular workers and regular workers in 
small companies were not sufficient. In this regard, staff in Rengō were reluctant to 
accept the integration reform, which might increase the burden of contributions on 
regular employees in large corporations.  
 
7.2.2. Debates on health insurance reform and insurer functions 
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As the government stepped up the health insurance reform, the actors in health 
care policy attempted to increase their political influences. In health policy commit-
tees of the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW)55, major actors debat-
ed the health insurance reform. As the debates became intense, clashes on the path of 
the health insurance reforms narrowed down the conflicts for and against the integra-
tion of health insurance schemes. These two sides had shaped the different meanings 
of fairness, responsibility, and efficiency of health insurance schemes through ongo-
ing debates.  
 
Fairness 
 
Those who supported a single-payer system stressed “solidarity” and “indis-
crimination as fairness” (Hori, 2009, 197). This meant that all people should not be 
discriminated on the ground of their health insurance programmes. Under a multi 
payer system, the insured persons of municipal health insurance societies were treat-
ed less favourably than those of employment-based health societies. Those who sup-
ported the integration reform claimed that the discrimination among different occu-
pational health insurance schemes was unfair. They maintained that the burden of 
insurance premiums should be proportional to the financial capability just like taxa-
tion. In this sense, they claimed that the unification between the employees and self-
employed insurance schemes would be necessary in order to achieve fair burden 
(Reich et al, 2011). The idea was based on the concept that the health insurance 
should be a tool to achieve a solidaristic health insurance system.  
In contrast, those in favour of a multi-payer system stressed “insurance princi-
ple and self-governance”. They described the fairness of health insurance as a fair 
burden among different insurance programmes (Kenporen, 2008; Kurata, 2009). 
Their argument was that the different treatment among different groups could be jus-
tified. That was because the different types of health insurance programmes were 
reflecting the different income structures and occupational features among different 
groups. There were considerable differences in income structures and transparency 
among several occupational groups (Reich et al, 2011, 1113; Shimazaki, 2009, 25; 
                                                          
55 There was the merger between the ‘Ministry of Health and Welfare’ and the ‘Ministry of 
Labour’ in 2001. 
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Izumi, 2010, 77). The raison d’être of organising health insurance societies at the 
company level was based on the uniformity of its members and thus solidarity 
should be limited within homogeneous groups at the workplace level (Tsutsumi, 
2008).  
The key point underlying the debates on fairness was whether an individual in-
surance scheme was a subordinate or substantial unit. If an individual insurance 
scheme was just subordinate to the public health insurance system, one the one hand, 
the government could impose and adjust the burdens on a section of populations for 
the management of the whole health insurance schemes. Since the burdens would be 
proportional to their economic conditions, the high contributions of company-based 
health insurance schemes could be justified. If an individual insurance scheme was 
essentially substantial unit under the public health insurance system, on the other 
hand, the government should respect the difference among various health insurance 
programmes.  
In the Japanese context, where labour and business equally took part in the de-
cision-making process of company-based health insurance schemes, there had been a 
strong sentiment of legitimacy of a self-governed health insurance society. The 
health insurance schemes were recognised as substantial and autonomous units. The 
company-based health insurance schemes had been long embedded in the Japanese 
tradition of industrial relation and social welfare. An official in Rengō mentioned the 
autonomy of company-based health insurance schemes should be respected within 
the boundary of the public insurance system (Interview with an Assistant Director in 
Welfare Policy Division of Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014). This principle was men-
tioned several times in the official documents in health care reform as the guideline. 
For instance, the “Outline of the Health Care Reform” made by the MHLW (2001) 
mentioned the independence and autonomy of the employment-based health insur-
ance schemes should be respected. In addition, the discourse of insurers’ roles 
strengthened the perception that individual insurance societies would be a substantial 
and autonomous unit to increase the efficiency of the whole health insurance system. 
Based on this perception, inequality among different insurance schemes could be jus-
tified to a large extent.  
 
Responsibility  
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There had been the debates on responsibility of the fiscal crisis in the health in-
surance schemes. Those who supported the integration reform claimed the structural 
vulnerability in municipal health insurance programmes led to the financial problem 
and it could be only solved by the integration reform (Interview with a Head of Health 
Centre in Machida City). Since the Citizen Health Insurance (CHI) schemes consisted 
of the self-employed, unemployed, retired, and elderly, they had the relatively weak 
financial foundation. The difference in participants’ age structures and income levels 
within the medical insurance system led to heavy burden on the CHI schemes.  
Furthermore, those who supported the integration reform stressed the govern-
mental responsibility for protecting the universal public health insurance system. 
They argued that the government should take more responsibility for financial diffi-
culty in the municipal health schemes since this health insurance programme sus-
tained the most vulnerable sections of the universal health insurance system (Inter-
view with a public officer in Municipal Health Insurance Division of Kunitachi City, 
Tokyo, January 2015). These health plans had encompassed those who were not enti-
tled to join the employment-based health insurance plans. In this regard, the munici-
pal health programme was the last resort of the universal health insurance system 
(Saguchi, 1995, 202; Shimazaki, 2005, 217). Recently, these health schemes were at 
the verge of collapsing due to structural changes in Japanese society and economy. 
Considering these circumstances, they claimed that the government should integrate 
all health insurance plans into one plan in order to sustain the universal health insur-
ance system (Interview with a public officer in Municipal Health Insurance Division 
of Kunitachi City, Tokyo, January 2015).  
In contrast, those who were opposed to the integration reform stressed the prin-
ciple of “self-governance” of the health insurance schemes (Kenporen, 2008; Rengō, 
2005). One of the crucial characteristic features of the Bismarckian welfare system is 
a partial decentralisation of authority to quasi-public administrative bodies, which is 
often co-managed by labour and business representatives (Häusermann, 2010, 20). 
The health insurance society has the responsibility for operating its fund, ranging 
from collecting revenues to managing the balance of its account (Kurata, 2009, 202-
4). If an insurance scheme streamlines its management, then the good results of 
managerial performance would be attributed to its members. Although employment-
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based health insurance schemes could provide financial transfers to municipal health 
insurance to some extent, such transfers had to be controlled under the self-
governance principle.  
The key point of the debates on responsibility was whether it was possible that 
a fragmented health insurance system would be able to provide the universal and de-
cent health insurance benefits for all population. In practice, a multi-payer insurance 
system in Japan had redistributed financial resources through a variety of subsidies, 
which made it possible to build the sustainable universal health insurance system 
(Hussey and Anderson, 2003, 217). The unique aspect of Japanese health insurance 
system was a substantially high political responsibility for fiscally distressed health 
insurance schemes. As mentioned, this was because the central and local govern-
ments had a high legal responsibility for the health insurance system and risk-
adjustment programmes were well developed in order to support the municipal 
health societies. These practices had fostered the interpretive effects that it might be 
possible to balance the principle of solidarity and self-governance under the current 
health insurance system and thus destroying this balance would result in worse out-
comes than the current health insurance system.  
 
Efficiency  
 
Those in favour of the integration reform believed that the unification had the 
advantages such as wider risk pooling and lower administrative costs. A single-payer 
reform could substantially reduce the excessive administrative costs arising from 
managing thousands of the fragmented health insurance societies. There were more 
than 5,000 individual health insurance schemes and it cost enormously to operate 
these numerous and diverse programs (The Japan times, 2003). However, the inte-
gration reformers were not successful in making solid arguments on enhancing effi-
ciency in the health insurance system.  
In contrast, advocates of the fragmented system well demonstrated how the vi-
talisation of insurer’s roles could enhance the efficiency of the whole national health 
insurance system, as mentioned above. They argued these roles would be more effi-
cient at the individual health insurance plan level rather than the national level 
(Rengō, 2005, 19; Tsushima, 2003, 197). In addition, those who claimed the mainte-
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nance of corporate health insurance schemes argued that they should have more au-
tonomy to operate themselves (Tsushima, 2003). In Japan, the autonomy of health 
insurance schemes was quite limited. It was hardly possible for those in a health in-
surance scheme to make a direct contract with doctors and assess the claim made by 
providers. They argued that enlargement of insurers’ autonomy could improve the 
efficiency of healthcare system. In addition, they criticised a single-payer system for 
bringing a moral hazard problem in the whole public health insurance system (Rengō, 
2002, 49). There would be few financial incentives for managers and members to 
save their resources under a single-payer system (Interview with an Executive of a 
Company Health Insurance Society, Tokyo, December 2014). Furthermore, those in 
favour of the fragmented health insurance system framed the integrated health insur-
ance system as an inefficient “state-controlled mechanism” (Kenporen, 2005, 9; So-
cial Security Advisory Council's Subcommittee, 7th Meeting Minutes 2004).  
 
7.2.3. Political process and negotiations 
 
After the submission of a set of bills aimed at cutting the national medical 
spending in March 2002, the MHLW moved to focus on the reform of the health in-
surance governance. They stepped up the reform, calling for the fundamental chang-
es in the health insurance governance in order to cope with rapidly ageing society.  
 
Responses from the coalition for the prevailing system 
 
As mentioned above, Minister Sakaguchi called for the enlargement of the risk-
sharing programme in September 2001. However, the coalition in the employment-
based health insurance schemes including Kenporen, Keidanren, and Rengō was 
strongly opposed to it. In the Committee on Health Insurance Reform, Murakai, rep-
resentative of Rengō, claimed that the single-payer system would be less efficient 
than the current one similar to the government-insurance programme for small com-
pany workers, which suffered serious deficits. Simomura, representative of Rengō, 
argued that the single-payer system was supposed to be a government-operated 
health care system, which would be odd with the principle of the social insurance 
system (Kokuho Shimbun, 2001b).  
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In addition to trade unions, most of the LDP lawmakers were opposed to the in-
tegration reform. The Committee on Basic Medical Problems in the LDP set up its 
own working group for health insurance reforms. Most of the committee members 
supported the independent health insurance programme for the elderly based on the 
fragmented system. The chairperson of the committee Niwa expressed the concerns 
about the full-scale integration and risk-structure adjustment plan, claiming these 
ideas would impair the autonomy of the health insurance societies and eventually 
ruin the social security system (Asahi Shimbun, 2002a).  
In November 2002, the working group in the LDP released its reform proposal, 
proposing the establishment of new independent health insurance for those aged over 
75. Although the medical professions also supported this plan for the elderly, they 
favoured a far more generous health insurance programme for the elderly than the 
LDP’s plan. The JMA called the government to increase the subsidy rate of the el-
derly’s insurance contributions to 90 percent in order to stabilise elderly people’s 
healthcare programme. It would guarantee more stable incomes to the doctors since 
elderly people could visit hospitals and clinics more often (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2002).  
At that moment, welfare bureaucrats took ambiguous stances on the reform of 
health insurance governance. Their main concern was to manage the financial prob-
lem of the municipal health insurance and to curb public subsidy for health care (Ito, 
2008). The manager of the Municipal Health Insurance Division in the MHLW said, 
“The independent elderly health insurance scheme and two-track programme would 
make the fiscal condition of municipal health insurance schemes much worse than 
the current system. Moreover, the two-track system is hardly acceptable since it con-
tradicts the principle of social solidarity too much (Kokuho Shinbun, 2001a).” 
Moreover, the health insurance programme for elderly people would result in the 
large-scale subsidies for them if the new programme minimised the cross-
subsidisation transfers. It would increase the subsidy by 10.8 trillion Yen by 2025, 
according to the outcome of the simulation conducted by the MHLW (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2002a).  
 
The 2002 MHLW proposal and 2003 Cabinet’s basic guideline  
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These two policy ideas raised by the LDP and Minister Sakaguchi were both in-
cluded in the 2002 MHLW proposals. In December 2002, the MHLW released the 
draft on health insurance reforms, including two plans. The first plan (plan A) adopt-
ed the ‘risk structural adjustment formula’, calling for the enlargement of the cross-
subsidisation among different health insurance programmes to adjust different enrol-
ees’ risk level in the age and income structure. It was similar to Minister Sakaguchi’s 
proposal and could attenuate the heavy burden of the elderly care on the CHI 
schemes. The plan B adopted the ‘creation of a new insurance scheme for those aged 
75 and over’, based on the LDP’s proposal. The late elderly would be separated from 
the previous system, focusing their high demands on medical service. Local govern-
ments would be in charge of the new health insurance for elderly people. Elderly 
people would bear more contributions than under the current system for equality of 
medical fees among different generations (Ikegami and Campbell, 2004, 30-1).  
The Kenporen was strongly objected to the risk adjustment plan, saying there 
was no room to negotiate on the plan. The risk-adjustment scheme was designed to 
transfer money from low-risk to high-risk group, as shown in Table 7.3. It would 
largely increase the amount of financial transfers from corporate to municipal health 
insurance programme. The Kenporen (2002:5) said that “The financial transfer for 
the elderly health care is out of control and it has brought the crisis of the health in-
surance system by undermining the self-governance. It makes no sense to increase 
the controversial cross-subsidisation in spite of this circumstance. We call to scrap 
the cross-subsidisation scheme.”  
 
Reform option  CHI SMHI 
Risk-adjustment scheme 
total - +300 billion Yen 
Per person - +11,000 Yen 
Independent health insurance  
for elderly people 
total +600 billion Yen +200 billion Yen 
Per person +17,000 Yen +9,000 Yen 
 
Table 7.3 Expected increasing burden incurred by health insurance reforms 
Source: Asahi Shimbun, 2002b 
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The government sought to find the common ground where all major stakehold-
ers could compromise (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2003). The government decided to com-
bine plans A and B in the 2002 MHLW draft. The cabinet made the decision on 
health insurance reforms, so-called the “Basic Direction on the Health Care Reform” 
in March 2003. New insurance schemes for the late elderly would be created and the 
risk adjustment system for those aged between 65 and 74 would be introduced. The 
compromise suggestion had some advantages compared to the initial proposals. It 
could make the balance of additional burdens among major actors. Moreover, this 
proposal could curb the increase in public expenditures for the elderly care through 
the transfer from the company-based health insurance programme to the elderly care.  
 
7.2.4. Reform outcomes 
 
The landslide victory in the 2005 general election following rejecting the bill to 
privatise the national postal service promoted the health insurance reform (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2005; Izumi, 2010, 76). The MHLW released a proposal, the “Structural 
Reform of the Healthcare” (Iryō seido kōzō kaikaku shian) in October 2005 (MHLW, 
2005b). In June 2006, the Diet passed a law which introduced new insurance 
schemes to cover people aged 75 or older. It was called the “Health Insurance 
Scheme for the Late Elderly” (Kōkikōreisha Iryōhoken). Firstly, the new health in-
surance programme for people aged 75 or older would be established, as shown in 
Figure 7.3. Elderly people would pay for some portion of their premiums, which 
would account for 10 percent of the total costs of the programme. Secondly, risk ad-
justment system for those aged between 65 and 74 would be introduced (See Izumi, 
2010, 62-4; Shimazaki, 2009, 5).  
Although the solidaristic health insurance reform was supported by municipal 
health insurance societies, the Health Minister, and some scholars, the reform was 
thwarted by the coalition between business, labour, and conservative politicians. In 
addition to the balance of power among policy coalitions, this issue had quite low 
salience among mass population. When a certain issue gained low political attention, 
it was much easier to defend the status quo (Cappoccia, 2016, 1112). The integration 
of health insurance was dealt only within health care policy community. Therefore, 
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institutional incumbents easily resisted the policy change by mobilising their voices 
in institutionalised policy arena.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 The structure of new health insurance for elderly people 
Note: Arrows in the figure mean the flow of financial Transfer 
Source: MHLW, 2008 
 
7.3. The DPJ’s failed reforms 
 
The late elderly health insurance programme started in April 2008. After the 
launch of the new health insurance programme, however, this programme backfired 
due to several serious problems such as administrational errors and high contribu-
tions. Although the LDP and the MHLW made minor revisions on the programme, 
the new insurance scheme was unpopular. In 2009, the newly-elected Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) government vowed to abolish this scheme and integrate all 
health insurance schemes at the prefectural level. The DPJ’s historical victory and 
expression of mass grievance on the new health insurance system opened the oppor-
tunities for another health insurance reform. 
 
7.3.1. Power transition in 2009 
 
Manifesto election in 2009 and the re-emergence of integration plan 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the leading opposition party at that time, 
swept to a landslide victory in the House of Representatives election held in August 
2009. The party gained overwhelming 308 seats among the 480-member House of 
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Representatives. The party took advantage of the growing discontent at the widened 
inequality stemming from the Koizumi reforms. The party presented its policies as 
clearly different from the LDP’s reform agenda. The DPJ coined the new slogan, 
“People’s Lives Come First”, by forming new party identity. The party campaign 
called for the expansion of welfare safety net in response to increasing unemploy-
ment and inequality (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010, 191). Several key interest groups 
such as the JMA and agricultural cooperative associations eschewed the endorsement 
of the LDP candidates and declared free vote in the general election in 2009. The 
JMA had been one of the major supporters for the LDP but the organisation was an-
noyed when the Koizumi administration cut the level of the national medical fee 
schedule twice to curb the increasing national health expenditures.  
The DPJ launched its manifesto for the 2009 general election, which focused on 
boosting social security funding. The party vowed to block the welfare budget cut 
suggested by the previous LDP government. Instead, the DPJ laid out the expansion 
of social welfare programmes. The party outlined its key demands; the reconstruc-
tion of the pension system including a minimum 70,000 Yen monthly pension, the 
provision of income supports for households in the agricultural sector, the removal 
of the high school fees, and the provision of increasing child allowance. In addition, 
the party said that these promises would be achieved without tax increase. 
In health care policy, the DPJ (2009, 18) vowed to abolish the new health insur-
ance scheme for the late elderly because it discriminated elderly people, bearing 
more burdens of medical services on them. Moreover, the DPJ's manifesto suggested 
gradually integrating all health insurance schemes. It was said in the manifesto that 
the inequality of benefits among diverse health insurance plans would be reduced. 
To rectify the inequality, the party proposed the integration of all health funds as a 
long-term goal. The health care reforms would be implemented in two stages. At the 
first stage, the government would scrap the special health insurance scheme for the 
late elderly and establish a transitional programme. At the next stage, the govern-
ment would implement the consolidation of all health funds at the prefecture level. 
 
Structural shifts in welfare policy under the DPJ government 
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The DPJ pursued equity in welfare policy in terms of age and gender. They 
pledged to introduce universal child benefit and strengthen the measures to support 
child care. The party also attempted to put more emphasis on activation such as in-
vestment in skill training. It has been often said that Japan was one of the most elder-
ly-oriented welfare states in comparative welfare state studies (Lynch, 2006, 8). 
Most of the benefits were concentrated on elderly people while the spending for 
mothers and children was under-developed. (Osawa, 2007). For instance, 69 percent 
of public welfare spending was devoted to elderly people in 2001 (Chopel et al, 2005, 
22). In addition, Japan had shown the strong features of “male-breadwinner welfare 
system”56, which was based on the idea of separate gender role that a man works 
full-time and a woman dedicates herself to housework. Under this system, the eligi-
bility of welfare benefits was usually connected to the long-term labour market par-
ticipation and contribution. Women were usually covered through derived rights 
from their husbands. Child care service remained substantially unpaid and performed 
inside home. It led to low female labour market participation because woman tended 
to exit labour market for child care (Häusermann, 2010).  
 
7.3.2. Labour’s position under the DPJ government 
 
Rengō’s call for welfare expansion and transformation 
 
Rengō exercised strong influences on the DPJ’s social and welfare policies as 
one of the party’s key interest groups. Under the DPJ government, Rengō called for a 
transformation of welfare policy. According to the “New Vision for Social Security 
in the 21st Century” (Rengō, 2011), there were three main proposals that would 
transform welfare policies. Firstly, it sought to change welfare policies from elderly 
people-oriented to the age-neutral social policy (Rengō, 2011, 13). Rengō blamed the 
current welfare system for being biased towards elderly people (Interview with an 
Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014). 
Instead, the organisation proposed to increase social spending for the working gener-
                                                          
56 According to Pascall (2010), “the male breadwinner model is an ideal of the family in which 
men earn a family wage and provision while wives do domestic labour and care for family 
members”. 
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ation, who would support elderly people by paying tax and social insurance contribu-
tions. Secondly, Rengō highlighted the transition from the “safety net for poor relief” 
towards “active policy for promoting work continuity” (Rengō, 2011, 12). The or-
ganisation stressed the social investments in education and skill training. Thirdly, it 
stressed the transition from the “state-led” towards “self-governed” welfare pro-
grammes (Rengō, 2011, 14). The unions proposed to establish the “Social Security 
Fund”, which labour, business, and other insurance subscribers would equally take 
part in with regards to the administration of social security programmes.  
As mentioned earlier, Rengō called for including non-regular workers as the 
beneficiaries of employees’ health insurance schemes. While the proportion of part-
time and temporary workers was on the rise, the social security system was not 
geared to coping with these new forms of employment. Most non-regular workers 
were not able to be enrolled in the social insurance programmes provided by their 
firms. For instance, 24 percent of the subscribers in the municipal health societies 
were non-regular workers who could not join the health societies in their companies 
in 2005 (MHLW, 2005a). Rengō claimed that those who worked more than 20 hours 
in a week would be the beneficiaries of the employment-based health insurance and 
pension programme.57 Furthermore, the organisation argued the proposal would re-
lieve the heavy burdens on municipal health insurance schemes (Rengō, 2010, 27-
30). The crisis of the municipal health insurance programme was partly caused by 
the increase in low-income non-regular workers. Although they were employees in 
company, they could not join the company-based health programme. If some part of 
the non-regular workers and their family members moved to the corporate health in-
surance schemes, the burdens on the municipal health insurance programme would 
be reduced (Interview with an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of 
Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014).  
In addition, Rengō called on the government to introduce the “taxpayer identifi-
cation number” to identify an individual for tax and social security system. The or-
ganisation claimed the underreporting of income was still widespread, mainly by the 
self-employed. This practice undermined the fairness of social security system. The 
tax payer number system could make tracking down of the income record much eas-
                                                          
57 With strong support from the DPJ lawmakers, a bill which expanded the coverage of the em-
ployment-based social insurance programmes was passed in 2012. 
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ier and thus it could contribute to enhance the transparency of taxation of the self-
employed (Rengō, 2010, 32).  
 
Rengō’s responses to the health insurance proposals  
 
Rengō was not satisfied with the special health insurance programme for the 
late elderly, which was implemented by the Koizumi administration. Firstly, it was 
not sustainable to introduce insurance only for elderly people since they were a fairly 
high risk group. Secondly, the financial transfer from company-based health insur-
ance schemes to elderly people health insurance was complicated. Thirdly, it may 
lower the quality of the elderly medical care. Lastly, all elderly people paid their 
premiums under the present system whereas elderly people who were dependents of 
company workers were exempted from payment under the previous system.  
Although the welfare policy orientations of the DPJ and Rengō were similar, the 
latter was opposed to the integration reform supported by the former. Rengō’s health 
care policies were still influenced by the corporate coalition with business. Accord-
ing to an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of Rengō, although Rengō 
collided with business on labour market reform issues after the Koizumi administra-
tion, we had maintained a cooperative relationship in the health care policy (Inter-
view with an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of Rengō, Tokyo, De-
cember 2014). Firstly, the organisation was still against the integration reform pro-
posed by the new ruling party. If all health insurance schemes were integrated into a 
single scheme, premiums of employees and employers would rise. The organisation 
mentioned that the integration plan was at odd with the goals to control the medi-
cal care expenditures and vitalise the role of insurance schemes (The Daily Yomiuri, 
2009).  
In addition, the decision to increase insurers’ roles in the health care policy un-
der the DPJ government bolstered the coalition between labour and business for the 
fragmented system. The company-based health insurance societies played more im-
portant roles in health promotion on their members than before. The company-based 
health insurance societies put forward the “Data Health Plan”, which prompted effi-
cient and effective health promotion activities of individual health insurance socie-
ties based on the analysis of related data. The employees’ health insurance societies 
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would collect and analyse their members’ medical reimbursement statements and 
diagnostic data. This information would be used to maintain insurance subscribers’ 
health condition. A trade union official mentioned company-based health societies 
do their best to streamline the health costs in the long-term perspectives through ac-
tivating the plan (Interview with an Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of 
Rengō, Tokyo, December 2014).  
The municipal health insurance, the late elderly health insurance, and the health 
insurance for the employees of small companies recorded massive deficits and thus 
they needed rise in contribution rates. Faced with the problems, the government 
chose to increase the burdens on the health insurance societies for the large corpora-
tions as new problem-solving practices in 2009. First, the government provided 
around 45 million Yen as special subsidy for municipal health insurance societies, 
which was 12,000 Yen per household. Second, the government increased the subsidy 
for health insurance for the employees of small and midsize companies. It was ex-
pected that the scheme had to increase the rate from 8.2% to 9.9% of members’ sala-
ries. However, the government increased the subsidy rates from 13% to 16.4% of 
their health expenditures instead of allowing rise in health insurance contributions. 
Third, the government increased the subsidy for health insurance for the late elderly 
health insurance to prevent steep rises in the contributions of elderly people. It was 
expected that the government had to increase the contribution rate by 14.2%. How-
ever, it only increased by 2.1% since the government paid the gap as special gov-
ernmental subsidy to stabilise the fiscal condition of the late elderly health insurance 
programme.  
In contrast, the government decided to put more burdens of health insurance 
costs in the health insurance societies of large corporations. Their burdens increased 
by 50 billion yen since the government made a change in the rule of the calculation 
of the cross-subsidy for the late elderly health insurance programme. The Diet re-
vised the National Health Insurance Act, which stipulated that the rule of cross-
subsidy for the late elderly health insurance would be based on total salary including 
bonus while the previous rule for cross-subsidy was based on subscribers’ basic sala-
ry.  
In response to the change in the rule of burden sharing, the actors in company–
based health insurance societies were strongly opposed to this measure, criticising it 
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for being unfair. As the government implemented this change, they thought that the 
government was more interested in the protection of the elderly and self-employed at 
the expense of salaried workers. These problem-solving practices strengthened the 
perception of the actors in company–based health insurance societies that solidaristic 
health insurance reforms would shift the fiscal responsibility of health care costs on-
to them. An official in Economic Policy Bureau of Keidanren mentioned that “mu-
nicipal health insurance societies in metropolitan areas have a large room to collect 
more contributions from the rich subscribers but they do not attempt. That is because 
they just rely on subsidies from the government and company-based societies. In this 
regard, it is quite unfair system” (Interview an officer in Economic Policy Bureau of 
Keidanren, 2014). An official in Head of Planning Department of Kenporen also 
mentioned that the government put more burdens on the company-based health soci-
eties in order to control the health care spending from the government (Interview 
with a Head of Planning Department in Kenporen, Tokyo, 2014). 
 
7.3.3 Political process and negotiations 
 
In September 2009, the DPJ and its two coalition partners, Social Democratic 
Party and People's New Party, signed the agreement to underpin their coalition gov-
ernment, which included the abolition of the special health insurance programme for 
the late elderly. The DPJ lawmakers were eager to scrap this programme built by the 
LDP. As people's dissatisfaction with this late elderly health insurance programme 
contributed to the DPJ’s victory, the removal of the plan was considered a symbolic 
action. They thought that it would bring a favourable public opinion about power 
transition. A senior DPJ member said that scrapping the scheme would be a litmus 
test of the policy credibility of the new government (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009). 
Health, Labour, and Welfare Minister Nagatsuma announced that the government 
would scrap this unpopular health scheme just after he took up his post.  
However, it was unclear which programme would replace the new health insur-
ance system (The Japan Times, 2009). Minister Nagatsuma decided to postpone the 
abolishment of the new health insurance programme for the late elderly until the end 
of 2010. He set up “the Council for the Reform of Health Care Services for the El-
derly” (Kōreisha Iryōseido Kaikaku Kaigi) in order to investigate new health insur-
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ance system. The health insurance reform under the new government was guided by 
the principles suggested by the Minister: abolishing the health insurance plan for the 
late elderly, creating a new insurance programme on the basis of wider regional inte-
gration, not dividing subscribers by their age, financially supporting the municipal 
health schemes, and not causing inequity in the health care system. 
 
Doctors’ proposal for integration 
 
After the political regime change, the JMA changed its position on the integra-
tion reform. The JMA (2010) released a report, “Medical Insurance System to Prom-
ise Peace of Mind” and proposed a step-by-step reform. In the first step, the govern-
ment would abolish the health insurance programme for the late elderly. The second 
step was to merge the CHI schemes at the prefectural level. At the same time, the 
government would integrate the scheme for public servants and one for employees in 
small firms. Third step was to merge all SMHI schemes. Lastly, all health plans 
would be integrated into a single body.  
There were some reasons why doctors turned to support for the consolidation of 
health insurance programmes. A linkage between the new president of the JMA and 
the DPJ contributed to the shift of its position on the integration reform, too (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2010a). In April 2010, the JMA elected Katsuyuki Haranaka as new presi-
dent, who backed up the party. He moved the organisation close to the ruling party 
on the health care policies. In addition, the serious financial crisis in municipal 
health insurance schemes led to a rise in the patients’ out-of-pocket payments. It was 
often said that there would be a negative relation between burdens on the patients 
and demands for the medical service. For instance, when the government increased 
the co-payment in the late 1990s and early 2000s, patients tended to refrain from vis-
iting medical institutes. 
 
Competing reform ideas in the Council  
 
In the Council for the Reform of Health Care Services for the Elderly, there 
were the four different ideas on the health insurance reform, which were similar to 
previous reform debates from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Firstly, Ikegami, Pro-
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fessor at Keio University, advocated the integration of all health insurance pro-
grammes at the prefectural level. He claimed that it could maintain equitable and 
universal coverage in response to the ageing society and changes in employment pat-
terns. Secondly, the president of the Kenporen Tsushima favoured the minor revision 
of the current system, supporting the independent health insurance for elderly people. 
He suggested expanding the boundary of beneficiaries for the elderly health insur-
ance programme from aged 75 to aged 65. Thirdly, the representative of Rengō in the 
council, Kojima, backed up the two-track system, calling for the special health insur-
ance for the retired workers who were enrolled in the employment-based health soci-
eties for more than 25 years. Lastly, Miyatake, Professor at the Mejiro University, 
proposed to integrate the elderly health insurance scheme into the municipal health 
insurance programme. As the special health insurance for the late elderly would be 
absorbed into the municipal health insurance schemes, this idea could bypass the 
ageism. The plan also maintained the divided health insurance system based on the 
occupations.  
The Council for the Reform of Health Care Services for the Elderly released an 
interim report calling for abolition of the health insurance for the advanced elderly 
based on the professor Miyatake’s idea. The prefectures would run the whole part of 
municipal health insurance plans, including elderly people. In contrast to his idea, 
however, the report suggested that elderly people who were employees or depend-
ents of employees could move into the corporate health insurance plans. The Elderly 
Health Care Reform Committee (2010) submitted the final report on the elderly 
health insurance reform in 2010. The basic structure of health insurance reform was 
same as the interim report (Shimazaki, 2011, 112).  
 
The comprehensive review of social welfare and tax system 
 
During the election campaign in the House of Councillors in 2010, the LDP 
proposed the increase in consumption tax. It was expected that the government social 
welfare spending would reach about 60 trillion Yen in 2025 (The Japan Times, 2011). 
Faced with the financial problem of the growing social security spending, some DPJ 
politicians considered the consumption tax hike. Especially, Prime Minister Kan 
took the lead in the discussion of the rise in consumption tax although it deviated 
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from the 2009 DPJ manifesto (Lee, 2012, 1). In response to the agenda on tax hike, 
the division within the new ruling party emerged. As the party pledged to improve 
social welfare benefits without additional taxation in the 2009 DPJ Manifesto, tax 
hike would undermine its political responsibility. Particularly, DPJ Secretary Gen-
eral Ozawa was strongly opposed to the consumption tax hike. 
These circumstances created issue linkages between social welfare reforms and 
tax hike, deterring the ruling party from submitting the health insurance bill in De-
cember 2010. The cabinet endorsed the “Outline of the Integrated Reform on the So-
cial Security and Tax” in February 2012. There was a political negotiation between 
competing groups on tax increase, which allowed the implementation of pension and 
health insurance reforms posted in the 2009 DPJ manifesto in exchange for approv-
ing the consumption tax hike.58 In April, the Diet began to review the outline of the 
integrated reform proposed by the DPJ. The government and the ruling party were 
planning to submit a bill to abolish the contentious health insurance scheme for el-
derly people in the Diet session. 
However, the LDP was strongly opposed to these moves which would scrap the 
elderly health insurance schemes. The party, which designed and implemented this 
health insurance schemes, claimed that the current system made a significant ad-
vance in the Japanese health insurance system and it should be maintained (The Dai-
ly Yomiuri, 2012a). The LDP said, if the DPJ simply returned to the previous health 
insurance system for the old, it would repeat the same problems. Moreover, interest 
groups such as Kenporen and Rengō strongly opposed the integration of the health 
insurance system.  
 
7.3.4 Reform outcomes  
 
As the ruling and opposition parties reached the gridlock on social security re-
forms, the review on the health insurance reform bill was also halted. The LDP at-
tempted to dissuade the ruling party from implementing the social welfare reforms 
presented in its manifesto. The LDP released a counter proposal on social security 
reforms in May 2012 and mentioned that the abandonment of these “radical” social 
                                                          
58 The pension reform included introducing a guaranteed minimum pension and the health 
insurance reform contained abolishing special health insurance for the elderly. 
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policy reforms was the precondition for final agreement on the consumption tax hike. 
The cooperation from opposition parties was indispensable for the DPJ because the 
ruling party lost the majority in the House of Councillors in 2010, which was the less 
powerful Upper House but a majority approval was still necessary for any bill to pass.  
Finally, the DPJ, the LDP, and New Komeito reached the basic agreement to 
pass several bills on the reforms of tax systems and social security on 15 June 2012. 
These three parties agreed to raise the consumption tax rate to 8 percent in April 
2014 and then to 10 percent in October 2015. Instead, the implementation of the con-
troversial proposals on welfare reforms such as abolishing the health insurance 
scheme for the late elderly and creating a minimum guaranteed pension would be 
dealt with in the “National Conference on Social Security”, which would be estab-
lished under the Prime Minister to discuss the whole social welfare reforms (The 
Daily Yomiuri, 2012b). 
However, some DPJ members were furious about the three parties’ agreement, 
which would break the crucial pledges in the manifesto of their party. The DPJ faced 
a huge internal revolt. 57 DPJ lawmakers voted against the bill for the rise in con-
sumption tax in the Lower House on June 26, 2012. 57 other ruling party lawmakers 
who were opposed to their party orientation split to form a new party after the pas-
sage of this bill. They criticised Prime Minister Noda for breaking the DPJ’s election 
manifesto and fundamental party identity. Based on the three parties’ agreement, the 
discussion on these reform agendas such as health insurance reform and pension re-
form moved into the “National Conference on Social Security”. However, the dis-
cussion on these reforms was halted after the collapse of the DPJ government. In 
December 2012, the DPJ fell from power as a result of the stunning landslide loss to 
the LDP and thus the health insurance reform led by the DPJ was totally stopped. 
As shown in this period, while the government partisanship can be important, it 
cannot explain the reform outcome. The DPJ government in Japan was a strong sup-
porter of the integration reform. However, it failed to obtain the supports from trade 
unions and mass population. In this regard, the integration reform ended up with 
failure due to strong opposition from the coalition for the fragmented system be-
tween business and labour. 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
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This chapter has analysed the political dynamics underlying the health insur-
ance reform in Japan between the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Japan had over 
3,000 public health insurance schemes, broadly divided into employment-based and 
residence-based programme. However, the ageing population and changes in work-
ing patterns had eroded the fiscal basis of municipal health insurance schemes. The 
residence-based health insurance schemes particularly had suffered a serious fiscal 
problem because they covered relatively lower-income and older people compared to 
the employment-based health insurance schemes. To solve the fiscal problem in the 
municipal health schemes, local governments and some scholars proposed the inte-
gration of all health insurance schemes. However, the idea was rejected by the stake-
holders of the employee health insurance programme. Labour and business built up a 
policy coalition for protecting the occupation-based health system.  
This chapter has presented how two crucial institutional features in Japanese 
health insurance system affected the path of health insurance reforms by shaping the 
main actors’ attitude and strategies. The first characteristic of unique aspects was the 
self-governance and workers’ participation in the management of the corporate 
health insurance schemes, which increased the political base, legitimacy, and effi-
ciency of the fragmented health insurance system. The second characteristic was the 
high political responsibility for the health insurance system. That was because mu-
nicipal health insurance schemes were directly run by the local governments. It also 
fostered specific problem-solving mechanisms through which the central government, 
local governments, and corporate health insurance fought for subsidy or cross-
subsidy.  
The ideas of labour unions and the network between labour and business were 
crucial in explaining the reform outcome by reshaping their interests and interpreting 
the meaning of a prevailing health insurance system. The strong network between 
labour and business had long existed in the health care policy. They attempted to 
protect the corporate actors’ interests in the health care system. The cooperative la-
bour movement in Japan also contributed to this coalition. The coalition thought a 
fragmented health insurance system as a tool to protect their common interests in the 
whole health care system. 
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Chapter 8 Comparative politics of health insurance reform in Ko-
rea and Japan 
 
Based on the findings in the previous two chapters, this chapter conducts a 
comparative analysis of the politics of the health care reform in Korea and Japan. 
Firstly, this chapter examines the different aspects of the health insurance reforms in 
these two countries. Secondly, this chapter examines main actors’ stances on the 
health insurance reform, investing how these positions shape various policy coali-
tions. This chapter specifies the different institutional practices and unions’ orienta-
tions in these two countries and then analyses how the interactions between distinct 
institutional practices and unions’ orientations had affected the divergence of the 
health care reforms in the two countries.  
 
8.1 Comparison of Korean and Japanese health insurance reform 
 
Korea and Japan had the fragmented health insurance systems, which were 
broadly divided into employment- and residence-based health insurance schemes. In 
these two countries, the ageing population and changes in working patterns had 
eroded the fiscal basis of municipal health insurance schemes. The residence-based 
health insurance programme particularly had suffered serious fiscal problems be-
cause it covered relatively lower-income and older people compared to the employ-
ment-based health insurance schemes. In addition to the fiscal difficulty, there was 
inequality among various occupational health societies. Contribution rates in em-
ployees in large corporations were substantially lower than others. To solve the prob-
lems, some of the actors in in the municipal health insurance schemes and scholars 
proposed the integration of all health insurance schemes. However, Korea and Japan 
chose the different reform paths. While the Japan government maintained its frag-
mented health insurance system, Korean counterpart implemented to integrate all 
health schemes into the not-for-profit National Health Insurance Corporation, which 
could be regarded as more solidaristic health insurance reform in terms of risk pool-
ing in health care finance.  
The integration of all health schemes was successfully implemented in South 
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Korea in the early 2000s. In the mid-1990s, labour sought to change its identity and 
orientation towards embracing social solidarity with other progressive groups. Kore-
an workers led by the KCTU formed a coalition with farmers and civil activists to 
challenge the current system. The trade unions, farmers, and civic movements estab-
lished the “Coalition for the Integration of the NHI”. As democratic labour move-
ment joined the forces for the health insurance reform, it could make the expansion 
of reformers’ political influences on the reform. The labour movement leaders un-
derscored the common interests between labour and farmers. The Korean trade un-
ions attempted to link the bargaining with employers at the company level into the 
health insurance reform at the national level. This organisation held social solidarity 
in terms of risk and income since the reform would create the ‘single-payer system’. 
When it comes to the risk pooling in health insurance finance, the unitary risk pool 
Korea adopted held the strongest solidarity than other systems since the revenues 
were placed in a single central pool that attempted to cover a set of public health care 
services. 
In Japan, by contrast, the reform was denied by the coalition between labour 
and business. Some proposed the consolidation of all health insurance schemes in 
Japan to sustain the universal health insurance and solve the fiscal problem in the 
municipal health schemes. The 1997 health insurance reform proposal made by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare partially accepted this idea. It suggested two options 
including the integration of all health funds and independent health scheme for the 
elderly. In the early 2000s, Health, Labour and Welfare minister Sakaguchi was also 
interested in the solidaristic health insurance reform. He proposed the extension of 
inter-fund transfers, which was regarded as a stepping stone for the consolidation of 
all health funds.  
However, this idea was rejected by the coalition between labour and business 
because these proposals would increase the burdens of employees and employers on 
health insurance contributions. They made a strong policy coalition to protect their 
corporate health insurance schemes and lobbied the government. In this regard, the 
Koizumi administration decided to protect the fragmented system favoured by corpo-
rate actors. The government decided to introduce new insurance scheme for people 
aged 75 years and older in 2005, maintaining the employment-based health insurance 
schemes. When it comes to the risk pooling in health insurance finance, Japan main-
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tained the ‘partially integrated risk pools.’ Although the institutional arrangement 
contained financial transfers among various risk pool to some extent, it had signifi-
cant limitation since it was based on the fragmented risk pool.  
 
8.2 Labour’s significant role in the health insurance reform 
 
In the health insurance reform in Korea and Japan, the positions of one political 
actor (labour) were significantly different. While business opposed and actors in-
volved in the municipal health insurance societies supported the health insurance re-
form in both countries, the attitudes of physicians were ambivalent in both countries. 
Although government partisanship and welfare orientation explains their positions 
on health insurance reform, the reform outcomes in Japan cannot be explained by 
this factor. It was labour’s identity and incentives that had crucial impact on the re-
form outcomes in these two countries. 
Firstly, business in the two countries was strongly opposed to the integration re-
form. This was because the reform would increase the burden of large corporations. 
When all health societies were merged, those who had high incomes and low risks 
would bear more contributions for those who had low incomes and high risks. In ad-
dition, the integration reform would get rid of the company-based health societies, 
which had strong relation with their companies. The company-based health societies 
provided exclusive benefits for their employees and they were regarded as one of the 
company-based welfare programmes.  
Secondly, actors who were involved in the municipal health insurance societies 
in the two countries were supportive of the integration of health insurance societies. 
The residence-based municipal health insurance societies in the two countries had 
suffered serious fiscal problem because they covered relatively lower-income and 
older people compared to the employment-based health insurance schemes. To rem-
edy the fiscal failure in these schemes, the integration of all health insurance 
schemes was proposed. The integration reform could solve the fiscal difficulty in 
municipal health insurance societies as well as enhance equity among various occu-
pational groups. The movement for health insurance consolidation was ignited by the 
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local governments and municipal health societies in Japan and it was led by the 
farmers in South Korea.  
Thirdly, physicians in both countries were largely indifferent to the integration 
reform, taking ambiguous stances (Jeong and Niki, 2012; Kwon and Reich, 2005, 
1016). In Korea, while they were supportive of the reform at the early stage, they 
turned to the opposition. In Japan, while they were supportive of the reform, they 
suggested the different reform idea at some points. More importantly, physicians in 
both countries were not committed to implementing the reform of health insurance 
governance since they were not directly affected by the outcomes of the integration 
reform. Instead, they focused on the negotiation on the fee schedule and the reforms 
on the payment system.  
Fourthly, governments in both countries changed their stances based on leaders’ 
ideas and partisanship of governments. The Korean government was opposed to in-
tegration reform between 1987 and 1997. Under the conservative governments, the 
Korean government was opposed to the integration reform. They were worried that 
the integration of all health schemes could increase the governmental subsidy for 
health insurance system. However, the government shifted its stance after Kim Dae-
jung won the presidential election in 1997. It supported the integration reform and 
built the special committee which handled the reform process.  
In Japan, the government took ambiguous stances at the first stage of the reform. 
Although the Ministry of Health and Welfare (The Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare later) was not a stanch supporter of the integration reform, the ministry did 
not exclude the integration reform from policy alternatives. The 1997 health insur-
ance reform proposal made by the Ministry of Health and Welfare partially accepted 
this idea. It suggested two options including the integration of all health funds and 
independent health scheme for the elderly. In the early 2000s, Health, Labour, and 
Welfare minister Sakaguchi proposed the solidaristic health insurance reform, too. 
He proposed the extension of inter-fund transfers, which was regarded as a stepping 
stone for the consolidation of all health funds. Moreover, the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) which proposed the integration of all health insurance societies during 
2009 became the supporter of the reform. The DPJ government was fully supportive 
of the integration reform based on its 2009 General Election Manifesto. However, 
while government partisanships look important in explaining the Korean case, it 
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cannot properly explain the reform outcome in the Japanese case. Although the DPJ 
government was a strong supporter of the integration reform, the reform trial ended 
up with failure due to strong opposition from the coalition for the fragmented system 
between business and labour.  
This leaves only labour as a political actor that might have affected reform out-
comes in different ways in Korea and Japan. In fact, labour in both countries took 
totally different stances. In Korea, trade unions shifted their attitudes towards the 
health insurance reform in the mid-1990s when they adopted more socially oriented 
unionism with the emergence of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). 
The Korean labour movements became “active supporters” for the integration of 
health insurance schemes. The union leaders stressed the importance of redistribu-
tion across different income groups through the consolidation of the health insurance 
system. To increase the political salience of the health insurance reform, the KCTU 
linked the health insurance reform into wage bargaining. The KCTU generated the 
new strategy that linked the health insurance integration into national wage bargain-
ing process, which was called “fight for social reform”. It expanded reformers’ polit-
ical influences and finally led to the integration of all health insurance schemes un-
der the Kim Dae-jung government.  
As mentioned Chapter 3, the Bismarckian health care system holds the tension 
between the ideas of solidarity and conservatism. In the mid-1990s, the union leaders 
in the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) stressed the redistribution and 
solidarity across different income groups rather than occupational differences. 
Though this transformation, the KCTU accepted the integration reform as its policy 
alternative in the health insurance reform. The “solidarity” among labour, farmers, 
and civil movements could break down occupational barriers among various social 
groups. This organisation held strong social solidarity in terms of risk and income 
since the reform would create the single-payer system, as mentioned above. 
In contrast, Japanese unions were not supportive of the consolidation of all 
health funds. The Japanese trade unions had incentives to maintain the separate sys-
tem. If all health insurance schemes were integrated, workers’ contributions would 
significantly increase and health care benefits for them would be reduced. In addition, 
the current system strengthened workers’ influence on health policy through the co-
administration of company-level health insurance schemes. Furthermore, Rengō at-
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tempted to fortify the demarcation between their members and the others, claiming 
that each health insurance association had to maintain membership for the coverage 
for those who have retired from the company, which was based on the prevailing 
fragmented insurance system. It would construct a more strongly divided system be-
tween employee-based and residence-based health insurance schemes penetrating all 
aged group. Labour in Japan embraced ‘conservatism’ rather than ‘social solidarity’, 
which meant that they sought to protect occupational barriers among various social 
groups. When it comes to the risk and income solidarity, the organisation wanted to 
reduce the sharing of risks and revenues with other groups. They stressed the self-
governance in the social insurance scheme. According to them, the boundary of an 
insurance scheme had to be limited to a similar occupational group since the health 
insurance schemes had to be organised by strong group identities and similar income 
structures.  
In this regard, this study has focused on the roles of labour which can dramati-
cally change their ideas and interests on health insurance policy through shifting un-
ion identity. Unions’ stances on the integration of health insurance schemes were 
quite crucial to account for the different reform outcomes in the two countries since 
they had shaped the different social coalitions underpinning the health insurance sys-
tems.  
 
8.3 Ideational and Institutional differences in Korea and Japan 
 
The different levels of solidarity in the labour movements and formations of 
policy coalitions in Korea and Japan would be explained by the process in which 
trade unions (re)interpreted their interests based on the interactions between ideas 
and institutional practices. Therefore, this section compares the ideational differ-
ences in the Korean and Japanese trade unions and the institutional differences in the 
Korean and Japanese health insurance system.  
 
Ideational orientation of trade unions  
 
The Korean trade unions made ideational shift towards social movement union-
ism while Japanese trade unions took more economic orientation. The Korean labour 
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movements adopted the militant position at the first stage of the reform. They were 
more concerned with members’ economic conditions and attempted to improve them 
by militant industrial actions. However, faced with serious threat from inside and 
outside, progressive labour unions led by the KCTU undercut narrow group identi-
ties and created a broad coalition in favour of egalitarian social policy. In the early 
1990s, the general strikes and other mobilisations ended up in failure due to not only 
the brutal government repression but also the cynical middle-class attitude towards 
the labour movements. Frustrated by the failed militant strategy, labour sought to 
change its identity embracing social reform and other progressive issues. The KCTU 
adopted a more socially conscious orientation in the mid-1990s, pursuing the wider 
public interest and proposed a closer partnership with civil movement. The fierce 
deabtes on unions’ orientation and dense networks between labour and reformers 
such as farmers and civic activists also was credited with the position change of la-
bour through intensive policy learning.  
In Japanese case, trade unions sought economic objectives. There was a trend of 
the pursuit of economic goals such as job security, increased wages and improved 
working conditions through collective bargaining. As Mouer (1989: 120) mentioned, 
Japanese “unions have shifted their attention from the distributive or egalitarian in-
terests of individual workers to administering personnel policies on behalf of man-
agement in the name of higher incomes and a larger pie for all workers”. Moreover, 
the Japanese labour movement was fairly keen on the insider-oriented economic 
struggles (Song, 2012, 416; Yun, 2008, 147). In addition, there were strong policy 
networks in health care policy domain between trade unions and big businesses. 
These policy networks were built up by cooperative business-labour relationship 
(Kume, 1998). This relationship has existed since the mid-1970s and it was mainly 
cultivated by export-oriented private sectors (Suzuki, 2007).  
 
Decision-making processes 
 
In Korea and Japan, the decision-making processes at the individual health in-
surance society level were entirely different. A health insurance society is responsi-
ble for its management and financial outcome and managers and insured people join 
the decision-making process together, called as “self-governance” principle (Giaimo, 
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2002). While Korean labour could not join the decision-making processes at their 
employment-based health schemes, Japanese counterpart could join the processes. 
The self-governance principle was rarely realised in Korea (Kwon and Reich, 2005, 
1006). Contrary to the official regulation that guaranteed equal participation between 
employers and employees, workers were hardly able to take part in the administra-
tion of their health insurance societies. Only 10 percent of corporate health insurance 
schemes allowed labour to join managerial meeting of their health insurance 
schemes and the other corporate insurance societies were operated solely by manag-
ers. In addition, most of the corporate health insurance societies allowed their man-
agers to use the reserved funds without the permission of the insured. 
Employees in Japan, by contrast, had taken part in the decision-making pro-
cesses at their employment-based health schemes. Two main bodies existed for deci-
sion making at company-based health insurance level; the Society Committee and 
the Board of Directors (Kenporen, 2014). In these bodies, employers and employees 
shared equal portion of the committee members and directors. Trade unions could be 
involved in important decisions such as budget, rule changes, and annual business 
plan as representative of the insured. In addition, they could take control of the re-
served funds in their corporate health insurance societies with employers.  
 
Problem-solving practices 
 
The second institutional difference in the health insurance systems between 
these two countries was the levels of political responsibility and commitments on the 
problem-solving mechanisms in the health insurance systems. In Korea, the govern-
ment showed weak commitments to back up financially distressed municipal health 
societies. Firstly, the number of subsidies for municipal health schemes was left to 
the discretion of the government. When municipal health schemes began in 1988, the 
government assured the insured that they would be significantly subsidised. Howev-
er, this promise was not strongly institutionalised in the 1988 Medical Insurance Act. 
The government had the discretion to manipulate the size of subsidy and, thus, it was 
subject to change depending on various political and economic circumstances (Kim, 
2012, 102). Secondly, a municipal health society had no legal relation with its local 
government, which was opposite to the Japanese regulation. As a consequence, a 
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municipal government did not need to put its budget into a health insurance society 
in its jurisdiction. Lastly, the municipal health insurance societies relied on a steep 
rise in contributions in response to the serious fiscal crisis and huge deficits (Federa-
tion of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, 1997, 570).  
The Japanese health insurance system, by contrast, showed high political re-
sponsibility. The municipal health insurance schemes have been directly run by local 
governments. The municipal governments have managed their local health insurance 
programs on the basis of the 1948 Citizen Health Insurance Act (Iwabuchi, 2013; 
Shimazaki, 2005). It had also fostered specific problem-solving mechanisms in 
which central government, local government, and corporate health insurance decided 
the rules of subsidy and cross-subsidy. Firstly, central government had provided 
around half of expenditures of municipal health insurance schemes with strong legal 
binding (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998). Secondly, municipal governments spent 
considerable amount of their budgets in general accounts in making up for the defi-
cits of their health insurance societies. Municipal governments spent around 10 per-
cent of their annual spending on balancing the budgets of their health insurance soci-
eties (Kokumin Kenkōhoken Chūōkai, 2012, 7). Third, risk-adjustment programmes 
transferred a significant proportion of financial resources from employment-based to 
residence-based health insurance societies. 
 
8.4 Interactions between ideational and institutional factors and reinterpre-
tations of institutional meanings 
 
This interaction between actors’ ideas and institutional practices in the health 
insurance system made political actors (re)interpret the meaning of the institution. 
When these orientations of trade unions in Korea and Japan interacted with specific 
institutional practices mentioned above, they led to the divergent political dynamics 
by making different interpretations and interests on the fragmented health insurance 
system.  
 
Interactions between union orientations and decision-making process 
 
The different decision-making processes in Korea and Japan mentioned above 
198 
 
had shaped and actors’ interests and interpretations on the health insurance system 
by interacting with unions’ ideational orientations. First, the different decision-
making processes in these countries affected to shape the ‘interests’ of trade unions. 
Korean trade unions had fewer institutional incentives to support the fragmented 
health insurance system than the Japanese counterpart. Although core members en-
joyed economic benefits from the fragmented insurance system, their organisational 
benefits from the fragmented insurance system were narrow due to the exclusion 
from the company-based health insurance schemes. It made them shift their stances 
on the health insurance reform in the mid-1990s much easier when the Korean la-
bour movements adopted social-movement orientation. They thought long-term or-
ganisational incentives would be larger than short-term economic interests if they 
joined forces on the health insurance reform.  
When the presence of self-governance in the health insurance societies interact-
ed with economic orientation of the labour movements in Japan, by contrast, this in-
teraction strengthened the perception that the current system could serve unions’ in-
terests. The priority of trade unions on health insurance policy was the economic 
benefits for their core members. In Japan, trade unions saw the health insurance sys-
tem as benefits for their members based on their labour market status. The fragment-
ed health insurance system provided health care benefits at low price and thus trade 
unions supported this system. In this background, trade unions had regarded corpo-
rate health insurance schemes as effective tools to protect their interests in health in-
surance policy. At the individual health society level, labour could have a huge in-
fluence on its administration through self-governance body. In addition to its promi-
nent role in health insurance administration, labour enjoyed official status in policy 
forum. The government consulted Rengō and Kenporen on major policy proposals 
and changes at the national level. The administrative role in managing the social in-
surance systems gave them an institutional channel to affect health insurance policies 
based on their own interests (Clegg and van Wijnbergen, 2011).  
The differences in the decision-making processes also fostered the different in-
terpretations of the fragmented health insurance system, which could affect the ‘le-
gitimacy’ of the prevailing system. The absence of self-governance principle in Ko-
rean had significantly undermined the legitimacy of a fragmented system. In the 
mid-1990s, labour began to criticise that the previous management of the health in-
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surance societies skewed towards business. More importantly, this feature reduced 
the meaning of an individual health insurance society to no more than a governmen-
tal body to collect contributions. The occupational divisions in the health insurance 
system had not special meaning. This perception of health insurance programmes 
helped the Korean labour movements change its position on health insurance reform 
after they adopted the social movement orientation. They thought company-based 
health insurance schemes were able to be merged into other schemes. .  
 In Japan, by contrast, the presence of self-governance led that people perceive 
a health insurance society as a substantial unit. A company-based health insurance 
scheme was recognised as a basic unit embedded in the long history of industrial re-
lation. The government and other major actors involved in health care domain re-
spected the tradition of the self-governed corporate health insurance schemes. The 
occupational divisions in the health insurance system had special meanings to sustain 
democratic governance and increase micro-efficiency in the Japanese health insur-
ance system. This perception strengthened the legitimacy of the fragmented health 
insurance system. In this background, Rengō effectively used the codetermination 
between managers and workers as a tool to protect their interests in health insurance 
policy. 
 
Interactions between union orientations and problem-solving practices 
 
The divergent problem-solving practices in Japan and Korea mentioned above 
made significant effects on the health insurance reform in two ways. First, these dif-
ferences led to contrasting interpretations on governmental responsibility for the 
health insurance system. When the low credibility of problem-solving practices were 
combined with social-movement orientation in the Korean labour movements, it 
made the change in the meaning of the fragmented health insurance system. When 
the universal public health insurance system is initiated, people have an expectation 
that their government holds responsibility to provide health care for all citizen. 
Based on this expectation, the notion of fairness in the universal public health insur-
ance system is created. However, when the actual governance of the insurance sys-
tem by their government collide with this expectation to large extend, people may 
delegitimise the institutional configuration. In these backgrounds, when the KCTU 
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embraced the social movement orientation, its leaders thought trade unions had to be 
involved in this issue to strengthen their political influence and moral grounds. 
While union leaders regarded the health insurance system as mere economic benefits 
for workers in the 1980s, it was seen as symbol of “social exclusion of the disadvan-
taged” and “malfunctioned social policy” stemmed from the irresponsible govern-
ment in the 1990s. They thought that their government was rarely concerned about 
less fortunate citizens’ welfare and failed to establish a fair and trustful health insur-
ance governance. They also shared the idea with farmers and civil activists that the 
integration reform was the only possible and fundamental solution in Korea because 
of weak commitments on financial aid for municipal health societies.  
In Japan, by contrast, the credible problem-solving practices interacted with 
economic orientation in the Japanese labour movements. This interaction fortified 
the notion that it did not need to adopt more solidaristic reform because the Japanese 
health insurance system had already established a systematic support for the fiscally 
distressed municipal health societies. Trade unions thought that the government pro-
vided significant protections for the municipal health insurance schemes and this 
well organised support for the municipal health societies provided the foundation for 
the self-governance of individual health insurance societies. In this regard, trade un-
ions stressed the financial responsibility for individual health insurance societies ra-
ther than social solidarity among a variety of the health insurance societies. Further-
more, they regarded the excessive amount of cross-subsidisation programme among 
various insurance schemes just as a tool which was geared to shift the health care 
costs onto them. 
Second, these problem-solving practices also created different political dynam-
ics of the reform in Korea and Japan, which affected the organisational incentives to 
take part in new policy coalitions. As mentioned above, the problem-solving practic-
es in Korea contradicted the rural residents’ expectations towards the universal 
health insurance system, which was based on the equity and government’s responsi-
bility. The mismatch between ideas underlying the public health insurance system 
and its weak institutional capability made the friction. The insured in the municipal 
health societies were outraged by the broken pledge to support their health insurance 
schemes. The farmers who were the main subscribers to the municipal health insur-
ance schemes became strong proponents of this reform. The massive mobilisation 
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based on rural areas raised public awareness of the health insurance reform. It pro-
vided the political opportunity to form an alliance between farmers and labour. 
When Korean trade unions called for solidarity with other civic groups, they had to 
find the critical issues to be involved. Due to the lack of organisational capability, 
they could not get involved in all social movement agendas. While Korean trade un-
ions raised a variety of the social reform agendas such as education, judicial process, 
and media related reform, their organisational capability was limited. Since there 
was high public awareness in the health insurance reform, trade unions chose to join 
this reform issue. In addition, when the KCTU mobilised their members in this issue, 
the organisation framed the health insurance reform as the most critical problem 
among the Korean social reforms based on these problem-solving practices. 
In Japan, by contrast, problem-solving practices did not make serious friction 
among mass population. Instead, municipal governments and managers in municipal 
health schemes became the strong advocates of the integration reform while the 
farmers were not active in this movement. This was because farmers obtained the 
significant level of protection on their health insurance schemes whereas local gov-
ernments in charge of their municipal health schemes put a lot of financial resources 
for them. In this regard, the debates on the health insurance merger in Japan were 
confined in the boundary of the health care policy community and public attention 
on the health insurance reform was fairly low. Rengō could not find organisational 
incentives to support the integration reform.   
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has compared the politics of the health insurance reform in Korea 
and Japan from the 1990s. This chapter has examined the main actors’ stances on the 
integration reform and identified that the positions of labour on the reform and dif-
ferent policy coalitions were crucial to account for the different reform outcomes in 
these two countries. This chapter has also compared institutional factors related to 
policy making and problem-solving mechanisms, and the identities and orientations 
of labour movements in the two countries. The interactions between these institu-
tional practices and workers’ ideas made the totally different cognitive and incentive 
mechanisms of labour movements in these two countries, which led to forming vari-
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ous policy coalitions for the health insurance reform and the diverging outcomes of 
health insurance reforms.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to analyse the question on why and how Korea chose to 
integrate all health insurance societies while Japan chose to keep its fragmented 
health insurance system. The health insurance systems in Korea and Japan were di-
vided on the basis of occupation and labour market status. In the 1990s, there were 
more than 400 different health insurance societies in Korea and more than 3,000 
health insurance societies in Japan. However, these two countries have taken fairly 
different reform paths on health insurance reform. Korea implemented the integra-
tion of all different health funds in the early 2000s. In contrast, Japan chose to keep 
its occupation-based health insurance system in the mid-2000s. This thesis has em-
phasised the role of labour and cross-class coalition in the health insurance reform in 
these two countries. This final chapter discusses this study’s theoretical contributions 
to the literature on institutional change and ideational shift. The chapter then consid-
ers the implications of this thesis’s findings for the solidarity in labour and welfare 
politics. 
 
9.1 Theoretical contributions  
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the political economy of institutional 
changes and preference formation processes, especially in relation to labour and wel-
fare politics. The first contribution is to the literature on institutional change. The 
thesis has demonstrated that some potential winner groups could form a coalition 
with the loser or reformer groups and achieve a policy change, by combining the mi-
cro and macro process. This thesis has explained institutional changes through inter-
actions between political actors’ ideas and institutional practices by bridging micro 
and macro foundations. At the micro-level, some institutional practices conflict with 
ideas embedded in the current health insurance system. This incongruence in the cur-
rent institutional practices provides the room for institutional change by giving rise 
to the mass mobilisation of disadvantaged groups from the existing institutional set-
ting. At the macro-level, the transformation of major political actors’ orientation can 
lead to their shifts in stances on the specific policy reforms by forming a broad cross-
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class coalition. Ideas act as cognitive filter through which actors perceive the envi-
ronment and their interests. In the ideational process, political actors reinterpret the 
meaning of institutions by reshaping their own preferences and perceptions about it, 
rather than simply repeating the same actions. This process of institutional changes is 
much more likely to successfully work when institutional conflicts provide micro-
foundations for them. Furthermore, when actors’ ideas on their broad orientation in-
teract with institutional incongruence, it could create the specific policy ideas which 
challenge the prevailing institution.  
Secondly, this study contributes to the debate on the roles of ideas in institu-
tional accounts. There are continued debates among scholars about the role and rela-
tive importance of ideas in institutional explanations (Berman, 1998). Traditional 
historical institutionalism has the structural-materialist core to analyse the origin, 
evolution, and transformation of institutions (Skocpol, 1995, 105; Thelen, 1999). 
Many sceptics argue that “ideas” are not independent but rather epiphenomenal to 
material factors (Hansen and King, 2001, 258). By contrast, other scholars argue that 
institutionally critical choices are shaped by the ideas actors have and debate with 
others (Béland and Cox, 2011, 12). By reconciling ideas and institutions, this study 
suggests that ideational and material analysis of institutions must be integrated in 
order to gain greater understanding of the complicated realities. This study shows 
how ideas exert their own influences on the mechanism of institutional change and 
interact with other contextual and institutional factors (Parsons, 2016). Actors make 
political actions through interpreting their world through specific ideational elements. 
At the same time, such interpretation which bring to an institutional change could 
happen when it was based on corresponding institutional configurations.  
Thirdly, this thesis explains the importance of the role of labour and cross-class 
coalitions in welfare reforms. Korean trade unions embraced the solidaristic health 
insurance system and it led to the success of the reform. In contrast, Japanese trade 
unions cultivated the cooperative relationship with business and attempted to pro-
tect their company-based health insurance schemes. This thesis has demonstrated 
that workers’ different stances on the health insurance system and cross-class coali-
tions for the welfare policy reform explain the crucial diversion of health insurance 
reforms in the two countries. In addition, this thesis develops the account for work-
ers’ attitude towards solidaristic welfare reforms. Worker’s solidaristic support for 
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welfare development cannot be taken for granted as the labour class is often divided 
when facing specific welfare issues (Nijhuis, 2009; Rueda, 2007). Actors can shape 
their preferences by re-interpreting the meaning of institutional arrangements. The 
shift in attitude towards the prevailing institutions can be explained by the interac-
tions between ideas and institutional arrangements and practices.  
Lastly, the thesis contributes to our understanding about East Asian welfare 
states by conducting a systematic comparative analysis. Most studies on the welfare 
system in this region understood the consolidation reform of health insurance pro-
gramme in Korea and its absence in Japan solely based on single case studies. For 
example, single case studies on the Korean health insurance reform have tended to 
regard the multi-payer system as a legacy of the authoritarian state. However, this is 
the case only in the Korean context. In addition, single case studies on the Japanese 
health insurance reform have tended to underestimate the non-providers’ roles, par-
ticularly business and labour, in the reform process. This thesis has shown how polit-
ical dynamics including labour and business as political actors could explain the spe-
cific aspects of the health insurance reforms in the two countries. 
 
9.2 Political implications 
 
This thesis’s empirical study of Korean and Japanese health insurance reforms 
could be extended into the trajectories of health insurance reforms in other countries. 
Firstly, solidaristic social policy reform could be possible even under neoliberal 
globalisation, as seen in South Korea. Labour’s position on the reform is fairly cru-
cial to explain reform outcomes, and workers’ positions on health insurance reforms 
are various depending on their conditions and ideas. Ironically, some trade unions 
have taken more solidaristic stances on social reform in the era of neo-liberalism 
since neoliberal reform faced with reducing their political power. For example, trade 
unions that attempted to revitalise their organisation in the US embraced the solidar-
istic health care reform and other social movements (Weir, 2006).  
Secondly, political activists and policy entrepreneurs could use multiple and 
ambiguous meanings of specific features in their health insurance system to chal-
lenge the previous one (Béland, 2009; Béland and Cox, 2016). This thesis has shown 
the institutional arrangements of public health insurance in South Korea and Japan 
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had various meanings and interpretations. In a similar way, the public health insur-
ance systems in the Continental European countries may have various goals and 
meanings as they contain social solidarity and occupational division at the same time. 
In this regard, policy entrepreneurs who want to challenge the status quo of institu-
tional arrangements may attempt to frame the relevant health insurance system in 
different meanings. In this regard, framing on policy reforms are also crucial to ex-
plain the outcome of health care and insurance reforms. For example, the Dekker 
Commission in the Netherlands diffused some crucial policy ideas such as ‘managed 
competition’ and ‘internal market’ to implement comprehensive health care reform. 
As also seen in Korea and Japan, political actors use policy ideas and framing on re-
lated ideas to persuade populations and various interest groups to support or oppose 
specific reform proposals (Van Kleef, 2012). 
 
9.3 Closing remarks 
 
After the 1990s, the health insurance system in Korea and Japan had struggle to 
cope with the fiscal problems and inequality among different occupational schemes. 
In response to these problems, two countries chose different reform paths in spite of 
certain similarities. This question is fairly intriguing due to the trade unions’ posi-
tions. Labour in these two countries had taken totally different stances on this issue. 
However, the most common explanatory approaches such as power resources, plural-
ism, and rigid institutionalism had difficulty in explaining the divergence. Particular-
ly, against social democratic assumption, this thesis has pointed out that labour’s 
support for solidaristic welfare programme was contingent on political contexts and 
their orientations. The thesis has found out the conditions under which trade unions 
in both countries shaped different policy interests. 
As the Korean experience has shown, the institutional shift is possible in a high-
ly path dependent policy area such as health insurance. The institutional arrange-
ments of welfare policy are not as resistant to reform as has often been suggested. 
The analysis of the political processes surrounding health insurance reforms corrobo-
rates the basic assumptions laid out in the theoretical framework about the underly-
ing institutional features and ideas in health politics.  
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Therefore, the adoption of certain reforms in the area of health care policy will 
be affected by the policy coalitions. As the Korean experience has shown, a broad 
cross-class alliance may be able to implement very comprehensive changes to the 
status quo of health insurance policy. By contrast, as the Japanese experience has 
shown, privileged groups could effectively block the reform. The privileged groups 
are committed to organising their political resources. In addition, they could invent 
policy discourses and logics which are used to defend the status quo. In addition, we 
can analyse complex interactions of numerous individual and corporate actors with 
specific capabilities, perceptions, and preferences under certain institutional setting. 
We must take into account the specific internal structures and ideational aspects of 
corporate actors in order to account for variations in their stances on health reforms. 
In these backgrounds, it remains to be seen whether these countries will also be able 
to implement reforms in health insurance policy to ensure the fiscal sustainability 
and social solidarity of their arrangements in the context of an ageing society at the 
same time. 
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<Appendix1> List of interviewees 
Japanese case 
Affiliation Place Date of  
Interview 
Assistant Director in Welfare Policy Division of Rengō Tokyo 9 December 
2014 
Economic Policy Bureau in Keidanren Tokyo 10 December 
2014 
Researcher in the “Welfare and Future Centre” Tokyo 12 December 
2014 
Executive of a Health Insurance Society in “A” Company Tokyo 15 December 
2014 
Head of Planning Department in Kenporen Tokyo 17 December 
2014 
Head of Health Centre in Machida City (Tokyo) Tokyo 19 January 
2015 
Physician  Tokyo 20 January 
2015 
Public Officer of Health Centre in Machida City, Nurse  Tokyo 22 January 
2015 
Public Officer, Municipal Health Insurance Division in Ku-
nitachi City (Tokyo) 
Tokyo 29 January 
2015 
 
South Korean case 
Affiliation Place Date of 
Interview 
Senior Director of Policy Division in the KCTU Seoul 23 April 
2015 
Senior Director of Strategy and Planning in Korea Health and 
Medical Workers’ Union 
Seoul 14 May 2015 
Deputy Director of Human Resources Department in National 
Health Insurance Corporation 
Seoul 27 May 2015 
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(Former a civil activist in “Solidarity for the Integration of the 
National Health Insurance”) 
Former Vice Chairperson of the KCTU Seoul 29 May 2015 
 
 
